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Abstract
The aim of this dissertation is to provide an analysis for those involved and
interested in the interdisciplinary study of logic, particularly Universal Logic.
While continuing to remain aware of the importance of the central issues of
logic, we hope that the factor of “culture” is also given serious consideration.
Universal Logic provides a general theory of logic to study the most general
and abstract properties of the various possible logics. As well as elucidating
the basic knowledge and necessary definitions, we would especially like to ad-
dress the problems of motivation concerning logical investigations in different
cultures.
First of all, I begin by considering Universal Logic as understood by Jean-
Yves Be´ziau, and examine the basic ideas underlying the Universal Logic
project. The basic approach, as originally employed by Universal Logicians,
is introduced, after which the relationship between algebras and logics at an
abstract level is discussed, i.e., Universal Algebra and Universal Logic. Sec-
ondly, I focus on a discussion of the “translation paradox”, which will enable
readers to become more familiar with the new subject of logical translation,
and subsequently comprehensively summarize its development in the litera-
ture. Besides helping readers to become more acquainted with the concept
of logical translation, the discussion here will also attempt to formulate a
new direction in support of logical pluralism as identified by Ruldof Carnap
(1934), JC Beall and Greg Restall (2005), respectively. Thirdly, I provide a
discussion of logical pluralism. Logical pluralism can be traced back to the
principle of tolerance raised by Ruldof Carnap (1934), and readers will gain
a comprehensive understanding of this concept from the discussion. More-
over, an attempt will be made to clarify the real and important issues in
the contemporary debate between pluralism and monism within the field of
logic in general. Fourthly, I study the phenomena of cultural-difference as
related to the geography of thought. Two general systems in the geogra-
1
2phy of thought are distinguished, which we here call thought-analytic and
thought-holistic. They are proposed to analyze and challenge the universality
assumption regarding cognitive processes. People from different cultures and
backgrounds have many differences in diverse areas, and these differences,
if taken for granted, have proven particularly problematic in understanding
logical thinking across cultures. Interestingly, the universality of cognitive
processes has been challenged, especially by Richard Nisbett’s research in cul-
tural psychology. With respect to these concepts, C-UniLog (appendix A)
can also be considered in relation to empirical evidence obtained by Richard
Nisbett et al. In the final stage of this dissertation, I will propose an in-
terpretation of the concept of logical translation, i.e., translations between
formal logical mode (as cognitive processes in the case of westerners) and
dialectical logical mode (as cognitive processes in the case of Asians). From
this, I will formulate a new interpretation of the principle of tolerance, as
well as of logical pluralism.
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Tarski’s account of the concept of logical consequence has gained great
importance in modern mathematics, and moreover has founded the role of
logic in scientific studies. Universal Logic as a general theory of logics is
the view that has followed the most rudimentary stage of Tarski’s notion for
logical consequence. The conceptual analysis of logic is what the Universal
Logic project is about.
There are many questions that one might ask about Tarski-oriented con-
tributions. One – perhaps the most obvious – is why one might suppose the
concepts of logical consequence to be mathematical. Another question one
might ask is why one might suppose Universal Logic, as a general theory of
logics, to be mathematical as well. Yet another question is that of how the
logical structures that Universal Logic discusses are mathematical. The short
answers might be that a Tarskian contribution is important not for its prac-
tical applications, but because a vast quantity of mathematical work assumes
that it is true. The aim of this dissertation is to provide not only a theoreti-
cal analysis but also application-oriented perspectives for those involved and
interested in the interdisciplinary study of logic.
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The very nature of Universal Logic is to provide a general theory of logic to
study the most general and abstract properties of the various possible logics.
Currently, it is anticipated that many logical researchers will again take an
interest in this project. The situation here might be illuminated by analogy
with Universal Algebra. Universal Algebra was originally proposed by an
interest in a rather precise but intuitive notion to provide a general theory of
algebras. Here the notion was that of a conceptually-oriented approach that
is closer to our everyday life than the axiomatic approach.
What this dissertation will discuss is the relation between the Universal
Logic project and certain core theoretical computer scientific and philosoph-
ical notions. The Universal Logic project follows some well-known notions of
abstract logic that have their widespread applications.
The first part of this dissertation focuses on such abstract logical in-
vestigations. The second part discusses logic translation investigations that
have closely followed the techniques adopted in abstract logic. The third
part presents logical pluralism, proposed by Rudolf Carnap in 1934 and J.
C. Beall and Greg Restall in 2000, respectively. The fourth part concerns
cross-cultural logic, a topic rarely considered in formal logic studies, which
we discuss in relation to psychology, anthropology, and in particular, modern
cognitive science.
1.1 Universal Logic
The meaning of the term Universal Logic is easily misunderstood as “a
logic” to unifiy all logics literally, however, this is disputed by Jean-Yves
Be´ziau and other pioneer universal logicians, who considered logic on a gen-
eral and abstract level. On the contrary, according to Universal Logic project,
the view that there is only one “universal” logic is not possible, claiming that
Universal Logic is a general theory of different logics .
In the 1920s, Tarski proposed his theory of consequence operator as a
very general theory of logical consequence (see [207], [208], [209], [210]), in
the 1930s, Gentzen’s sequent calculus considered a family of formal systems
sharing a certain style of inference and certain formal properties ([105]),
and in the 1970s, Roman Suszko (with Stephen Bloom and Donald Brown)
proposed a concept of abstract logic 〈A,〉 consisting of an algebra A and
a closure system  ([52], [53]). These three studies considered logics at a
general level. They attempted to see logics from a general point of view to
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discuss the properties, and relations that different logics should have. None
of these logicians said that “abstract logic” is the “universal” logic.
It has been explicitly elucidated that Universal Logic is a general theory
to study logical structures. The Universal Logic project we discuss follows
the same thinking of the three aforementioned studies by combining a general
bivaluation semantics with Gentzen’s sequent calculus in order to promote
“logic in general” to an even more abstract level. This means, once we
recognize which parts of different logics are universal and common, according
to the Universal Logic project, we can take them more or less directly to
specific logics by the tool kit it provides. Moreover, we could “build” a
specific logic of accounting specific situations and problems. (see [29], [31],
[34], [38], [39], [46]).
An example raised in [31], states that “the first proofs of completeness
for propositional classical logic give the idea that this theorem is depending
very much on classical features.” People mistakenly think the concept of
maximally consistent1 is to depend on classical negation when they study
the completeness theorem of classical logic. The fact, however, is “one can
present the completeness theorem for classical propositional logic in such a
way that the specific part of the proof is trivial.” (Ibid, p. 13). This means
showing maximal consistency in the proof is trivial. It does not depend on
the property of classical negation. It should belong to the universal parts of
different logics. In other words, the completeness should be generalized, that
is, it should not depend on any specific feature of any given logic.
The Universal Logic project discusses the distinction between what is
universal and what is specific for logics. Moreover, it attempts to build a
logic for specific problems, just as a doctor prescribes medicine or treatment
for an illness. Such a “utopia” provides us a new paradigm to revolutionize
the old-fashioned axiomatic approach in Logic (compare e.g. [32], [39]).
1.1.1 Philosophical Background of Universal Logic (I):
Bourbakism
Universal logicians are neither pure logicians nor pure philosophers and can
be regarded as “Philogicians”. Universal Logic is not considered as a logic
but provides a general theory of logics. On one hand, it can be viewed as
1A theory is a maximal by a consistent set of sentences, if it is consistent and none of
its proper extensions is consistent.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
philosophy-like in terms of a philosophy of logic. On the other hand, it can
be thought of as mathematical-like in relation to studies concerning mathe-
matical logic. This is a hybrid theory that includes both mathematical and
philosophical aspects where logical structures are considered as mathematical
structures within the spirit of Structuralism. This position is hardly a new
one, but the Universal Logic project has a profound proposal on the subject
as follows:
• The idea of Universal Logic says precisely that logic (logical structures)
are considered as mathematical structures. Universal Logic is to de-
velop a general theory of logics which is an analogy to the idea of
Universal Algebra.
Universal Algebra is a field of mathematics which is seen as a special branch
of Model Theory. Generally speaking, it deals with “structures having op-
erations”; specifically speaking, it studies “algebraic structures” themselves
instead of studying various specific examples or models of algebraic struc-
tures. For example, it takes “the theory of groups”, “the theory of rings”,
and “the theory of fields” as the objects of study instead of taking “particular
groups”, “particular rings”, and “particular fields” as the objects of study.
In other words, Universal Algebra studies the theory of algebraic structures,
and is a general theory of algebra. Similarly, Universal Logic claims to study
“the theory of logical structures”, and is a general theory of logics.2 Adopt-
ing the position of Bourbakism, the Universal Logic project proposed that
a logical structure is considered as type 〈S,⊢〉 where ⊢ is a consequence re-
lation on P(S) × S. Moreover, S is not specified and any one of the three
Bourbakian mother structures could be included in S. This basic conception
of logical structure with regard to Bourbakism plays an important role in the
Universal Logic Project.
Before proceeding, we mention the work of Bourbaki, which had the goal
of founding all of mathematics from the axiomatic point of view, and to en-
tirely reconstruct mathematics through the concept of structure. They strove
2Universal Algebra was founded by Garrett Birkhoff who aimed to provide a definition
of abstract algebra, which is “a set with operations,” in a very general manner and then
apply this to prove fundamental universal results ([48]). Similarly, Universal Logic is
concerned with providing a definition of abstract logic, which is “a set with consequence
operations,” in a very general manner and attempting to prove fundamental universal
results.
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for rigour and generality of mathematics and proposed the concept of fun-
damental mother structures, consisting of the notions of algebraic structures,
topological structures, and order structures. Furthermore, they considered
“cross-structures” by some crossing processes3. This stance is called Bour-
bakism (compare e.g. [32], [56], [67]).
Be´ziau and pioneer universal logicians claim to follow Bourbakian ideas
on fundamental mother structures, arguing that logical structures should, in
a Bourbakian sense, comprise the fourth mother structure ([32], [37], [45]).
This means the arbitrary logical structures should be considered as 〈S,⊢〉,
where S can be any of these three mother structures in Bourbakism. For
example, for algebraic structures, from the Universal Logic point of view,
this implies that algebraic structures have been put on S with implicit logical
structures. To remember the slogan, say, “Universal Logic is a general theory
of logic, which considered logics as mathematical structures.” It is to say, so
far, that the idea of “abstract logics” should be generalized much more to
serve as the fourth mother structure in Bourbakism and that it has been
considered as a mathematical structure.
1.1.2 Philosophical Background of Universal Logic (II):
Logical Structuralism
“Now what concerns us are not so much historical and soci-
ological considerations about the development of structuralism,
but rather the issue of the ultimate view of structuralism as un-
derlying mathematical structuralism and Universal Logic.” ([32],
p. 138)
The concept of structures is not only restricted to mathematical realms,
even if Bourbakism was deeply influenced by structuralism, which was
fashionable in 1960.4 It has been claimed that the Universal Logic project,
following Bourbakism, is seen as a sort of structuralism. Structuralism is
another philosophical background to the Universal Logic project. However,
3See also, [32], p. 137
4This history should be clarified much more but we ignore it without affecting our
discussion here. One citation sentence in [32], p. 138, is provided for readers: “The notion
of structure largely goes beyond the mathematical area, and Bourbaki said himself that
he was influenced by such linguists as Benveniste. During the sixties, ‘structuralism’ was
meant as a large movement that mainly occurred in human sciences.”
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we are not concerned with the merits or demerits of structuralism, nor will
we debate whether it was appropriate for the Universal Logic project to take
this position.
For the Universal Logic project, it is especially important considering
the logical structure, 〈S;⊢〉 in the Boubakian sense. We would like to call
this position as a sense of logical structuralism (structuralism in logic), if
we may. It is worth saying again that the logical structures are considered
as mathematical structures in the Universal Logic project, and this logical
structuralism is seen as mathematical structuralism in Bourbakian sense.
Specifying the term “logical structuralism” is technically and philosophically
useful in the context of studying the Universal Logic project. Here, logi-
cal structuralism is a certain version of Bourbakism, a sort of mathematical
structuralism in essence, since logical structures are considered as mathe-
matical structures within the spirit of Universal Logic project. It is useful to
notice the roles that logical structures play in mathematics. As we have men-
tioned, logical structures are claimed to be the fourth mother structure and
are seen as a generalization of abstract logics. Thus, universal logicians claim
the stance they hold as the Neo-Bourbakism (compare e.g. [32], [34]).
Another reason to specify the term “logical structuralism” is to avoid
the misunderstanding that Universal Logic is a part of Universal Algebra
(compare e.g. [31], [32], [34], [37], [45]). In the past, non-experts in this field
have mistakenly viewed Universal Logic to be a part of Universal Algebra.
The main reason for this misunderstanding is the development of algebraic
logic in the history of mathematical logic. The idea in algebraic logic is to
take algebras as models of logics, for example, Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra is
the model of classical propositional logic (CPL from now on) and Heyting
algebra for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL from now on) . Using the
term “logical structuralism” will draw attention to the fact that Universal
Logic, in essence, is different from Universal Algebra.5
1.2 Logic Translation
The immediate stimulus for this study comes from several ambiguous con-
cepts found in the analysis about the concept of sub-logic. In some rela-
tive discussions about the conceptual analysis of translation paradox, people
found the following situation paradoxical: given two logics, one is weaker
5A similar discussion occurs in ([45], pp. 130–133).
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than the other in the sense of proving everything the former proves, while at
the same time the stronger logic can be translatable to the weaker one ([41],
[127], [128], [129] [151] [177])
We present two logics: one is the classical logic LClassical with the well-
known semantic conditions for implication and negation; the other is LClassical/2
which is a logic with classical implication but with only the half part seman-
tic conditions of classical negation: given any truth-assignment such that if
ϕ is 1, then ¬ϕ is 0. We demonstrate the translation paradox in Be´ziau’s
case and exploit it to discuss the historical development of the translation of
logics between classical logic and intuitionistic logic. Historically speaking,
we see intuitionistic logic firstly appears as a sublogic of classical logic. By
intuition, this means intuitionistic logic, which is a sub-logic should be weaker
than classical logic. However, we will see that CPL can be translated into
IPL, indicating that IPL is, in a sense, stronger than CPL. It seems to be
that the meaning of sublogic and the strength of logics are not clear enough.
Many papers about the negative translation from classical to intuitionistic
logic have been written, since the proposal of double negation translation.
Over the last seventy years, there have been various discussions on this logic
translation, moreover the general concept of logic translation that has been
discussed pertains to the area of abstract model theory (see [104], [151]).
The other focus is this study is the survey and systematic development of
logic translation, begun from 1930, with respect to the study of general logic
originating from Alfred Tarski. Moreover, we would like to relate it to the
discussion about the deviance of logics that was proposed by Susan Haack
in 1974.
1.2.1 From Sub-logic to Logic Translation
Before proceeding to the discussion of logic translation, a conceptual analysis
on the notion of sub-logic should be given. There is a long tradition of
attempting to weaken classical logic, e.g. the development of intuitionistic
logic. Firstly, the sublogic relation is a sort of contained-relation of logics at
the deductive level. To say the logic L is a sublogic of L′ means that the
theorems of the former are a proper subset of the theorems of the latter, i.e.,
L is in a sense contained within L′. However, details about the inference
rules and axioms behind these logics should be specified individually. For
example, “is the principle of excluded middle accepted or not by these two
logics?” or “do two logics L,L′ own the same structure, e.g., (two-sorted)
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first-order structure?”
Studies on logic translation can be traced back to Andrey Nikolaevich Kol-
mogorov (1925), Valery Ivanovich Glivenko (1929), Gerhard Gentzen (1933),
and Kurt Go¨del (1933). “Translation” has generally played an important
role in the history of structural linguistics. According to structuralism,
the nature of an object is (relationally) determined by its own structure, that
is, its meaning is completely determined by its relationships with other ele-
ments within a linguistic system. Thus, for “translations” of two linguistic
systems, the following question is addressed:
• How can an object belonging to one structure be identical to an object
of another structure?”
Logic translation may accordingly be classified with respect to their concerns
on mathematical structures. Be´ziau [41] (p. 147), for instance, described the
following questions:
• How can an object in N = 〈N,+,×,≤〉 be identical to an object in
Z = 〈Z,+,×,≤〉?”
• How can an object in K = 〈K,¬,∧,∨,→,⊢〉 be identical to an object
in K = 〈K,¬,∧,→,⊢〉?”
To discuss Be´ziau’s case the translation paradox makes it easier to un-
derstand a more general and abstract logic by using the bivaluation approach.
It also helps us better understand what logic translation is, especially from
the abstract logical point of view. Logic translation is a relatively new realm
in logical society. Not only have new logical results been generated, but old
results and concepts have been re-examined by these translation methods in
recent years, for example, “proof methods” used in the “decidability prob-
lem”, originally raised by Michael O. Rabin (1965) ([186]); Dov Gabbay’s
considerations about “Translation of superintuitionistic logics into normal
extensions of S4” (2005) ([99]) and “accomplishing belief revision with AGM
postulates by translation” (1999) ([101]).
1.2.2 The Senses of Logic Translation
The question of “What is logic translation?” should first be addressed before
delving into greater depths. We are not concerned here with logic transla-
tion in the following sense, for example, CP L; CP L is a class of equivalent
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structures ([37], [151]). In this example, let us further clarify the question
“What is the logic translation of CPL?” In other words, this question seeks
the equivalent of the many possibilities of CPL structures. We list these
possibilities as follows:
1. CPL is a two-valued truth-table.
2. CPL is a Hilbert-type axiomatic system.
3. CPL is a Gentzen-type proof system.
Thus, we understand that the question should be further clarified: “What
is the logic translation of CPL-structures?” In other words, to “translate”
is to determine the equivalent relations between these CPL-structures. We
do not want to discuss translation in this sense. Hence, we need to elucidate
in which sense the term “logic translation” is employed in our discussions.
Here, we consider the following as our study of logic translation:
• The translation between classical logic and intuitionistic logic, dis-
cussed against the background of modern philosophy: philosophy of
mathematics and philosophy of logic.
• The translation between some deviant systems and extended systems of
logic, discussed against the background of modern philosophical logic.
In this study, we will discuss these two aspects as follows:
• We will present an in-depth discussion to elucidate logic translation
between classical logic and intuitionistic logic with the help of an ab-
stract example provided by Be´ziau that has been commonly named the
Be´ziau’s Translation Paradox ([127], [128]). Further, an in-depth
explanation of logic translation will be provided.
• We will describe two investigations on the general systematic research
of logic translation in modern mathematical logic. One is an inves-
tigation by Kolmogorov-Glivenko-Go¨del-Gentzen to Esptein-Wo´jcicki,
which focuses on the consequence relation ⊢ (KGGG-EW). The other
is an investigation by Bloom-Brown-Suszko to Brazilian logical group-
Esptein-Wo´jcicki that focuses on the consequence operator Cn (BBS-
BEW).
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1.3 Pluralism in Logic
Only later, when I became acquainted with the entirely different
language forms of Principia Mathematica, the modal logic of C. I.
Lewis, the intuitionistic logic of Brouwer and Heyting, and the type-
less systems of Quine and others, did I recognise the infinite variety
of possible language forms. On the one hand, I became aware of the
problems connected with the finding of language forms suitable for
given purposes; on the other hand, I gained the insight that one can-
not speak of ”the correct language form”, because various forms have
different advantages in different respects. The latter insight led me to
the principle of tolerance.
(Rudolf Carnap, Intellectual Autobiography, p. 68, (1963))
Where is logic heading today? There is a general feeling that the
discipline is broadening its scope and agenda beyond classical founda-
tional issues, and maybe even a concern that, like Stephen Leacock’s
famous horseman, it is ‘riding off madly in all directions’. So, what
is the resultant vector? There seem to be two broad answers in cir-
culation today. One is logical pluralism, locating the new scope of
logic in charting a wide variety of reasoning styles, often marked by
non-classical structural rules of inference. This is the new program
that I subscribed to in my work on sub-structural logics around 1990,
and it is a powerful movement today.
(Johan van Benthem, Logical dynamics meets logical pluralism? p.
182 (2008))
Traditionally, there was only one—the logic of Aristotle and the
Stoics, as melded together in the Middle Ages–and the question never
arose. This century, we have seen a plethora of logics: Frege/Russell
(classical) logic, intuitionism, paraconsistent logic, quantum logic. Usu-
ally, the advocates of these logics were still logical monists, in the sense
that they took it that other logics were wrong.
(Graham Priest, Doubt truth to be a liar p. 194 (2006))
Traditionally, human reasoning investigations have been pursued mainly
in disciplines related to logics performed by the singularity of one true logic.
Classical logic can be thought of as the common agreements among the tra-
ditional perspective of philosophy. Just as in the fields of philosophical logic
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(non-classical logic), however, the birth of modal logics and non-monotonic
logics first raises a huge change of formal logics with different philosophical
considerations and varying expressive capabilities. This study is a fundamen-
tal investigation into various logic translations, including the Go¨del-Gentzen
negative translation and the onto-logical translation graph ([150]). However,
this is not about defending and endorsing any sense of “logical pluralism”
but to propose that logical pluralism could be the foundation or the basic
spirit for various logic translation investigations. Here, we outline the gen-
eral methodology for Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism (BRLP) and
what they have achieved in their version of pluralism. It rests on three main
principles: firstly, they formulate a pre-theoretic notion of logical consequence
as the General Tarskian Thesis (GTT); secondly, they specify different cases
for the pre-theoretical logical consequence; thirdly, they structure a model
to unify three cases that they think are “equally good” in a coherent way to
justify the plurality of logical consequences.
Of the various definitions of “pluralism”, we present the intuition given
in the history of philosophy, like Leibniz’s philosophy of mind, in which a
monism was always proposed as the opposition of pluralism and vice versa
in some traditional theoretical topics.
Similarly, the idea of pluralism in logic has been formulated since the
principle of tolerance proposed by Rudolf Carnap. In the same spirit, plu-
rality in logic refers to the increasing plurality of logical systems presented
in the second half of the 20th century. However, at the end of 20th century,
Beall and Restall defended another version of pluralism in logic ([10], [14]).
This trend has been widespread in the whole logic society and moreover chal-
lenges the old notions on the human intelligence investigations, even directly
affecting some interesting research in computer science in applications ([137],
[150]).
The often cited definition of the term “pluralism” in academia is not fully
captured by BRLP. We will discuss this in detail and relate it to what we
believe are the more important aspects of plurality with respect to human
reasoning with cognitive differences.
We will argue that BRLP, being precise enough, should have a specific
role in modern logic investigations, in particular concerning the coherence ex-
emplification of the general concept of logical consequences. It is a concern
that the “tolerance” and “equality of goodness” usually adopted in plural-
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ism is not evident in BRLP.6 Nevertheless, BRLP partially captures certain
perspectives of the term “pluralism” as follows:
1. BRLP begins with an analysis of the disambiguations of the notion of
logical consequence and claims that logical consequence possesses a sim-
ple structure: “a conclusion is a logical consequence of some premises
if and only if that conclusion is true in every circumstance in which the
premises are true.” ([193], p. 427)
2. BRLP claims that there are three extensions of the term “circum-
stance”: worlds, constructions, and situations that separately generate
classical, intuitionistic, and relevant logical consequences, respectively.
Further, these three logical consequences are equally good.
3. BRLP does not provide different accounts for logical consequence; how-
ever, it does provide an irreducible plurality of the notion of logical
consequence in applications.
We present a more philosophical and foundational summary in this study
and explicate in particular what we mean by the term the pluralism in logic.
In the first half of this study, we will sketch BRLP; in the second half, we will
discuss the scope of monism in relation to BRLP to present three versions of
logical monism with respect to BRLP.
In order to relate the issues to the aspects of universality in human reason-
ing and cognitive processes, we will formulate a possible revision for pluralism
in logic: the cognitive processes mergence pluralism in a boarder sense.
We begin this dogma by taking logic as the cognitive process. A fundamental
distinction which was understood as the cross-cultural psychological, cultural
6We see political pluralism and value pluralism in the practical philosophy
“Political pluralism usually starts with the observation that there are dif-
ferent value systems in use in the world, and there are various positions that
arise out of observation. Political pluralism is concerned with the question
of what sort of restrictions governments can put on people’s freedom to act
according to their value systems. The strongest version of political pluralism
claims that all these value systems are equally true (and thus presumably all
ought to be tolerated), a weaker view is that these value systems all ought
to be tolerated, and probably the most common version of the view is that
some of these systems (the reasonable ones) ought to be tolerated. ”
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy–Value Pluralism)([185])
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psychology, and cognitive scientific perspectives was introduced by Richard
Nisbett et al. in [156], [157], [158]. The assumption of treating “logic as cog-
nitive process” should first be kept in mind. After building a background of
empirical results in cultural psychology, we will propose a revision of plural-
ism in logic. Using this assumption, we will present a cognitive processes
mergence pluralism in an interdisciplinary manner.
1.4 The Geography of Thought
So far we have discussed two projects, both reasonable, for accepting the gen-
eralized Tarski’s account of logical consequence: the Universal Logic project
and BRLP.7 The first is a conflation of the mathematical perspective of logical
structures. Universal Logic is to logic what Universal Algebra is to algebra.
It is perfectly obvious when an adequate formulation of the conception of
logic is taken, it can yield fresh viewpoints on general logic by revisiting
modern logic investigations, such as Be´ziau’s proposal of arbitrary logical
structure with bivaluation semantics and the notion of institutions that
was introduced by Goguen and Burstall in the late 1970 (compare e.g. [111],
[112], [113]), moreover it can be widely applied to various computer scientific
application domains and foundational domains (e.g. [137], [150]). The second
is the philosophical perspective of logical structure that has plural instanti-
ations of the General Tarski Thesis (GTT). Logical pluralism, not restricted
to BRLP, has played a role in general logic studies in modern logical society.
This study goes beyond merely adopting different positions. We introduce
the cultural psychology perspective to Universal Logic, in an interdisciplinary
manner. The same term embodies significant meaning on the principle of
tolerance in logical pluralism and stems from the assumption of taking logic
as cognitive process and the permissible differences of different cultures.
In this introduction, we have presented an integrated account of the con-
tributions of these works. These works on concepts and advocacy of Universal
7We borrow the expression ‘Geography of Thought’ from a book with the same ti-
tle: The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently...and
Why([156]). This book is written by the famous social psychologist Richard Nisbett who
is working globally on many cutting edge studies about reasoning and cultural-difference.
After participating in the second world conference on Universal Logic in Xi-an, China, I
came to understand that a completely different notion of Universal Logic had been devel-
oped in Mainland China in the late 1990s. Reading this book inspired me to reflect on
the underlying reasons for formulating this Chinese universal logic system.
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Logic concern the nature and ambitions of the Universal Logic project, and
we believe they are sufficient to shed interesting light on the idea of the
Universal Logic project and the kind of logical investigations it requires and
supports. The Universal Logic project reflects various aspects of logic and
extends interpretations in some philosophical logics. In detail, the following
aspects have been studied:
• Logic as Mathematical Structure
• Logic as Algebra
• Logic as Cognitive Processing
Our discussions in this dissertation are of fundamental value not only within
the Universal Logic movement, but also to the more exact consideration of
the concept of logic. Specifically, this thesis:
1. discusses the joint contributions of two influential programs, Universal
Logic project and logical pluralism, by discussing logic translation.
2. clarifies and discusses distinct notions of logic translation.
3. specifies and discusses the role that non-western logic could play in
logic, by introducing the psychologism viewpoint.
4. provides new insights into the meaning of logic translation by consider-
ing the modification of cognitive processes in cultural-psychobiological
perspectives by providing new insights into the principle of tolerance
and logical pluralism.
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2.1 Introduction
“Logica Universalis (or Universal Logic, Logique Universelle,
Universelle Logik, in vernacular languages) is not a new logic,
but a general theory of logics, considered as mathematical struc-
tures.” ([31] p. vii)
This chapter addresses a comprehensive discussion on the Universal Logic
project. We describe the main features of the Universal Logic project: its
connection with Bourbakian structuralism and Universal Algebra. The main
point that we will emphasize is that Universal Logic as understood by Be´ziau
is not one absolute system of logic. Universal Logic, we are told, is not itself
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a special logic, but a general theory of investigating whatever should be
common to all putatively distinct logics.
One of the main results of the Universal Logic project is to combine a
general bivaluation semantics with Gentzen’s sequent calculus in order to
promote the idea of abstract logic which has played an important role in the
development of modern logic to an even more general level. According to the
Universal Logic project,the universal and common parts of various logics are
able to be clarified, and moreover be taken more or less directly to specific
logics that depend on certain situations or certain problems.
In this chapter, firstly, we discuss the development of Universal Logic,
in particular the influences of algebraic logic and Bourbakism. Secondly, we
elaborate the main techniques that people usually implement in the Universal
Logic project. As a result of the Universal Logic project, while we prove the
completeness of a given logic, the maximal consistency , which is traditionally
considered to depend on specific features, should be attributed to the univer-
sal parts of logic instead of taking it as the specific parts of various specific
logics. For example, dependence on the features of classical negation in the
proof of classical logic completeness is trivial. Moreover, we distinguish that
it is a conceptual mistake to claim the logically many-valued semantics by
Suszko’s Thesis. “Many-valuednesss” should actually be attributed to alge-
braic values instead of logical values. The logic two-valuedness also has to
be classified as the common part of various logics, which does not depend on
the specific characteristics of individual logics.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In section 2.2, we start our
discussion on the relationship between algebra and logic, moreover to the rela-
tionship between Universal Logic and Universal Algebra moving through the
influence of the development of algebraic logic. Section 2.3 then discusses the
conceptual approach and Neo-Bourbakism that the Universal Logic project
is attempting to take. In section 2.4, we provide a discussion on the strate-
gies and techniques in the Universal Logic project, followed by a discussion
on the idea of logical many-valuedness being a misleading notion.
2.2 Algebraic Structures and Universal Logic
“Universal Logic is about to expand naturally and will plau-
sibly become soon the mainstream in logic in a short time, sup-
planting “formal logic”, “symbolic logic”, or “mathematical logic”.
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It helps logic and logicians to be again meaningful.” ([32], p. 148)
In the introduction, we discussed the motivations for the Universal Logic
project: while analogizing to the Universal Algebra, being a s,general theory
of algebra Universal Logic is a general of logics . However, there is also a
more fundamental motivation for the Universal Logic project, namely the
nature of logical structures is not captured fully by algebra but instead, it
depends on a rapidly changing array of application domains to which modern
logicians and computer scientists are devoted, although various techniques
in algebraic logic are still predominant in current computer scientific ap-
plications (e.g. [24], [66], [80], [134], [152]). To trace the development of
mathematical logic to algebraic logic, Universal Logic which adopts various
techniques in algebraic logic such as logical matrices (compare e.g. [31], [36]
[213], [221]) is always misunderstood as a part of Universal Algebra. It gains
importance when considering the suitable status of Universal Logic to avoid
being understood as a part of Universal Algebra. To remember the philo-
sophical background of Universal Logic, let us say algebras could be put into
the logical structure in the sense of Universal Logic.1 The concept of the
reduction relation between algebra structures and logical structures, in this
way, would always be a concern.
2.2.1 The Relationship between Logic and Algebra
Algebra and logic are invariably considered together in the literature, whether
this is in terms of the Algebra of Logic ([54], [55], Boole), Algebraic
Logic ([51], Blok and Pigozzi), or Abstract Algebra Logic (AAL)([82],
[83], Font and Jansana).2 A series of clarification has been made for the
relation between logic and algebra (see [31], [32], [35], [37]). The reduction
relation between algebra and logic and the concept of algebraizability are two
important concepts we try to clarify. First of all, we exploit the concept of
reduction between logic and algebra in order to realize the background, and
to discuss that Universal Logic is not a part of Universal Algebra. Yet the
1This does not imply that logic should be viewed as algebraic structures, that is, logical
structures are algebraic structures. What we see here is to algebraically instantiate logic.
2The complex history relating to these concepts will, however, not be discussed here.
Readers interested in this should consult the references already cited. However, the influ-
ence of Abstract Logic and Abstract Algebra Logic on Universal Logic will be discussed
later.
22 CHAPTER 2. ON UNIVERSAL LOGIC
Bourbakism that the Universal Logic project has already taken will also pro-
vide a reason for us to see the relation between algebra and logic. According
to Universal Logic, logical structures are considered mathematical structures,
and should be considered in a more general sense than Tarski and Suszko did
previously, crossing with three mother structures in Bourbakian sense. In
this way, there is no reason to say that “logic as structure” implies “logic as
algebra,” and there is also no reason to support the claim that “considering
logical structures” is the same as “considering algebraic structures”; further-
more, there is no reason to regard an “abstract logical structure” as a kind
of “abstract algebraic structure,” of which the definition is satisfied with a
set of operations from a more abstract “Universal Algebra” point of view. In
fact, these concepts only appear to be similar.
We will not spend time discussing the history of the study of the relation-
ship between algebra and logic by George Boole (1815-64), namely Boolean
algebra or algebra of logic. Alternatively, we ask readers not to forget their
knowledge about Universal Logic they have so far acquired, but to return to
a conceptual analysis of the term, “algebraic logic”. We believe the discus-
sions below will help readers clarify various possibilities for using this term,
and moreover will shed light on the attitude universal logicians should have
in the future when they face the term “algebraic logic”. Hence, we conclude
that logic should not be a part of algebra, moreover we can understand the
concept of algebraizability by means of several famous examples.
First of all, Be´ziau analyzes the term “algebraic logic” in ([34], p. 11) as
follows:
“Algebraic logic is an ambiguous expression which can mean
several things. One could think that it is crystal clear and that
algebraic logic means the study of logic from an algebraic point
of view. But this is itself ambiguous, because this in turn means
two things: (1) the study of logic using algebraic tools: (2) log-
ics considered as algebraic structures. (2) implies (1) but not
necessarily the converse.”
It has become a common position that universal logicians strongly argue
against the notion of a reduction of logic to algebra, for the simple and
basic reason that algebraic structures are different from logical structures.
From the universal logical perspective, algebra is simple one of the options
that can be included into the logical structure, with “topology” and “order”
being other options. Thus, if logical structures are considered in the sense
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of the Universal Logic project, people who hold the idea of reducing logic to
algebra should not think of logical structures as only reducible to algebraic
structures but also reducible to “topological” or “order” ones.
As we have stated, in the Universal Logic project, logical structures are
independent from the three mother structures in a Bourbakian sense. In fact,
it is hard to find an explicit statement that proposes the reduction between
logic and algebra. The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra (or Lindenbaum alge-
bra) of a logical theory seems to provide a more robust claim for a reduction
relationship between algebra and logic. In order not to lose readers with
little background in algebraic logic, we first explain the approach used in
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra before continuing our discussion.
Intuitively speaking, the approach the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra takes
firstly is to factorize the propositional language to a certain structure, that
is, to be a Boolean algebraic structure (or Boolean algebra for short). This
structure is an algebraic structure, and is called Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra.
In other words, it is a way to factorize to obtain a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
of a propositional language. See the following definition.
Definition 1. Let PROP be a classical propositional language. We define
the equivalence relation ∼ over formulas F of PROP , by x and y are equiv-
alent, when x → y and y → x are theorems (or equivalently x ↔ y is a
theorem), denoted as x ∼ y if and only if ⊢ x → y and ⊢ y → x (or equiva-
lently ⊢ x↔ y), for any two formulas x, y. Given a theory Γ of PROP , the
relation ∼Γ is also an equivalence relation of the algebra of the formulas F ,
where ∼Γ is defined by x ∼Γ y iff Γ ⊢ x↔ y. The quotient algebra F/ ∼Γ is
the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra , which is determined by Γ.
Let B = PROP/ ∼ be the set of equivalence classes. We define the
operations ∨B, ∧B, and complementation of ∗ on B as follows:
1. [x] ∨B [y] = [x ∨ y]
2. [x] ∧B [y] = [x ∧ y]
3. [x]∗ = [¬x]
We define 0B = [x ∧ ¬x] and 1B = [x ∨ ¬x]. Then the structure
〈B,∨B,∧B, ∗, 0B, 1B〉
which satisfies axioms (1)-(6), is a Boolean algebra, called the Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebra of the propositional language.
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(1) ∀x∀y(x ∧B y = y ∧B x), ∀x∀y(x ∨B y = y ∨B x) (Commutativity)
(2) ∀x∀y∀z[x ∧B (y ∧B z) = (x ∧B y) ∧B z], ∀x∀y∀z[x ∨B (y ∨B z) = (x ∨B
y) ∧B z] (Associativity)
(3) ∀x∀y[(x ∧B y) ∨B y = y], ∀x∀y[(x ∨B y) ∧B y = y] (Absorption)
(4) ∀x∀y∀z[x ∧B (y ∨B z) = (x ∧B y) ∨B (x ∧B z)],
∀x∀y∀z[x ∨B (y ∧B z) = (x ∨B y) ∧B (x ∨B z)] (Distributivity)
(5) ∀x(x ∧B x
∗ = 0B), ∀x(x ∨B x
∗ = 1B) (Complements)
Note here that the Lindenbaum-Tarski approach means “the method”
used in algebraization of logical systems, e.g. classical propositional logic in
this case. It could be further extended to study the algebraization of first-
order logic, called cylindric algebra. Similarly, by this method, IPL has
an algebraization of Heyting algebras.
2.2.2 Three Traditions in Algebraic Logic
The previous discussions will directly lead to the following questions:
• Does it mean “logic is reducible to algebra?”
• Or, does it simply mean “logic is algebraizable?”
The Lindenbaum-Tarski approach is a typical example of this type of relation.
As in [50], there are many forerunners to the development of algebraic logic
which may have had an effect on this reduction relation.
“Algebraic methods have played an important role in the de-
velopment of logic. Indeed, it may be argued that modern logic
began with the algebraic work of Boole and De Morgan. Their
line of investigation was continued by Peirce and Schro¨der in the
latter half of the 19th century, and was taken up again later by
Tarski. This work constitutes the first of three distinct traditions
that can be traced in the history of algebraic logic.” ([50], p. 365)
There are three distinct traditions in the development of taking algebraic
methods to develop logic: the Boolean tradition, the logistic tradition, and
the model-theoretic tradition. We explain each as follows:
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• To the extent that Boolean tradition is concerned with calculus re-
garding the truth value of propositions (truth and falsity) by way of
the operations of logical connectives ∨, ∧, ∧, ¬, propositions are taken
as primitive mathematical elements, and the calculus of propositions
is akin to the calculus of natural numbers. Boolean tradition, on the
other hand, considers truth as the primitive logical predicate.
• To the extent that logistic tradition is concerned with the idea of a
“non-algebraic” formalism, which is known as the logistic method of
Frege, Peano, Whitehead, and Russell, it consists of a logistic system
with a formal language and its own deductive apparatus. For example,
as shown before, Lindenbaum-Tarski constructed the algebra of propo-
sitional formulas which comes from logistic systems for CPL that cor-
responds with quotient algebra through defining a relation ∼ (logical
equivalence) on the set of formulas, and ∼ forms a congruence relation
on the formula algebra. Further it is stated that the quotient algebra
is Boolean ([207], [210], Tarski). We refer to this as an algebraic rep-
resentation of the logistic systems of classical propositional logic, that
is, a logical structure can be represented or transformed by an alge-
braic structure. The logistic tradition considers logical equivalence as
a primitive logical predicate ([83], p. 14).
As we have explained, in logistic tradition, the algebraization of logistic
systems is possible, i.e., to have the algebraic representations of logistic
systems. Next, we see the role that the model-theoretic tradition plays
in the development of algebraic logic.
• A description of the model-theoretic tradition (model theory) is given
as follows:
“The third line of investigation in algebraic logic con-
cerns itself with the algebraic semantics of logical systems
on a more general level. It has its roots in the study of ab-
stract consequence relations and their matrix models, begun
by Tarski and ULukasiewicz in the 1920’s and 30’s, and later
further developed especially in Poland. Although most of
the familiar logistic systems are algebraizable in the sense
explained earlier, and therefore can be studied adequately
through their associated quasivariety, there are important
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systems to which the process of algebraization cannot be
applied. Attempts have been made to enlarge the domain
of logical systems for which a satisfactory semantics can be
found that still shares many of the attractive feature of a qua-
sivariety semantics for an algebraizable system.” (See, [50],
p. 369)
By tracing the three traditions of algebraic logic, there is not sufficient
reason to claim that algebraic approaches fully cover all aspects of logic.
In other words, “some logics” which deserve the name logic are not known,
from an algebraic point of view, whether taking logics as algebraic structures
(Boolean tradition) or studying logic using algebraic tools (logistic tradition
or model-theoretic tradition) in modern logic. If the reduction we propose
from logic to algebra precisely refers to “the relation from CPL to Boolean
algebra” ([207]), the meaning of reduction then becomes clearer, that is, it
means “Boolean algebra is one of the ways by which classical propositional
logic can be realized,” i.e., the former can “reduce” to the latter in a very
weak sense.
So far, the discussion above does not support the radical perspective of
reducing logic to algebra with claims that algebra is all there is to logic,
that is, logic is completely reducible to algebra; a position called radical
reductionism with regard to logic. So, if we do not have a radical reductionism
point of view in logic and it is clear that Boolean algebra is not all there is
to CPL, it is possible to employ “CPL is (Boolean) algebraizable” to refer
to a weaker meaning of reduction.
Essentially, to claim radical reductionism in logic is counter-intuitive from
the point of view of modern logic. For example, paraconsistent logic C1
is equivalent to C1–Curry-algebra, i.e., it is algebraizable but the former
cannot be reduced to the latter because of the irreducible notion of order
in C1-Curry-algebra (see [45], pp. 138–139). C1-Curry-algebra is not a pure
algebraic structure; it is an order-algebraic structure. Hence, as discussed
above, it is better to clarify the relation between logic and algebra by claiming
that logic is algebraizable instead of claiming logic is completely reducible to
algebra.
Ramon Jansana answered an interesting question in Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy – Propositional Consequence Relations and Alge-
braic Logic ([131]):
Q: “What does this mean when a logic is algebraizable?”
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A: Generally speaking, when a logic has an algebraic semantics we call it
algebraizable.
This is further elaborated as follows:
“The term ‘algebraic semantics’ was (and many times still is)
used in the literature in a loose way. To provide a logic with
an algebraic semantics was to interpret its language in a class of
algebras, define a notion of satisfaction of a formula in an algebra
of the class and prove a soundness and completeness theorem,
usually for the theorems of the logic only.” (Ibid.)
For example, as mentioned, the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra factorizes classi-
cal propositional language to Boolean algebra. Moreover, to define a semantic
concept, “satisfaction” in an algebra, Boolean algebra in this case prove some
meta-properties of this given logic. What is presented in the citation above
is a general statement which discusses a general statement of the way to
“algebraize” logical systems, that is, to interpret the formal languages of the
logical systems into a class of algebras. The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra we
mentioned previously is only a case of this general statement. It discusses
CPL only. We do not discuss all the details of this article [131], although
some will be discussed in the next section as they are helpful in understand-
ing how universal logicians were inspired by the development from algebraic
logic to Universal Algebra. For a precise concept of algebraic semantics for a
logic system and to understand algebraic logic comprehensively, the readers
are referred to ([51], Blok-Pigozzi, 1989), besides reading this self-contained
article.
2.2.3 The Influence of the Development of Abstract
Logic on Universal Logic
The approaches algebraic logic have taken did not directly influence the meth-
ods universal logicians have taken in the Universal Logic project, however,
they directly influenced the development of Universal Algebra and inspired
the development of Universal Logic.3 It is important to see the status of
Universal Logic regarding logical structures, which is analogous to that of
3The approach provided by algebraic logic should be fruitful for the development of
Universal Logic. A book will soon be published on a recent development of Universal
Logic: Hajnal Andre´ka, Istva´n Nemeti, Ildiko´ Sain, Universal Algebraic Logic: Dedicated
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Universal Algebra regarding algebraic structures. Universal Algebra is a
general theory of algebraic structures and Universal Logic is taken as a gen-
eral theory of logical structures. In this subsection, we briefly describe the
development from algebraic logic to Universal Logic.
First of all, it has been stated that “the general theory of the algebraiza-
tion of logical systems that has developed is called abstract algebraic logic”
([83], p. 15). In modern mathematical logic, abstract algebraic logic has been
seen as a subfield of algebraic logic. It is also a study of the algebraization of
logical systems and is an “abstraction” of the Lindenbaum-Tarski approach
generally.4 To take the expression we often use, it is to study Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebra in general. Furthermore, it studies the relationship between
the given logical systems and the algebras, algebraized from the given logical
systems. Abstract algebraic logic did not directly influence either Universal
Logic, nevertheless, the relation between abstract algebraic logic and alge-
braic logic could also be analogous to the relation between Universal Algebra
and abstract algebra. It shares similarities with the general theory of logics
for the Universal Logic project.5 Unlike abstract algebraic logic, Universal
Algebra inspired the Universal Logic project much more. Universal Algebra
was independently developed in two directions, one by Garrett Birkhoff, and
the other by the Polish researcher Tarski. Universal Algebra was widely pop-
ular in “Polish logic” (see [39], p. 15). Suszko, a representative of the Polish
school of thought, proposed a concept of abstract logic 〈A,〉, consisting of
an algebra A and a closure . This conception of abstract logic was seen as
a basic notion in Polish logic. As discussed in previous sections, Universal
Logic was easily misunderstood to be a part of Universal Algebra, possibly
because abstract logic was considered to be a part of Universal Algebra by
to the Unity of Science (Studies in Universal Logic), Birkha¨user (December, 2013) and
many concepts of algebraic logic were used in studies of logic translation, which are seen
as one of the cornerstone of the Universal Logic Project.
4There is a similar description in [83], p. 15.
“One of the goals of AAL is to discover general criteria for a class of
algebras (or for a class of mathematical objects closely related to algebras
such as, for instance, logical matrices or generalized matrices) to be the
algebraic counterpart of a logic, and to develop the methods for obtaining this
algebraic counterpart. In this connection, an abstraction of the Lindenbaum-
Tarski method plays a major role.”
5Universal Logic follows Bourbakism. “Logics” here refers to logical structures in ab-
stract, defined as 〈S,⊢〉. Logical structures should be seen as mathematical structures.
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Roman Suszko himself. Moreover, “it seems that it turned out to be a com-
mon idea in Poland” (Ibid, p. 15).6 However, we do not trace the history
of the development of Polish logic, rather a detached description of the de-
velopment of abstract logic to Universal Logic is given in [39] to which the
readers are referred. Readers could consult [222] to understand much more
about the logic and philosophy developed in Poland.
One thing the Universal Logic project demonstrates is that logic and
algebra are closely related to each other, but Universal Logic should not
be misunderstood as a part of Universal Algebra. Clarifying the difference
between Universal Logic and Universal Algebra requires the “independent
existence” of logical structures. When dealing with logical structures ab-
stracting from the Tarskian abstract logic, logical structures can be seen as
the fourth mother structure by following Bourbakism.
2.3 Neo-Bourbakism as a Conceptual Approach
Let us now turn to another inspiration from the “conceptual approach” in
Birkhoff’s stream of the development of Universal Algebra. In previous sec-
tions, we remarked that the Universal Logic project might be taken as an
outgrowing of the Polish school of thought. I will begin this section by dis-
cussing how, upon adopting conceptual approach, the direct abstraction of
the Tarskian account of logical structures gives way to the recognizable arbi-
trary logical structure with bivaluation. However, this conception of logical
structures is strikingly different from that presupposed in the Tarskian ac-
count, for reasons that will become obvious. The Universal Logic project
adopts the conceptual approach that conforms to our daily life rather than
the axiomatic approach in logical society.
6This information on the historical misunderstanding was rephrased from a paragraph
in [39], p. 15 as follows. It is provided to help readers understand much more about the
history of Universal Algebra and Polish logic.
“[...]universal algebra was very popular among people working in Polish
logic. Suszko himself considered≪ abstract logic≫ to be a part of universal
algebra and it seems that it turned out to be a common idea in Poland, as
suggests the following comment by S. L. Bloom: ≪ Roman taught us the
Polish view of logic – as a branch of universal algebra (a novel outlook for
us) ≫ (Bloom 1984, p. 313).”
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In arriving at the formulation of logical structuralism (structuralism in
logics) in the Bourbakian sense that regards logic as a mathematical struc-
ture, it is attributed to a restricted version of mathematical structuralism.
In other words, the existence of logical structures seems to depend strongly
on three mother structures, algebraic structures, topological structures, and
order structures. Does this not enhance the reason for those possible rad-
ical reductionists to support the reduction of logic to algebra? Universal
logicians, however, do not, apparently, wish to see this. They claim that a
logical structure consists of the following type:
〈S,⊢〉
where S can be included in any of the three mother structures in the Bour-
bakian sense. Once we have only this conception of logic, it implies that
there are no pure logical structures and that logical structures do not possess
an independent existence. Therefore, the fact that logical structures are con-
sidered as mathematical structures means that mathematical structuralism
should principally be applicable to logical structures; in other words, logical
structuralism can be useful to universal logicians in the sense of acting as
a restricted version of mathematical structuralism. However, the fact that
logical structures are taken to be mathematical structures does not imply
Universal Logic is the same as a mathematical structure. Universal Logic
has its own special status: “it is a general theory of logical structures” and
universal logicians would “agree with the fact that logic is algebraizable” in-
stead of “a complete reduction of logic to algebra.” We can detect certain
meanings that typify logical structuralism in the Universal Logic project,
which indicates that it is not just a special case of mathematical structural-
ism. Moreover, logical structuralism could make the relation between algebra
and logical structures clear.
Bourbakism has the goal of founding all mathematics from an axiomatic-
formalistic stance. The special status of logical structuralism in relation to
the Universal Logic project has caused the Universal Logic project to propose
a “Neo-Bourbakian approach”, consisting of several criteria:
1. Logical structures are one of the prototypes of the fundamental mother
structures based in Bourbakism.
The first criterion is the main assertion as to why this stance is called
“Neo”-Bourbakism. Logical structures are the fourth mother structure,
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hence, it leads to the view that Universal Logic is not a part of Uni-
versal Algebra.
2. Logic is not reducible to algebra and Universal Logic is not a part of
Universal Algebra.
The second criterion is especially important to Universal Logic to state
its own stance.
3. The conceptual approach of Universal Logic aims to capture all logical
phenomena.
The third criterion is important to complete Neo-Bourbakism.
(The conceptual approach)
Having explored the connection between the trend of the Polish school of
thought and Neo-Bourbakism, let us now explore the connection between
Universal Logic and the conceptual approach – or non-axiomatic approach.
It is natural enough to claim that one ought to follow the conceptual
approach. The “ought” here, note, has nothing to do with what morality
requires. What we will pursue now is the possibility of a claim about the
conceptual approach. The conceptual approach is seen as contrary to the
axiomatic approach here. This basic approach, taken by the Universal Logic
project, comes from an abstract viewpoint about logical structures. It in-
volves two factors:
To consider “logical structures”
(1) at a general level;
(2) without taking axioms into account.
What these factors illustrate is that attempts to formulate the conceptual
approach in terms of the combination of two abstract conceptions, one be-
ing Tarski’s consequence operation that is on “a general level” and the other
being Birkhoff’s general theory of algebra that does not “take axioms into
account”. It might be thought that Tarskian logical structures become more
general in the Universal Logic project by the inspiration of the second factor.
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Thus, Universal Logic is regarded as a general theory of logical structures.
Here, a logical structure is arbitrary and consists of an arbitrary consequence
operator without any axiom, as in Birkhoff’s sense. This conception of arbi-
trary logical structures will be discussed in section 2.4.2.
With this understanding, we can now address the non-axiomatic ap-
proach, which is often seen as a conceptual approach in the Universal Logic
project. Be´ziau states: ([32], p. 136)
“Such a surprising approach can be called a conceptual one,
as opposed to an axiomatic one. Category theory is itself more
conceptual than axiomatic. The point is not to produce a large
axiomatic system like ZF set-theory from which everything could
be deduced; rather, it is to elaborate some concepts that could
serve to describe the whole of mathematical phenomena in a uni-
tary fashion.”
As Be´ziau states, the conceptual approach seems to be higher than the ax-
iomatic approach, and, in this regard, beginning with a set of axioms seems
to represent an inferior methodology. The term “conceptual” here means
to be the opposite of “axiomatic”, that is, “non-axiomatic”. Specifically
speaking, it means not using axiomatic systems to derive everything but us-
ing much closer approaches in our daily life, that is free-axiomatic ones. In
mathematics, category theory is an example of a non-axiomatic but “more
conceptual” approach. A brief historical overview of category theory can be
found in [148].
Category theory has occupied an important position in modern mathe-
matics. There are several similarities between the Universal Logic project
and category theory. First of all, a general aim of category theory, men-
tioned in [148], states, “[...] Roughly, it is a general mathematical theory of
structures and of systems of structures.” Universal Logic employs a similar
thought providing “a general theory of structures” as the final target,7 by
restricting the discussion to logical structures aiming to capture all logical
phenomena. We do not discuss category theory in detail, however, we need
7Universal Logic aims to develop “a general theory of structures”, including mathe-
matical structures. “Universal Logic, like Universal Algebra, is just a part of the general
theory of structures, logical abstract nonsense is a subfield of general abstract nonsense.
If, as we have suggested, abstraction is the important thing, one could argue that what is
really interesting is a general theory of structures, like category theory, and not a theory
of specific structures like Universal Logic.” ([31], p. 14)
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to clarify the conceptual approaches universal logicians use in order to avoid
misunderstandings. Though category theory is more conceptual than ax-
iomatic, this does not imply that category theory does not adopt any axiom,
on the contrary, it is “the legitimate heir” of the Bourbakian tradition, which
has the goal of founding mathematics as a whole from an axiomatic point of
view. As stated in [148],
“[...] It could be argued that category theory represents the
culmination of one of the deepest and most powerful tendencies
in twentieth century mathematical thought: the search for the
most general and abstract ingredients in a given situation. Cate-
gory theory is, in this sense, the legitimate heir of the Dedekind-
Hilbert-Noether-Bourbaki tradition, with its emphasis on the ax-
iomatic method and algebraic structures [...]”
Universal Logic borrows Birkhoff’s idea of developing Universal Algebra with-
out taking any axiom into account. In other words, the term “conceptual
approach” in the Universal Logic project clearly refers to a “non-axiomatic
approach” and it adopts a “non-axiomatic approach” to address its basic
stance. Moreover, Be´ziau himself claims the approach of Universal Logic is
a conceptual one ([32], p. 136).
Category theory aims to provide a general mathematical theory of struc-
tures; the Universal Logic project aims to provide a general theory of logical
structures, where logical structures are seen as mathematical structures. In
this way, Universal Logic is not a subfield of category theory, rather they are
related to each other. Universal Logic claims to take a “non-axiomatic” ap-
proach in the spirit of Neo-Bourbakism. Although category theory might not
contribute to the essence of Universal Logic, it has provided powerful mathe-
matical tools for the Universal Logic project. There is nothing in this account
which criticizes the conceptual approach. It is, in fact, quite natural as to
what we usually do in daily life. Moreover, it may well be that there is no
uniform answer to the question as to whether to take an axiomatic approach
or not. Some answers may be appropriate in dealing with the assertions of
natural sciences in the physical world or in dealing with the statements of
pure mathematics in the abstract world, etc. These possibilities also lead in
the direction of the conceptual approach, since “not everything is axiomati-
zable”. Adopting something with conceptual understanding is much closer
to what we do in everyday life. Even if one knows the entire extension of
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the axiomatizable, either in the physical or pure mathematical world, one
would not deny that conceptual understanding tends to conform more to our
intuitions. These opinions and the understanding of the conceptual approach
coincide with the idea of Universal Logic.
In sum, Universal Logic provides a general theory of logical structures,
and demonstrates a hierarchical relationship between a specific theory and
a general theory, as well as the continuous interplay between “the specific”
and “the general” ([34], p. 15), e.g., CPL and Universal Logic, such that
this process of alternating between abstract and concrete levels is natural to
ordinary humans as it occurs in everyday life. As a universal logician would
suggest, Universal Logic is a new way to view logic ([32], p. 142), whether
to propose a new notion of logical structures, to specify the status of logical
structures in mathematics and its independent existence in ontology, or to
propose a conceptual approach in studies of logic. In addition, it is also
worth mentioning work which systematically studies these conception from
the philosophy of logic e.g. the well-known concept of Deviant Logics
which is discussed in later chapters. Maybe this is also a reason why people
“choose” to defend the position that the Universal Logic project has taken,
meaning many fundamental notions in Logic8 would have to be re-examined
and challenged.
2.4 Main Strategies and Techniques of Uni-
versal Logic
The literal sense of the term “Universal Logic” seemingly speaks of “a logic”
which unifies all logics, however, this interpretation has been challenged in
our discussions in previous sections. As discussed, Universal Logic is a general
theory of studying logical structures themselves instead of studying various
specific models or examples of logical structures. In the last section, we
showed that a logical structure is considered an abstract logical structure
in general, denoted as 〈S,⊢〉, that is an abstraction of an abstract logical
structure, which does not take any axiom into account. Moreover, it claims
to take a conceptual approach to the study of logic. In this section, we will
discuss the strategies and techniques taken in the Universal Logic project to
understand how people can achieve a Neo-Bourbakian paradigm.
8“Logic” is referred to as a discipline.
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2.4.1 Strategies
First of all, we examine the strategies used by Universal Logic, which are
closely related to our way of thinking in our daily life. As mentioned, it
is not necessary to possess an axiomatic mind in order to work with logic.
At its core, Universal Logic addresses the following question: “Is there a
way of determining the common features that would allow us to unify the
study of all particular systems into a science called logic?” To answer this
question, we first have to ask “What is logic?” Universal Logic suggests the
strategy of adopting a more concrete approach by answering more concrete
questions such as, “What is classical propositional logic?” ([37]) with an
abstract approach to logic9, in other words, to see each specific logic from
an abstract point of view, as discussed in previous sections. Note here that
this style of asking questions, considered basic conceptual analysis in analytic
philosophy, is also often used in Universal Logic to address questions such as
“What is many-valued logic?” ([44]), “What is paraconsistent logic?” ([40]),
“What is the principle of identity?” ([35]), “What is formal logic?” ([28]),
etc.
The strategy taken implicitly in the Universal Logic project is to “pull
back to a more concrete level from an abstract level with an abstract logic
point of view”. This means analyzing each concrete question such as “What
is classical propositional logic?” and “What is intuitionistic propositional
logic?” with a conception of “abstract logic” in order to answer a basic but
general question, “What is logic?” Certainly, Universal Logic proposes a new
conception of logic, that is arbitrary logical structures of the type 〈S,⊢〉,
without taking axioms into account. It tries to study several specific logics
with respect to this conception. Using this approach, they try to understand
the conceptual analysis of “logic”. We should note here that the “conception”
proposed by Universal Logic is not able to realize the “concept” of logic,
that is to say we are not able to answer a conceptual question about “what
is logic?” comprehensively. It at most provides a method to achieve this
conceptual analysis step-by-step.
Whichever is the case, generally speaking, this represents a more practical
method toward achieving the goal set by Universal Logic. All Universal Logic
researchers presume an abstract logic framework to view different kinds of
9The study of Universal Logic is attributed to an abstract level. Logic is an abstract
mathematical structure 〈S,⊢〉 where S could be put on any three of the Bourbakian
structures and ⊢ is an abstract consequence operator.
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logics, for example, paraconsistent logic, many-valued logic, classical logic,
intuitionistic logic, etc. In other words, all logics that we have considered can
be addressed from the viewpoint of the Universal Logic project. However,
when they try to decipher the meaning of logic, they must first discuss more
concrete examples; only then, can they legitimately claim that they could
jump into abstraction ([32], p. 142) to ascertain the common properties of all
varied logics. Moreover, any preconceived ideas can be amended by focusing
on the “difference” between logics.10
After all, a direct discussion of logic at such an abstract level can lead
us astray; for example, it is not possible for a logician to generalize the
completeness theorem or prove it without knowing the cases pertaining to the
completeness theorem, for example, the completeness theorem for classical
logic. Actually, as shown in their work, Universal logicians are trying to
prove different meta-properties without using any specific characteristic of a
specific logic. As stated by Be´ziau,
“In a proof of a completeness theorem for a given logic, one
may distinguish the elements of the proof that depend on the
specificity of this logic and the elements that do not depend on
this peculiarity, that we can call universal,... The first proofs of
completeness for propositional classical logic give the idea that
this theorem is depending very much on classical features. ... In
fact this idea is totally wrong and one can present the complete-
ness theorem for CPL in such a way that the specific part of the
proof is trivial, i.e. one can trivialize the completeness theorem.
One central aim of a general theory of logics is to get some uni-
versal results that can be applied more or less directly to specific
logics, this is one reason to call such a theory Universal Logic.”
([31], p. 13)
These universal logicians attempt to trivialize the completeness theorem, but
they do not stop considering individual logic; instead they also consider it
from an abstract point of view, the pull-back strategy previously discussed
being the preparatory work of the universal logicians. In order to “jump
10As Be´ziau states in his biographical paper: “... My attention was directed to the
common ground between C1 and classical logic. These two logics are very different and
my intuition was that the very essence of logic should not lie in any of their specific
differences but on their common features.” ([39], p. 6)
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into abstract”, they have to discuss concrete examples. This back-and-forth
movement between the general and the particular plays an important role in
the Universal Logic project. “Any abstract theory is not a pure abstraction,”
stated Be´ziau himself in [32], p. 148, “it is an abstraction of something else.”
Similarly, people jumping into abstraction should also begin from a “non-
abstract” stage. Universal Logic as an abstract theory, the concepts of which
are derived from many observations of specific cases, e.g. CPL, they will also
be applicable back to these specific cases. We cite a paragraph by Be´ziau to
conclude this section:
“What is crucial in Universal Logic is that logics are con-
sidered irrespective of the way they are generated, so that one
thus makes a jump into abstraction. And this is not surprising
at all, it’s the most natural thing you could have. CPL can be
generated in a hundred different ways, through Hilbert systems,
Gentzen systems, tableaux, two-, three- or infinite-valued seman-
tics. What is this object that can be defined in so much different
ways? Everybody believes in it, and nobody would venture to
claim that classical propositional logic reduces to one particular
way of constructing it.” (Ibid., p. 142)
Clearly, no one can be confident in claiming which“system” is exactly the
final target to reduce CPL. Faced with this situation, the universal logician
suggests that people tend to, as in daily life, freely and easily “jump into
abstraction.” Although this seems very romantic to logicians, “splitting of
hairs” is also worthless. Naturally, this approach will bring us closer to the
thinking patterns of human beings.
2.4.2 Main Techniques
“..., J.-Y. Be´ziau has recently provided a systematic connec-
tion between logical bivaluations and structurally standard sys-
tems of sequents... With this general result, it is very easy to
jump from sequent rules to bivaluation conditions, and thus to
provide axiomatization and completeness.” ([68], p. 288)
We have discussed the strategies used in the Universal Logic project. In this
section, we discuss some main techniques used in it.
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(Arbitrary Logical Structures with Bivaluations)
With the help of the ideas from Tarskian logic, it starts at the abstract level
by considering an arbitrary logical structure as a pair LS = 〈S,⊢LS〉, where
⊢LS is an arbitrary consequence relation.
Definition 2. An arbitrary logical structure is a structure of the form LS =
〈S,⊢LS〉, where S is an arbitrary set and ⊢LS is an arbitrary relation on
P(S)×S. Equivalently, we could have described it as a pair LS = 〈S,CnLS〉,
where S is an arbitrary set and CnLS is an arbitrary mapping from P(S) −→
P(S).
This conception of logical structures was introduced in [46] firstly (also see
[31], [34], [38]) in order to capture the most general formalization of logical
reasoning that we could call. The study of Universal Logic started by consid-
ering the conception of logical structure by Jean-Yves Be´ziau (1995).11 Re-
garding bivaluations ([38], Be´ziau) is crucial, moreover, it can be regarded
as the seminal work with respect to modern developments in Universal Logic,
which is typified by the following notion. This notion provides an important
clue regarding a key step to treat logic in Universal Logic. In this regard,
it attempts to dissolve the boundary existing between the syntactic and the
semantic. This notion will often be referred to in the discussions in the next
chapter on logic translation.
11An arbitrary logical structure is said to be Tarskian (normal) when it obeys the fol-
lowing Tarskian conditions: Given a set S of formulas, we say that ⊢⊆ P(S) × S defines
a (Tarskian) consequence relation on S if the following conditions hold, for any formulas
α and β, and subsets Σ and ∆ of S.
1. α ∈ Σ implies Σ ⊢ α. (Reflexivity)
2. (∆ ⊢ α and ∆ ⊆ Σ) implies Σ ⊢ α. (Monotonicity)
3. (∆ ⊢ α and Σ, α ⊢ β) implies ∆,Σ ⊢ β. (Cut)
A compact Tarskian logic L is definied as 〈S,⊢〉 with compactness.
∗ If Σ ⊢ α, then Γ ⊢ α, for some finite subset Σ ⊆ Σ. (Compactness)
The Tarskian conditions for consequence relation can be presented in the style of con-
sequence operator CnLS as follows: For the theories, T , K, T ⊆ CnLS(T ); T ⊆ K implies
CnLS(T ) ⊆ CnLS(K); CnLS(CnLS(T )) = CnLS(T ).
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Definition 3. A bivaluation of LS is any characteristic function v : X −→
{0, 1}, for X ⊆ S. Given a set V of bivaluations of LS, for all X ⊆ S and
ϕ ∈ S, the following semantical deduction relation is defined:
X |=V ϕ iff for all v ∈ V , v(X) = 1 implies v(ϕ) = 1.
This logical two-valuedness originated from R. Suszko and N. C. A. da
Costa independently. Suszko ([204]) proposed a method for providing any
structural abstract logic with a complete set of bivaluations. Suszko’s Thesis
(Suszko’s reduction method) was proposed, which states that any logic with
a structural consequence operator conforming to Tarski’s standard conditions
is logically two-valued, while da Costa’s theory of valuations ([69]) was used
in the analysis of the paraconsistent calculi comprehensively. Be´ziau (1995),
in this way, analyzed the conditions for an arbitrary logical structure, which
is a very abstract concept of logical structures, to obtain a complete set
of bivaluations, linking the theory of valuations with the sequent calculus
to show how it is possible to translate conditions defining bivaluations into
sequent rules and vice versa ([31], p. 13).
The conceptions of arbitrary logical structures and logical two-valuedness
(bivaluations) have been considered together in the idea of Universal Logic.
Definition 4. A theory Γ such that, if Γ ⊢ a then a ∈ Γ, is said to be closed.
A theory is considered as a bivaluation by taking its characteristic function;
a bivaluation can be considered as a theory by taking the set of true formulas
under this function.
Definition 5. (Be´ziau 2001) An adequate bivalent semantics for a logic
LS = 〈S,⊢LS〉 is a set of functions BIV from S to {0, 1} such that the
semantic deducibility relation |= defined in the usual manner ( T |= a iff for
every β ∈ BIV, if β(b) = 1 for every b ∈ T , then β(α) = 1) by this set is the
same as ⊢. If ⊢ is included in |=, we say that the semantic is sound (for LS,
and if |= is included in ⊢ we say that the semantic is complete (for LS)
Theorem 6. (Be´ziau 2001, 1995) The semantics of closed theories of a
Tarskian (normal) logic is an adequate semantics for it. If LS = 〈S,Cn〉 is
a logical structure such that X ⊆ CnLS(S), for all X ⊆ S (reflexivity), then
LS has a adequate set of bivaluations.
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Theorem 7. (Be´ziau 2001, 1995) A bivalent semantics is sound for a normal
logic iff it is included in the semantics of closed theories. If LS = 〈S,Cn〉
such that for all X, Y ∈ S, X ⊆ Y implies X ⊆ CnLS(X) ⊆ CnLS(Y ) and
CnLS(X ∪ CnLS(X)) = CnLS(X), then LS has a sound set of bivaluations.
Any set Vs of bivaluations of a logical structure LS which are adequate
and sound for it: X |=V s ϕ iff X ⊢LS ϕ, is called as a Suszko set for a LS.
Note. Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 were mentioned in [38], [42], and the
proofs can be found in [213]. Suszko’s thesis is connected with the reduction
of many-valuedness to two-valuedness (a discussion on this can be found [143]
and [68]). Bivaluation provides a more general formulation of Suszko’s thesis.
Readers should note that what we have presented for Be´ziau’s results should
be attributed to Gentzen’s sequent calculus, however, this requires in-depth
knowledge of Gentzen’s sequent calculus. Readers could consult [38], [46] to
obtain a comprehensive understanding of this.
The significance of this work is its claim that any semantics can be reduced
to a bivalent semantics. In other words, in a general sense, in relation to
Universal Logic, it provides a general definition of semantics: a semantics on
a given set S is a pair 〈K,Fun〉, where K is a set and Fun is a function
from S to P(K). The logic induced by the semantics is defined: Γ  ϕ iff
Fun(Γ) ⊆ Fun(ϕ), where  represents a general sense of semantic relation,
where given any semantics on a set S, we can find a bivalent semantics on
S which induces the same logic ([68]). For Universal Logic, the bivalent
semantics on a set S is a semantics, where K is a set of functions from S to
{0, 1} (bivaluations) and F is defined as follows: β ∈ Fun(ϕ) iff β(ϕ) = 1.
Here, bivaluations are logical values and not algebraic values, as in Suszko’s
terminology ([44], [68],[204], [213]). This definition is carried out at the
abstract level.
(Lindenbaum-Asser Theorem)
“Combining action of valuations upon sequent rules, in the
spirit of Gentzen’s 1932 proof,... with Lindenbaum-Asser theo-
rem, I have given a general version of the completeness theorem,
from which it is possible to derive instantaneously many specific
completeness theorems...” ([31], p. 13)
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Lindenbaum’s theorem states that a set S is maximally consistent if it is
consistent and no proper superset of S is consistent. A consistent theory is a
theory which is not trivial, i.e., there exists a formula which is not deducible
from it. This means there is no non-trivial strict extensions.
Definition 8. Given a theory Γ, a formula α such that Γ  ⊢L α and further
for any strict extension Σ of Γ, Σ ⊢L α, we say that Γ is relatively maximal
with respect to α in logic L.
From the Universal Logic point of view, when proving a completeness
theorem for a given logic, people might be able to make a distinction for
elements that depend on the specificity of this logic and the others that do
not depend on this specificity in the whole proof. The latter was called the
“universal” part. It was argued by universal logicians that a maximally con-
sistent set (in Lindenbaum theorem), which is a useful argument for proving
completeness, should be taken as the universal part. In other words, Univer-
sal Logic claimed that the concept of a maximally consistent set, which was
misunderstood as depending on the classical features of negations, should be
trivialized into the universal parts. It follows to generalize the completeness
theorem.
Lemma 9. (Lindenbaum-Asser Theorem) Let L be a compact Tarskian logic.
Given any set of formulas Γ and a formula α such that Γ  ⊢L α, there is an
extended set ∆, Γ ⊆ ∆ such that ∆ is relatively maximal in L (with respect
to) α.
Proof. Consider an enumeration {ϕn}n∈N of all formulas and a chain ∆n, n ∈
N of sets built as two cases,
(a) ∆0 = Γ;
(b) {
∆n+1 = ∆n ∪ {ϕn}, if ∆n, ϕn  ⊢L α;
∆n+1 = ∆n, if else.
Let ∆ =
⋃
n∈N
. We show ∆ is relatively maximal w.r.t. α in logic L.
By mathematical induction on the above chain, we get that ∆n  ⊢L α.
This implies ∆  ⊢L α. If this were not the case, there would be some finite
subset ∆FIN ⊆ ∆, such that ∆FIN ⊢L α by compactness. This implies ∆m ⊇
∆FIN for some m ∈ , such that ∆m ⊢L α by using Monotonicity This
contradicts ∆m  ⊢L α. Now we consider a formula β = ϕn, for some n, where
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β  ∈ ∆. From ∆n+1 ⊆ ∆, we get β  ∈ ∆n+1. Then ∆n+1 = ∆n and ∆n, β ⊢L α.
Since ∆n ⊆ ∆, we must conclude ∆, β ⊢L α by Monotonicity.
Lemma 10. Any relatively maximal set of formulas is a closed theory.
Proof. Given a set of formulas Γ that is relatively maximal with respect to
a formula α, then Γ L β if and only if β ∈ Γ.
(⇐=) By Reflexivity.
(=⇒) Given some β  ∈ Γ, we have that Γ  L α and Γ, β L α, since Γ
is relatively maximal with respect to α, as we say. Then we conclude that
Γ  L β.
Theorem 11. (Be´ziau 2001, [38]) The semantics of relatively maximal the-
ories of a Tarskian compact logic is an adequate semantics for it.
The Lindenbaum-Asser theorem claimed that, inside any compact Tarskian
logic L, every theory can be extended to a relatively maximal theory. Univer-
sal Logic, by the Lindenbaum-Asser theorem, takes the concept of “relatively
maximal consistent” to replace the concept of “maximally consistent” (or to
trivialize the concept of maximally consistent). So far, we have considered a
proof of Lindenbaum-Asser theorem. By considering the conception of the
arbitrary logical structures, a systematic study of the class of bivaluation
semantics which is adequate for a given “abstract logic” is presented. ([38])
From this point of view, it is claimed further to generalize or to trivialize the
meta-property, completeness pushing it to a more general level.
2.4.3 Logical Two-Valued Semantics and Algebraic Val-
ued Semantics
The idea to generalize logic by means of providing a general notion of log-
ical consequence operators was first raised by Tarski. However, Suszko, da
Costa and Be´ziau achieved a more general theory that can be seen in Polish
logic tradition, especially Be´ziau who used connecting sequent calculus with
bivaluation to prove completeness ([38], [46]).
This significant result in Universal Logic not only shows a general com-
pleteness without taking any specific characteristic of any specific logic, but
it is possible to obtain each individual completeness theorem for each indi-
vidual logic ([31], p. 13). This is a a powerful tool for logicians, who are
devoted to the realm of studying applications of logic. As Be´ziau states in
[32] (p. 146),
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“Universal logic considers the world of all possible logics and ways
to construct them, so that it gives a way out of many require-
ments and problems.”
This means, once we obtain what should be trivial, universal and common
to some sort of reasoning, as shown in Universal Logic, we are able to build
“a logic” in this situation. This is an ideal from the perspective of studying
applications in the logic discipline, however this utopia (Universal Logic)
is not “one universal logic” to explain everything but “a general theory of
different logics”.
For Suszko, logical two-valuedness (truth and falsity) means a (logical)
valuation, which is a function associating one value (true or false) to each
formula; algebraic values, on the other hand, are admissible reference assign-
ments (compare e.g. [143], [203], [221]). Algebraic valuation of formalized
language L, where L is a free (anarchic) algebra, is a morphism from the
free algebra of formulas into any algebraic structure A, which belongs to the
whole class of all algebraic structures, K(L). Suszko claimed:
“[...] the domain of them consists of all expressions of definite
syntactic category: formulas (sentences), terms (names) and
diverse kinds of formators. The size of codomains of algebraic
valuations is not a priori limited. In particular, the formu-
las may have many algebraic values (admissible referents).”
([203], p. 377)
Suszko’s logical two-valuedness is based on Tarskian logic. An earlier result
by J. ULos´ and R. Suszko in [184] (also see [62]) is: if M is a matrix, every
truth-assignment to the variables that verifies the formulas in the set of all
formulas X will define a system of truth-tables of the set of all formulas, de-
noted asM(X), such that the matrix consequence relation, Cn(X) =M(X),
and every uniform substitution consequence relation is a matrix consequence.
This idea is usually used in the Polish tradition of logic, including the birth of
the many-valued logics. Clearly speaking, many-valued logics are defined by
logical matrices in this way. Having a logical matrix is necessary to generate
a many-valued logic, in other words, the generated logic should be with a
truth-functional semantics (or the logic is truth-functional).
“[...] in case of any logic considered as an inference relation, ⊢,...
one can find sets V of zero-one valued functions defined for all
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formulas and, called here logical valuations,... In short, every
logic is (logically) two-valued.” ([203], p. 378)
According to Suszko’s reduction, given a consequence relation, it is always
possible to find a bivalent semantics with respect to this consequence relation.
However, for Suszko, this bivalent semantics should not be attributed to the
bivalence in the traditional matrix semantics, e.g. two-valued semantics in
CPL. The value 0 and 1, on the contrary, should be the logical values. It
is not the algebraic values that are always seen as the domain of an algebra.
Hence, in the case of L3, Suszko has claimed that it has both a two logical-
valued semantics and a three algebraic-valued semantics ([203], [204]).
2.5 Conclusion
In the last century, it has been common for logicians to conflate the notion of
logical consequence deductive calculus since Tarski proposed the consequence
operator. In the Universal Logic project, a new conception of the nature of
logical structures has been studied.
Universal Logic is a general theory of different logics, which allows it to
be a general theory of “many-valued logics”. However, the technique that
Universal Logic has taken reduces the many-valuedness to bivalence. In other
words, Universal Logic provides a general theory that includes bivaluation
(bivalent semantics) to treat many-valuedness. It seems to be paradoxical
to claim that a general theory with the property of bivalence is a general
theory of many-valued logics. However, we clearly see that the Universal
Logic project does not “reject” many-valued logic. On the contrary, many-
valued logics should also be treated equally in the Universal Logic project,
i.e. it provides a general theory of different logics, including many-valued
logics, but this general theory studies many-valued logics in a certain sense
of reductionism: the generalization of Suszko’s reduction
As discussed in this chapter, the bivalent semantics for Universal Logic
should not be two-valued in the sense of truth-functional matrix seman-
tics. A many-valued truth-functional matrix semantics is logically bivalent
in essence. “Logical matrices do not violate the principle of bivalence” ([36]).
Recalling the theory of valuation (bivaluation) with respect to the arbitrary
logical structures, it is possible to generate a logic whose semantics is with-
out truth-functionality in a very general sense ([43]). In other words, arbi-
trary logical structures and bivaluation, taken in Universal Logic generalize
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the truth-functional semantics as in the case of algebraic many-valuededness
that we have discussed and in a certain sense is a generalization of Suszko’s
Thesis. Finally, as logical two-valuedness should be the common part of var-
ious logics, it depends not only the specific characteristics of various logics.
Suszko’s Thesis states: “every structural Tarskian consequence relation is
characterized by a bivalent semantics”, therefore we obtain a generalization
of this reduction with the non-truth-functionality.
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3.1 Introduction
Jean-Yves Be´ziau in his work (Classical Negation can be expressed by One of
its Halves) ([41]) gave an example of a phenomenon that can be considered
the translation paradox. We elaborate on Be´ziau’s example, which concerns
classical negation to the half of classical negation, as well as proving relevant
background on this discussion. Be´ziau’s work turns out not to deliver new
results but is important in the interests of illustrating the development of
logic translation that is widely discussed in various modern applications to
computer science. In this chapter, we discuss logic translation. We review
the translation paradox and discuss the concepts of sublogic and deviant
logics. Then, we give a comprehensive survey on the development of logic
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translation. The discussion of the translation paradox will enable readers
to become more familiar with the development of the new subject of logic
translation which is a fundamental aspect of Universal Logic.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: In section 3.2, we discuss the
translation paradox using the example provided by Be´ziau, based on the pre-
sentation of two logics: LClassical and LClassical/2. Section 3.3 then discusses
a number of ideas on logic translation in history of modern logic with re-
spect to the abstract logic viewpoint. We also introduce the first systematic
investigation of logic translation attributed to Prawitz and Malmna¨s in 1968
([169]), and also to present two other systematic investigations by Wo´jcicki
(1988) ([223]) and Epstein (1990, 2006) ([74], [76]), where we discuss logic
translation with respect to the development of the consequence operation
that has been widespread in the Polish school of thought. In section 3.5, we
discuss the deviance of logics and the ideas of sub-logic with the growth of
various logics in modern logical society.
3.2 Translation Paradox
3.2.1 The Inclusion Relation
We use the results shown in [41] to understand the translation paradox.
Recalling the definitions shown in Chapter 1 (section 2.4.2): an arbitrary
logical structure L = 〈S,⊢L〉 and the bivaluation, which is a set of functions
BIV from the set of formulas into the set {0, 1}.
The logic LClassical = 〈S,→,¬, |=Classical〉 with its bivaluation BIVClassical
means CPL with classical implication → and classical negation ¬. The two
well-known classical semantic conditions for implication and negation are as
follows:
β ∈ BIVClassical iff given any two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ S the following two
conditions hold:
• β(ϕ→ ψ) = 0 iff β(ϕ) = 1 and β(ψ) = 0
• β(ϕ) = 1 iff β(¬ϕ) = 0.
Other classical connectives could be defined by implication and negation in
LClassical and then define the whole CPL. We consider the logic LClassical/2 =
〈S’,⊲,⊖, |=Classical/2〉 with its bivaluation BIVClassical/2 as follows:
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a. S ′ is a set of formulas constructed by one binary connective ⊲ and one
unary connective ⊖.
b. β ∈ BIVClassical/2 iff given any two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ S
′ the following
two conditions hold:
(1) β(ϕ⊲ ψ) = 0 iff β(ϕ) = 1 and β(ψ) = 0
(2) β(ϕ) = 1 implies β(⊖ϕ) = 0
c. T |=Classical/2 ϕ iff for every β ∈ BIVClassical/2, if β(a) = 1, for every
a ∈ T , then β(ϕ) = 1.
LClassical/2 is a weaker CPL with classical implication ⊲ and “half classical
negation” ⊖. Note here that “half classical negation” means we take only
the following “half” condition: if β(ϕ) = 1, then β(⊖ϕ) = 0 instead of the
condition for classical negation: β(ϕ) = 1 if and only if β(⊖ϕ) = 0.
Let us say that two formulas ϕ and ψ, ϕ is logically equivalent to ψ in
LClassical/2 iff ϕ |=Classical/2 ψ and ψ |=Classical/2 ϕ.
Lemma 12. In LClassical/2, for any formula ϕ, ψ, φ,
(1) ϕ⊲ (ψ ⊲ φ) is logically equivalent to ψ ⊲ (ϕ⊲ φ).
(2) ⊖(ϕ⊲ (ψ ⊲ φ)) is not logically equivalent to ⊖(ψ ⊲ (ϕ⊲ φ)).
Proof. In LClassical/2, ϕ ⊲ (ψ ⊲ φ) is logically equivalent to ψ ⊲ (ϕ ⊲ φ) iff
for any function β ∈ BIV, if β(ψ ⊲ (ϕ ⊲ φ)) = 1, then β(ϕ ⊲ (ψ ⊲ φ)) = 1
and if β(ϕ ⊲ (ψ ⊲ φ)) = 1, then β(ψ ⊲ (ϕ ⊲ φ)) = 1. This can be checked
by the truth-table method. For (2), consider a specific counterexample that
⊖(p⊲ (⊖p⊲q) is not equivalent to ⊖(⊖p⊲ (p⊲q) by the truth-table method
again.
In the following, we define some necessary concepts we will use in the
discussion of Be´ziau’s translation paradox.
Definition 13. A function f : X → Y is injective (one-to-one) if for any
x, y ∈ X, f(x) = f(y) implies x = y. A function f : X → Y is surjective
(onto) if for any y ∈ Y , there is a x ∈ X such that y = f(x). A function
is bijective (one-to-one and onto) if and only if it is both injective and
surjective.
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Take f as an bijection between the atomic formulas of A and the atomic
formulas of B. Given two algebras absolutely free algebras 〈A,⊲,⊖〉 and
〈B,→,¬〉, there is a unique extension g of f which is an isomorphism up
to g between these two absolutely free algebras, i.e., g(a ⊲ b) = g(a) → g(b)
and g(⊖a) = ¬(g(a)), such that T |=Classical/2 ϕ implies g(T ) |=Classical g(ϕ).
Here g is called a language-isomorphism.
Consider an atomic formula a and the bivaluation β ∈ BIV, β(a) = 0,
β(⊖a) = 0 and β(ϕ) = 0, where ϕ = ((⊖a⊲ a)⊲ a), such that (|=Classical/2 ϕ
in LClassical/2. It is known that ((¬a → a) → a) is a tautology in LClassical,
i.e. |=Classical ϕ in LClassical. Hence, g(T ) |=Classical g(ϕ) does not imply
T |=Classical/2 ϕ.
Here, we call the logic LClassical/2 is strictly included, up to language-
isomorphism, in the logic LClassical in the sense that the relation |=Classical/2
is strictly included in the relation |=Classical. This is explained as follows:
([41], p. 147)
“[...] it seems that we can say that the logic LClassical/2 is
strictly weaker than the logic LClassical”. One might want to
interpret this fact by saying that LClassical/2 is a proper sublogic
of LClassical [...]”
Apart from the presentation of these two logics, this is an attempt to interpret
the fact that the LClassical/2 is strictly weaker than the logic LClassical as
the former is the proper sub-logic of the latter to make the paradoxical
situation via the understanding of the contained-relation of deductive sense
to sub-logic.
3.2.2 The Translation Relation
As a prelude to study Be´ziau’s translation paradox, we set up the general idea
of translation between logics, as well as discussing the historical perspective
on translation between classical logic and intuitionistic logic.
Definition 14. Given two logics K1 = 〈A, |=1〉 and K2 = 〈A
′, |=2〉, K1,
K2 have the set Σ1 and Σ2 (of propositional symbols) as signatures, and a
function ρ : Σ1 → Σ2 between such sets as a signature morphism. A Σ-
model M is a mapping from Σ to {true, false}. αΣ is a sentence translation
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function from the Σ1-sentence to Σ2-sentences, and γ is a model translation
function from K2-models to K1-models, such that M2 |=2 α(ϕ1) if and only
if γ(M2) |=1 ϕ1 holds for any ϕ1 ∈ A and any M2 ∈ K2-model.
One can say that the translation from LClassical to LClassical/2 is as follows:
The logic LClassical = 〈S,→,¬, |=〉 and LClassical/2 = 〈S
′,⊲,⊖, |=1/2〉 have
sets Σ and Σ′ of propositional symbols as signatures, respectively. LClassical-
sentences are built from Σ with the propositional connectives ¬ and →, and
LClassical/2-sentences are built from Σ with the propositional connectives ⊖
and ⊲. Take the function Φ from Σ to Σ′ as the translation of signature,
and the function ρ as the translation of sentences from LClassical-sentences to
LClassical/2-sentences as follows:
1. ρ(p) = p, for any atomic formula p
2. ρ(p → q) = ρ(p)⊲ ρ(q)
3. ρ(¬p) = ρ(p)⊲⊖ρ(p),
such that the model translation γ along the Φ make the following hold: for
any ϕ ∈ S and any M1/2 ∈ LClassical/2-model, M1/2 |=Classical1/2 ρ(ϕ) if and
only if γ(M1/2) |=Classical ϕ.
We can not get a similar translation from LClassical/2 to LClassical. The sen-
tences of LClassical/2 are the same as in LClassical but the models are valuations
of all sentences that respect the truth-table semantics of the implication ⊲
and the negation ⊖, which is only with half of the condition in LClassical/2:
• ϕ⊲ ψ = 1 if and only if ϕ = 0 or ψ = 1
• ⊖ϕ = 0, if ϕ = 1.
(Be´ziau’s Translation Paradox)
As previously discussed, |=Classical/2 is strictly included (up to language-
isomorphism g) in the relation |=Classical. This might imply that LClassical/2
is strictly weaker (up to language-isomorphism g) than LClassical. Here, the
immediate connection to the idea of translation is perhaps that LClassical is
thought of as translatable to LClassical/2 (but not vice versa). Thus, for
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two logics LClassical and LClassical/2, the situation becomes that LClassical/2
is strictly included into LClassical which suggests the LClassical/2 is strictly
weaker than LClassical, but LClassical is translatable into LClassical/2. In other
words, while LClassical “specify a copy” of the LClassical/2, LClassical/2 should
be at least strong as LClassical. The LClassical is a “sub-logic” of the LClassical/2
in the sense of being translatable.
The so-called Be´ziau’s translation paradox (compare e.g. [127], [128],
[129]) actually originated from a quite similar situation that has already
been discussed about the development of intuitionistic logic. Graham Priest
stated:
“ [...] If an inference is intuitionistically valid, it is there-
fore classically valid (when ⇁ and ⊐ are replaced with ¬ and ⊃,
respectively). The converse is not true, as we shall see. Hence, in-
tuitionist logic is a sub-logic of classical logic [...] This is not true
of intuitionist mathematics in general. Intuitionist mathematics
endorses some mathematical principles which are not endorsed
in classical mathematics; in fact, they are inconsistent classically.
But because intuitionist logic is weaker than classical logic, the
principles are intuitionistically consistent. For the record, it is
worth noting that there is a certain way of seeing classical logic
as a part of intuitionist logic too [...]” ([171], p. 107)
It is this “certain way” that makes the phenomenon philosophically arguable,
say, a weaker logic is a “sub-logic” of a stronger logic but the latter is “con-
tained” in the former, which suggests the former is at least as strong as the
latter.
3.3 The Development of Logic Translations
within the Abstract Logic Tradition
In order to understand logic translation better, we discuss this in further
detail. An abstract logical perspective runs between different ideas of trans-
lation, ranging from the “rough” to the “rigorous”. Be´ziau’s statement is
a very specific case to provide an approach to examine the relationship be-
tween classical logic and intuitionistic logic from an abstract logical point of
view. For example, we do not need to know much about Glivenko’s theorem
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and what principles intuitionistic logic endorses or not, we only need to have
basic knowledge about some version of CPL.1
3.3.1 Consequence Relations and Logic Translation
Most ideas about logic translation in literature were founded on the discus-
sion of Tarskian logic. Some background on Tarskian logic has already been
mentioned in the previous chapter, but we further offer some definitions to
gain a deeper understanding of logic translation. First, we consider a conse-
quence relation ⊢ to define a logical structure L = 〈F ,⊢〉. Second, we con-
sider a consequence operator Cn to define a logical structure L = 〈F , Cn〉.
The idea of logic translation, in this way, can be traced back to different
sources by these two conceptions of logical structure. Recalling the concep-
tion of Tarskian logic, an arbitrary logical structure is said Tarskian when it
obeys reflexivity, monotonicity, and cut. Now, we explore various ideas on
translation (also see, [65], [76], [84], [223]).
Definition 15. (Rough Translation) A translation from one logic L1 into
logic L2 is defined as mapping: f : L1 → L2, that is to map the set of
formulas in L1 to the set of formulas in L2, such that for any formula ϕ, if
ϕ is a theorem of L1, then f(ϕ) is a theorem of L2.
Definition 16. (Revised Rough Translation (i)) Follow Rough Trans-
lation with a stronger condition:
(a) For any formula ϕ, ϕ is a theorem of L1 iff f(ϕ) is a theorem of L2.
Definition 17. (Revised Rough Translation (ii)) FollowRough Trans-
lation with another stronger condition:
(b) For any set of formulas Γ, formula ϕ, if Γ ⊢L1 ϕ then f(Γ) ⊢L2 f(ϕ).
1Readers might argue that we still need to have knowledge on bivaluation and abstract
logic. This is definitely debatable in methodology. But we should realize that understand-
ing “abstract” logic is not harder than learning CPL, moreover, “bivaluation” is as simple
as the way we assign truth value for formulas in CPL. In addition, intuitionistic logic, as
a deviant logic of classical logic (see, subsection 3.5.2), was born later than classical logic
and is seen as a rival of classical logic.
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Definition 18. (Conservative Translation) FollowRevised Rough Trans-
lation (ii) with a stronger condition than (b):
(c) For any set of formulas Γ, formula ϕ, Γ ⊢L1 ϕ iff f(Γ) ⊢L2 f(ϕ).
The more noteworthy idea on translation is schematic mapping (compare
e.g. [65], [76], [84], [223]). Schematic mapping relies on homomorphism
among formal languages, and involves some diagrammatic representation of
the structures of language expressions. Here, “some” preserved diagram-
matic representations are in a sense algebraic, which is in tune with Tarski’s
paradise.
Definition 19. (Schematic Translation) Let two formal languages L1 and
L2 with only unary ♠ and binary connectives ∐ be given. If for any atomic
formulae a0, a1, . . . , an, · · · ∈ L1, there are schemata of formulae A, B♠,
C∐ ∈ L2 such that the mapping r : L1 %→ L2 satisfies the following conditions,
then r is a schematic mapping.
(1) r(a) = A(a), for every atomic formula a ∈ L1,
(2) r(♠ϕ) = B♠(r(ϕ)), for every unary connective ♠ and formula ϕ of L1,
(3) r(∐(ϕ, ψ)) = C∐(r(ϕ), r(ψ)), for every binary connective ∐ and for-
mula ϕ, ψ of L1.
Definition 15-18 with schematic mapping are schematic translation.
3.4 The Systematic Discussion of Logic Trans-
lations
As mentioned in the introduction, in the development of logic translation and
abstract logic, three systematic discussions arise: firstly, the work of Prawitz
and Malmna¨s in the article A survey of some connections between classical,
intuitionistic and minimal logic (1968) ([169]), notably as primary systematic
discussion in the literature, which defines the term “translation” at a general
level; secondly, the Ryszard Wo´jcicki’s discussions which adopt the abstract
logical perspective fashioned in the Polish school of thought ([223]); thirdly,
the Richard Epstein’s which focus on the translations between propositional
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logics ([76]) and the translation within predicate logic ([74]). These system-
atic discussions and integrations relied on early work on translation, such
as ([133], Kolmogorov, 1925), ([107], Glivenko, 1929), ([109], Go¨del, 1933),
([106], Gentzen, 1933), and ([52], [53], Bloom, Brown, Suszko, 1973). We will
discuss two lines of thought on logic translation which have been the focus
of a large amount of literature.
3.4.1 History: 1968 – 1933 – 1929 – 1925
The first systematic definition of the term “translation” was discussed in
([169], Prawitz and Malmna¨s, 1968) as follows:
(a) Consider two logical systems S1, S2, an interpretation
2 from S1 to S2
is a mapping t from formulas of S1 to S2 such that for any formula ϕ,
⊢S1 ϕ iff ⊢S2 t(ϕ).
(b) For each set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of formulas in S1, Γ ⊢S1 ϕ iff t(Γ) ⊢S2 t(ϕ) where
t(Γ) is the set of replacing all elements ψ of Γ by t(ψ).
The idea in (a) is the same as the revised rough translation (i) (Definition
16). With regard to (a), we can say that S1 is interpretable into S2, and also
that S1 is interpretable into S2 with respect to derivability. Note here that
(b) does coincide with the conservative translation (Definition 18) that
was studied later in the literature (see e.g. [60], [84], [151]). As Mossakowski
et al. stated: “Prawitz and Malmna¨s also use a more permissive notion of
conservative translation where the equivalence is only required for Γ = ∅”
([151], p. 98). This amounts to Definition 16. Prawitz and Malmna¨s also
describe the idea of schematically interpretable as mentioned in Definition
19.
These works shown by Prawitz and Malmna¨s (1968) is the first survey
paper on the early work on translation, including ([133], Kolmogorov, 1925),
([107], Glivenko, 1929), ([109], Go¨del, 1933), and ([106], Gentzen, 1933). We
provide the gist of these papers without delving into the details, after which,
we proceed with our main discussion. These earlier papers focused mainly
on the problem of consistency and the relation between classical logic and
intuitionistic logic. To begin with, let us examine Kolmogorov’s idea on
translation in [133] reflected in the following quotation:
2Specifically, they used the term “interpretation”, whereas we use the term “transla-
tion”.
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“The main purpose of this paper is to prove that classical
mathematics is translatable into intuitionistic mathematics. For
this purpose, with each formula ℑ of mathematics there is asso-
ciated a translation ℑ∗ in a perfectly general manner (IV, § 2).”
([133], pp. 414–415)
Note here that we provide Hao Wang’s introduction before the English trans-
lation of this article; however, in the translation, we replace outdated terms
with modern terms.
(Kolmogorov, 1925)
For H (Hilbert’s formal system of CPL) and B (Brouwer’s formal system of
IPL), there is a translation ∗ from H to B such that for any atomic formula
p there is a corresponding formula (p)∗ which expresses the double negation
of p, denoted as ¬¬p and formulas (¬ϕ)∗, (ϕ → ψ)∗ are defined as ¬¬(¬ϕ∗),
¬¬(ϕ∗ → ψ∗), respectively.
Theorem 20. If Γ = {Γ1, . . . ,Γn} is a set of axioms in H and Γ
∗ =
{Γ∗
1
, . . . ,Γ∗
n
}, then for any formula ϕ, Γ ⊢H ϕ implies Γ
∗ ⊢B ϕ
∗.
Theorem 21. (Glivenko’s Theorem, 1929) (Glivenko’s translation) An arbi-
trary propositional formula ϕ is a theorem of the CPL, i.e. classically prov-
able if and only if ¬¬ϕ is a theorem of IPL, i.e. intuitionistically provable.
(Go¨del, 1933)
For a system of CPL A, and a system of IPL H′, the translation ⋆ from A
to H′ is defined as follows:
(1) ϕ⋆ =df ϕ
(2) (¬ϕ)⋆ =df ¬ϕ
⋆
(3) (ϕ ∧ ψ)⋆ =df ϕ
⋆ ∧ ψ⋆
(4) (ϕ ∨ ψ)⋆ =df ¬(¬ϕ
⋆ ∧ ¬ψ⋆)
(5) (ϕ → ψ)⋆ =df ¬(ϕ
⋆ ∧ ¬ψ⋆), for every atomic formula ϕ, ψ
Theorem 22. ⊢A ϕ implies ⊢H′ ϕ
⋆.
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(Gentzen, 1933)
For a system of CPL A, a system of IPL I, the translation  from A to I
is defined as follows:
(1’) ϕ =df ¬¬ϕ
(2’) (¬ϕ) =df ¬ϕ

(3’) (ϕ ∧ ψ) =df ϕ
 ∧ ψ
(4’) (ϕ ∨ ψ) =df ¬(¬ϕ
 ∧ ¬ψ)
(5’) (ϕ→ ψ) =df ϕ
 → ψ
Theorem 23. Γ ⊢A ϕ if and only if Γ
 ⊢I ϕ
.
Remark 24. Both Kolmogorov and Go¨del’s ideas on translation are special
cases of Definition 16, and Kolmogorov’s idea on translation also satisfies
Definition 17. We see that there is a translation ∗ or ⋆ that is considered
between two formal systems H (Hilbert’s formalization of propositional cal-
culus) and B or H′ (Brouwer’s or Heyting’s formalization of propositional
calculus). Gentzen’s idea on translation is a conservative translation (Def-
inition 18) which indicates the importance of direction, denoted as “⇔”.
Moreover, Gentzen translates implication, denoted as “→” directly rather
than in terms of “¬” and “∧” (Go¨del).
3.4.2 History: 1988 – 1973 – 1971 –
The second systematic research on translation was conducted by Ryszard
Wo´jcicki. Wo´jcicki used on the conception of consequence operators to de-
velop his idea about logic translation, by firstly considering language trans-
lation, that is, “the map” between languages, and secondly by “preserving”
the consequence operators. In other words, it is a derivability preserving
schematic translation. His idea can be viewed as a systematic study of logic
translation from an abstract logical point of view, which can be traced back
to Tarski’s idea of logical consequence (compare e.g. [65], [84], [210], [223]).
Before continuing, we should consider conducted research made by Brown-
Bloom-Suszko on abstract logic ([52], [53], Bloom, Brown, Suszko, 1973).
Brown-Bloom-Suszko’s idea is considered to be a pioneering point of view on
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abstract logic, which enhances an understanding of abstract logic from Polish
school of thought.
Definition 25. (Bloom-Brown-Suszko, 1971, 1973) The objects of the cat-
egory of abstract logics are ordered pairs 〈S, Cn〉 consisting of an abstract
algebra S and a closure operator Cn on S = |S|, the carrier (universe) of S.
If S is a non-empty set, Cn is a closure operator on S then 〈S, Cn〉 is called
a closure space.
Definition 26. Let K1 = 〈S1, Cn1〉, K2 = 〈S2, Cn2〉 be two closure spaces.
A mapping f from S1 to S2 is said to be continuous if f
−1(Z) ∈ Cn1, for
all Z ∈ Cn2. Here f
−1(Z) is the inverse image of Z under f . The set of
all continuous maps of K1 into K2 is denoted as Hom(K1, K2). If both f
and its inverse image f˘ are continuous, i.e., f ∈ Hom(K1, K2) and f
−1(Z) ∈
Hom(K1, K2), then a bijective map f : S1 → S2 is called a homeomorphism
between K1 and K2.
Note here that Brown-Bloom-Suzuko’s idea on abstract logic is a category-
theoretical viewpoint of logic inspired by topology. Naturally, they consider
a logical morphism as the translation between two abstract logics from a
topological point of view.
Adopting the position of abstract logic taken in the Polish school of
thought with respect to consequence operations, Wo´jcicki’s systematic study
on the logic translation is as follows:
(Wo´jcicki, 1988)
Given two propositional languages S1, S2 with the same variables, a mapping
t : S1 &→ S2 is a translation from S1 to S2 iff two conditions are satisfied:
(i) There is a formula ϕ(p0) ∈ S2 in one variable p0 such that for each
variable p, t(p) = ϕ(p).
(ii) For each connective ρi of S1 there is a formula ϕi ∈ S2 such that for all
terms α1, . . . , αk ∈ S1, k being the arity of ρi, we have that
t(ρi(α1, . . . , αk)) = ϕi(tα1/p1, . . . , tαk/pk).
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For two propositional calculi C1 = (S1, Cn1), C2 = (S2, Cn2), if there is a
translation t from S1 into S2 such that for all X ⊆ S1 and all α ∈ S1,
α ∈ Cn1(X) ⇔ tα ∈ Cn2(t(X))
then C1 has a translation in C2.
3.4.3 History: 2006 – 1990 –
The third systematic research on translation was conducted by Richard Ep-
stein. Epstein’s study on translation is divided into two parts, one to study a
general idea on translation between propositional logics ([76], Epstein, 1990)
and the other to study the translation within classical predicate logic ([74],
Epstein, 2006). Epstein’s statements regarding translation can be considered
at two different levels— the level of propositional logic and that of predicate
logic level.
Definition 27. (Epstein, 1990) A validity mapping of a propositional logic
L1 into a propositional logic L2 is a map t from language of L1 to language
L2 such that for every ϕ,
|=L1 ϕ ⇔ |=L2 t(ϕ).
Definition 28. (Epstein, 1990) For any theory Γ, formula ϕ, if the mapping
relation from t to t(Γ) = {t(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ Γ}, such that
Γ |=L1 ϕ ⇔ t(Γ) |=L2 t(ϕ)
then this mapping relation is a translation from logic L1 to logic L2, denoted
as L1 →֒ L2.
Definition 29. (Epstein, 2006) Given two theories T,R in first-order clas-
sical predicate logic and a mapping t from the language of T to the language
of R.
1. t is validity-preserving iff for every ϕ, |=T ϕ iff |=R ϕ.
2. t is a translation of T into R iff for every Γ and ϕ, Γ |=T ϕ iff t(Γ) |=R
t(ϕ).
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Note here that the term “translation” in ([76], Epstein, 1990) is used to
discuss the translation between two logics, L1 and L2. In ([74], Epstein,
2006), the term “translation” is used to discuss two different theories, T and
R, both of which are in the same first-order logic. To explain the motivation
to consider translation between two theories, Esptein states:
“[...] Mathematicians typically conceive of reductions of one
theory to another as transforming models of one to models of the
other, rather than as linguistic mappings.” ([74], p. 405)
Recall some basic notions: given a theory Σ and a class of models S. Th(S) =
{ϕ | for everyM in S,M |= ϕ}. The idea of model-preserving mapping
as follows:
(Epstein, 2006)
Let T = Th(T ) and R = Th(R) be two theories with respect to classes of
models T ,R in classical predicate logic, τ is a mapping from language of T
to language of R. If an onto mapping τ from R to T such that for every ϕ in
language of T, every modelM in R, the satisfaction condition: τ(M) |= ϕ
iff M |= τ(ϕ) holds, then τ is a model-preserving mapping with respect to
T and R.
Theorem 30. (Epstein, 2006) Every model-preserving mapping is a trans-
lation.
Proof. Assume τ is a model-preserving mapping from T to R with respect
to classes of models T ,R, then we claim τ is also a translation, i.e., we prove
Γ |=T ϕ if and only if t(Γ) |=R τ(ϕ) holds.
Γ |=T ϕ
⇐⇒ For any modelM∈ T ,M |= Γ impliesM |= ϕ.
⇐⇒ For any model N ∈ R, τ(N ) |= Γ implies τ(N ) |= ϕ, since τ is onto.
⇐⇒ For any model N ∈ R, N |= τ(Γ) implies N |= τ(ϕ), since τ is model-
preserving.
⇐⇒ τ(Γ) |=R τ(ϕ).
So far, we have seen many different ideas about logic translation in the
literature. These ideas can roughly be classified into two periods:
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(i) Kolmogorov-Glivenko-Go¨del-Gentzen to Esptein-Wo´jcicki period (KGGG-
EW):This period focuses on logical relation ⊢.
(ii) Bloom-Brown-Suszko to Brazilian-Esptein-Wo´jcicki period (BBS-BEW):
This period focuses on consequence relation Cn.
It is worth mentioning the difference between the two, since it shows that
logic has begun to be viewed as a finitary consequence operator in period
(ii) and it also highlights the trend of seeing logic in general or consider-
ing abstract logic, as Bloom-Brown-Suszko did. Research conducted in the
(BBS-BEW) period, from the abstract logic viewpoint, is concerned about
“consequence operator Cn”. Logics is characterized as sets with consequence
operator Cn, and translation as continuous functions between Cn. Although
research in the KGGG-EW period was also conducted from the abstract
logic viewpoint, it differs in that it discusses the concept of logic translation
by considering abstract logical structures instead of studying translation of
individual logics directly.
3.5 Logic Translation and the Deviance of Log-
ics
Traditionally, investigations into logic translation mainly focused on the re-
lationship between classical logic and intuitionistic logic. The study of logic
translation can be carried out to a large extent independently of the dis-
cussions of these two logics. Apart from the concerns of these fundamental
investigations, some researches into logic translation can be found (e.g. [137],
[112], [150]). It is true that, at certain times in the twentieth century, var-
ious logicians have endorsed intuitionistic logic. This is particularly true of
logicians in the realm of the philosophy of mathematics and logics. Kurt
Go¨del, for example, studied the translation from IPL to modal system G
([109]) which is a quite different idea from the discussion in previous sec-
tions. However it is fair to say that, at least since the discussions of various
non-classical logics in philosophy and theoretical computer sciences, little at-
tention has been paid on the classification of non-classical logics. Hence, we
attempt to have a broader discussion than that of logic translation between
classical logic and intuitionistic logic. In this section, we will attempt to re-
late the classification to the study of logic translation by means of a similar
discussion on the deviance of logics by Susan Haack (see [116], [118]).
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3.5.1 From Expansion/Reduct Cases to Deviant Cases
First of all, we make a distinction between two concepts: expansion and ex-
tension.
Given two structures S1, S2, S1 is a structure equipped with a domain D1
and a certain type of this structure T1, and S2 is a structure equipped with a
domain D2 and a certain type of this structure T2, denoted as S1 = 〈D1;T1〉,
S2 = 〈D2;T2〉, respectively.
(i) S1 is an expansion of S2 or we can say S2 is reduct of S1 if and only
if (1) D1 = D2 and (2) the type of S1 is included into S2, denoted as
T1 ⊆ T2.
(ii) S1 is an extension of S2 or we say S2 is a substructure of S1 if and only
if (1) D1 ⊆ D2 and (2) T1 = T2
In the following two examples:
• Z = 〈Z,+,×,≤〉 is an extension of N = 〈N,+,×,≤〉.
• K = 〈K,¬,∧,∨,→,⊢〉 is an expansion of K = 〈K,¬,∧,→,⊢〉.
Recalling the definitions of translation, the concept of logic translation might
be intuitively defined as the map preserving consequence relations or con-
sequence operators. Here, the “source” is selected in translation; then we
consider the “target”. First of all, given a formal language for the source, we
consider its expansion by adding a logical constant or its reduct by excluding
some logical constant for the target. For example, given a formal language
FPL for CPL as the source language, where A = {pn}n<ω is a countable
collection of propositional atoms and P is the set of propositional formulae
created from A by ¬, ∧, ∨, and →. Now, if we consider a expansion of
FPL by adding , ♦, then P should also expand to be MP that is built
from {¬,∧,∨,→} ∪ {,♦}; if we consider a reduct of FPL by excluding ¬,
then P should also reduce to be P− that is built from {∧,∨,→}. MP is the
formal language for modal propositional logic and P− is the formal language
for positive classical propositional logic (PCPL) (i.e., without negation).
After determining the structure of the two languages, we consider any
potential to conduct translations between the logics described by the source
languages and the target languages. Logic translations in this sense are
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quite different from the translation between classical logic and intuitionistic
logic that we have discussed. A famous example signifies this sort of logic
translation as follows:
(Go¨del, 1933)
Go¨del provides a translation from IPL to his “modal” system G ([109], p.
301). which is an example of expanding formal language. The modal system
G is an expansion of IPL by adding logical constant B, which is interpreted
as standing “provable”. Bp means “p is provable”. Except axioms of IPL,
G follows other axioms and a new rule of inference.
1. Bp→ p
2. Bp→ (B(p→ q)→ Bq)
3. Bp→ BBp
New inference rule: A
BA
, which means “from A, BA may be inferred.” The
mapping procedure Ω : IPL→ G is as follows:
(1) ϕΩ =df ϕ
(2) (¬ϕ)Ω =df ¬Bϕ
Ω
(3) (ϕ ∧ ψ)Ω =df ϕ
Ω ∧ ψΩ
(4) (ϕ ∨ ψ)Ω =df Bϕ
Ω ∨ BψΩ
(5) (ϕ→ ψ)Ω =df Bϕ
Ω → BψΩ
Theorem 31. ⊢IPL ϕ implies ⊢G ϕ
Ω.
In Go¨del’s example, as we saw here, it is assumed that we have a source
language (e.g., formal language for IPL), then we expand the languages
employed. Now the observation posed by the translation between classical
logic and intuitionistic logic, weakens the conditions of logical constants in
classical logic with the same language. Here, we discuss some deviant cases :
the translation from CPL to IPL.
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3.5.2 Deviance of Logics
As we have seen, discussions of expansions/reducts of languages are mechan-
ical adjustments from a formal language of propositional logic to another
formal language; further, only some of the logical terms were excluded from
{¬,∨,∧,→}, for example, positive CPL, or some modal terms were added,
namely, to propositional modal logics.
Haack’s Deviant Logic (Haack, 1974, 1996)
Although logicians such as Patrick Blackburn and Johan van Benthem con-
sidered the standard translation of modal language into classical first-order
or second-order languages (see [49]), what attracts us is not only the relation
of IPL and CPL, but also the relation of other deviant logics and CPL,
moreover classical first-order logic. Next, we discuss the basic distinction
between extended logics and deviant logics made by Susan Haack (see e.g.
[116], [117], [118]). Most related philosophical debates on Haack’s discussion
are about whether “deviance” is a sufficient condition to rival classical logic.
Here, we do not discuss these debates. We try to apply this distinction to
argue the reliability of the distinction between two concepts: deviant logic
translation and extended logic translation. Finally, we discuss the critical
opinions proposed by Be´ziau (in [32]) and what the Universal Logic project
expected to do for traditional studies of the philosophy of logic. Recalling
Be´ziau’s Translation Paradox, we can see that the method of translation in-
volves adjusting (in this case, weakening) the conditions of logical constants.
By Haack’s definition, the adjusted logic (weakened logic) in this case is pre-
cisely a deviant logic. In addition to this, there are other deviant logics,
such as paraconsistent logic, relevant logic, free logic, and intuitionistic logic.
Consider the following definition by Haack: ([116], p. 4)
(1) “The class of well-formed formula of L1 and the class of well-formed
formula of L2 coincide, but the class of theorems/valid inferences of L1
differs from the class of theorems/valid inference of L2. In this case L1,
L2 are deviations of each other.
(2) The class of well-formed formula of L1 properly includes the class of
well-formed formula of L2 and the class of theorems/valid inferences of
L1 properly includes the class of theorems/valid inferences of L2, the
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additional theorems/valid inferences of L1 all containing essentially oc-
currences of L1’s additional vocabulary. In this case L1 is an extension
of L2.”
In other words, for any one of the various non-classical systems of logic, if
the set of generated well-formed formulas is equal to that of classical logic
but the set of generated theorems is different from generated by classical
logic, then we call this non-classical system of logic a “deviant logic”.
According to Haack, some deviant logics rival the logics that are deviated.
We do not debate whether “deviance” is a sufficient or necessary condition
for deviant logics “being a rival” to deviated logics. Here, we discuss how
all deviant logics (e.g. IPL) disagree in some way with deviated logics (e.g.
CPL). For example, paraconsistent logics disagree in some way with classical
logic as well as relevance logic, intuitionistic logic, free logic, etc. These
represent case-by-case differences and there are fewer common disagreements
with classical logic. We further promote Haack’s definition to the discussion
of logic translation, and we try to distinguish different logic translations using
Haack’s idea of deviant logic. Following the examples of logic translation that
we have discussed so far, we can make a distinction in the studies of logic
translation using Haack’s distinction:
(1) a translation from CPL to IPL is called a deviant logic translation,
which is between a deviant logic and a deviated logic;
(2) a translation from IPL to modal system G is called an extended logic
translation, which is between two logics based on the formal language
expansion.
This distinction between deviant logic translation and extended logic trans-
lation seems vacuous. However, case (1) discusses two logics in one formal
language which generates different well-formed formulae, and case (2) dis-
cusses two logics in two formal languages, of which the language expansion
generates more well-formed formulae. Many find it difficult to consider that
the translation relations in these two cases are of the same kind.
Since we started this section with a discussion of deviant logics, let us
finish by relating it to the Universal Logic project. So far, we have seen
the second sense of logic translation other than the logic translation between
classical logic (deviated logic) and intuitionistic logic (deviant logic). The
stimulus to address this distinction is Go¨del’s example from IPL to modal
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system G, with the help of Haack’s famous distinction about various non-
classical systems of logic. A criticism made by Be´ziau was that Universal
Logic should provide a systematic framework for old ideas in the philosophy
of logic. He said that the reasonable distinction made by Haack lacks serious
and systematic theory from the Universal Logic point of view as follows:
“[...] that it doesn’t rest upon any serious and systematic
theory, but only on some ideas thrown in the air and explained
and justified with basic elementary examples.” ([32], p. 143).
He suggests that in order to make these distinctions, we need some new
concepts and an entire theory (Ibid, p. 143) within the framework of Universal
Logic. Universal Logic should provide a systematic framework to justify these
distinctions with more than only the help of case study examples. Otherwise,
as stated by Be´ziau, the case where CPL is definable within IPL seems to,
in some sense, consider IPL an extension of CPL ([32], p. 143), making
Haack’s distinction unjustifiable. In the same manner, Universal Logic is
expected to propose a systematic study on the concepts of logic translation,
which will help us better understand the philosophical concepts of Haack’s
distinction, as well as enhance our understanding of the whole picture of logic
translation investigations.
3.6 Conclusion
Traditionally speaking, intuitionistic logic was seen as a sublogic of classical
logic, however, the studies on logic translation, especially the phenomenon
of the translation paradox, are not clear enough for us to tell which one is
stronger or weaker, which one should be seen as an extension of the other, or
which one is indeed translatable to the other. As per the distinction made
by us in this chapter, the translation from CPL to IPL is concerned with
the translation of deviant logics; the translation from IPL to G is concerned
with the translation between extended logics and the original logics. The
notion of deviant translation could help us understand the relationship of
deviated logic and deviant logic. For example, intuitionistic logic is a deviant
of classical logic, and classical logic is a deviant of paraconsistent logic.3
3Intuitionistic logic is seen as target logic and classical logic is seen as source logic in
the former case; classical logic is seen as target logic and paraconsistent logic is seen as
source logic in the latter case.
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In other words, there is a deviant relation between intuitionistic logic and
classical logic, and there is, as well, another deviant relation between classical
logic and paraconsistent logic. However, there is no deviant relation between
intuitionistic logic and paraconsistent logic in this way, although there might
be a certain deviant relation between intuitionistic logic and paraconsistent
intuitionistic logic, where the latter is a deviant of the former. “Deviance”
always plays the key role.
The prima facie meaning of sub-super logic is intuitively realized as the
subset (superset) in set theory; that is, logic L1 is a sublogic of logic L2
which means that “something” of L1 is weaker/less than (or contained in)
L2. Nevertheless, we realize that sublogic in the aforementioned sense is
too vague. In this chapter, we have discussed some clear meanings that
support the use of this concept. First, the concept of sublogic should be
distinct from that of the strength of logics. Secondly, the definition of the
concept of sublogic should be clarified, that is, the relation of “weaker than”
should be clarified and be distinct from the relation of sublogic. Moreover,
the relation of “sublogic” should be treated in a rigorous way. We suggest
that the clarification of the meaning of sublogic and that of the strength
of logics should be within the framework of Logic Translation. It is worth
noting that the clarification between strength of logics and sublogic should
be about deviant logic translation, since the adjustment of logical principles
of classical logic causes the birth of deviant logics, moreover the birth of
deviant logic translation.
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Chapter 4
Pluralism in Logic
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4.1 Introduction
Just as one may ask what insight might be like if logic translation could
be addressed as the new subject in the logical community, so one may ask
what it must be like if logical pluralism could be treated seriously in the
philosophy of logic. This chapter discusses pluralism in logic, a subject made
fashionable through the work of J.C. Beall and Greg Restall. Pluralism in
logic can be traced back to ideas raised by Ruldof Carnap (1934). In this
chapter, we take up not only the stances of pluralism expressed by Beall
and Restall’s logical pluralism (BRLP), but we also ask what monism must
be like if BRLP is regarded as a sort of pluralism. This chapter is in some
sense quite independent from the rest of the dissertation, however, it should
be treated as a philosophical and fundamental study to the series of logic
translation investigations. In this way, we will better understand the role
that pluralism could play in the Universal Logic project.
69
70 CHAPTER 4. PLURALISM IN LOGIC
This chapter addresses philosophical questions related to logic translation,
namely it aims to substantiate the fundamental part of logic translation in-
vestigations by answering the following three basic questions: (1) What is
logical pluralism?; (2) Is it correct only to claim the singularity of classical
logic as the only one true logic?; (3) Is there a universality of the mode of cog-
nitive processes? To answer these questions, first of all, we take BRLP as the
modern landmark for pluralism usually discussed in logic. Then, we endorse
Rudolf Carnap’s principle of tolerance as the central dogma to the concept
of pluralism in logic, i.e., plurality in various logics within one dogma. Sec-
ondly, to structure and discuss BRLP in a critical manner, we base our work
on the style of modern analytic philosophy in order to challenge the concept
that BRLP does not capture the intuitive concept of plurality and pluralism,
like some examples that have been forcefully argued by John Etchemendy on
the concept of logical consequence ([77], [78], [79]) and Kurt Go¨del ([75], pp.
228–229). In particular, in this chapter, we distinguish the scope of pluralism
and monism in logic and some different kinds of formulations will be derived
from BRLP.
Moreover, we employ the cultural psychological perspective to formulate
the revision of “logical” pluralism under the assumption of taking “logic as
cognitive process”. We show how the notion of plurality can be understood
to benefit both philosophers and computer scientists ([137], [150]). In the
next chapter, we will show how different modes of cognitive processes over
logic translation are related to this philosophical proposal to connect the next
chapter in order to answer the third basic question.
4.2 Truth-Preservation and GTT
In logic, there is a long tradition of attempting to provide a criterion to the
validity of various arguments by the concept of “truth-preservation” and the
concept of logical consequence. This was first proposed by Beall and Restall
in 1999 (see [12], [13]) in what they call the GTT(Generalized Tarski
Thesis).
(GTT): An argument is validx if and only if, in every casex in which the
premises are true, so is the conclusion.
BRLP is a pluralism about the concept of logical consequence. That is to
say, “there is more than one relation of logical consequence.” ([10], p. 25)
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In the philosophy of logic, the idea of logical pluralism does not have a
long history. It can be traced back to Carnap’s principle of tolerance Ruldof
Carnap, in ‘The logical syntax of language’([59]), put forward the principle
of tolerance as follows:
“It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive
at conventions. ...In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at
liberty to build his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he
wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss
it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules
instead of philosophical arguments.” ([59],§17)
The idea of logical pluralism has been debated heavily within the intersec-
tion of philosophy and logic (compare [10], [21], [81], [173]). Pluralism in
logic has become in vogue after BRLP and is seen as a new landmark for the
logical pluralist thesis. Carnap argues that people should not be forbidden
to choose logics for themselves; in fact, they should be required to provide
their reasoning for choosing a particular logic and for the consequences of
the choices made. It is apparent that this principle focuses on the “liberty”
to choose a language. Moreover, the choice of language needs to be vali-
dated with statements about the methods and syntactical rules used when
determining whether or not an argument is valid. For instance, we may con-
struct a logic based on the choice of a language, such as CPL, IPL, relevant
logic, or paraconsistent logic. This principle allows us to admit different log-
ics in different philosophical situations and different practical applications in
computer science.1
Although people have attributed the origin of pluralism in logic to Car-
nap’s principle of tolerance, proponents of BRLP criticized Carnap’s version
of pluralism, stating: “according to Carnap, given an argument, the valid-
ity of the argument is determined by the languages we choose.” Further,
disputes about the validity of this argument become disagreements in our
understanding of the argument. Thus, we can interpret this argument as
being in Language X or as in Language Y . Therefore, there will be no real
disagreement on the validity of a given argument because the disagreement
is on the choice of language” (See [193], p. 431).
1For example, by taking Carnap’s principle, Kutz et al. ([137]) acknowledge the situa-
tion that there are various kinds of ontologies to target at various domains of applications,
and moreover, they are formulated in varying logical languages.
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This is a direct criticism of the principle of tolerance. In a different way,
Beall and Restall developed their own pluralism in logic. Firstly, BRLP
considers that logic is a matter of truth-preservation in all cases of GTT.
Secondly, to specify a logic is to give an account of the cases in GTT. Ac-
cording to Beall and Restall’s assertion, in order to determine the logic, one
must specify the cases. Thirdly, BRLP claims that there are exactly three
different logical consequence relations: classical, relevant, and constructive,
and these three are equally good and do not compete with each other.
4.2.1 The Classical case and GTT
“To construct a logic needs to specify what the casesx are
and to give an account of a claim to be truth in a case.” ([12], p.
476–77)
There are two different approaches of fleshing out GTT so as to develop it
as classical logic: (a) the possible-world approach and (b) the Tarski-model
approach
(a) The possible-world approach means: (i) to take cases of GTT as
possible worlds ; (ii) to state what account of a given claim is to be true in
possible worlds as follows:
For any claim ϕ, ψ and world w,
• ¬ϕ is true in w iff ϕ is not true in w.
• ϕ ∧ ψ is true in w iff ϕ is true in w and ψ is true in w.
• ϕ ∨ ψ is true in w iff ϕ is true in w or ψ is true in w.
• ∀xϕ(x) is true iff for every object a ∈ w, ϕ(a) is true in w.
• ∃xϕ(x) is true iff for some object a ∈ w, ϕ(a) is true in w.
In this approach, we can confirm that the truth-preservation criterion in
classical logic is satisfied as follows:
(GTTPW ): An argument is valid if and only if, in every possible world,
in which the premises are true, so is the conclusion.
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Example 32. (Ibid, p. 478)
Considering an argument that states “if an object is red, then is colored,” we
apply the possible-world approach to it to check its validity. It is easy to see
that in any case (possible world), where something is red, it is also colored;
it is impossible for something that is red to not be colored.
To elucidate, this specifies a necessary truth-preservation account of va-
lidity by this possible worlds approach. However, this is not the only way in
which GTT can be applied to classical logic in BRLP. The other approach is
the Tarskian-Model approach.
(b) The Tarskian-model approach means: (i) to take cases of GTT as
Tarskian models ; (ii) to state what account of a given is to be true in every
model.
A Tarskian-model is a structure M = 〈D, I〉 consisting of a nonempty
set D as a domain and an interpretation function I, which interprets a name
N into the domain D, symbolized as I(N) ∈ D. If N is a n-place predicate,
I(N) is a set of ordered n-tuples of D elements. We use model M to inter-
pret the formal language of first-order logic as follows:
Mβ represents a model M under the assignment β. β is a value assign-
ment to assign the value to variables, i.e., β(x) is the value of the variable x.
If a is a name, then Iβ(a) = I(a). If β is an assignment to assign the elements
in D to variables x, then Iβ(x) = β(x). For the predicate symbol f ∈M, any
term t1, . . . , tn,n ∈ N in this formal language L, f(t1, . . . , tn) is also a term in
L, and f(t1, . . . , tn) is true in Mβ if and only if 〈Iβ(t1), . . . , Iβ(tn)〉 ∈ I(f).
For any formula ϕ, ψ,
• ϕ∧ψ is true in Mβ if and only if ϕ is true in Mβ and ψ is true in Mβ.
• ϕ ∨ ψ is true in Mβ if and only if ϕ is true in Mβ or ψ is true in Mβ.
• ¬ϕ is true in Mβ if and only if ϕ is not true in Mβ.
• ∀xϕ is true in Mβ if and only if ϕ is true in Mβ′ for each x-variant β
′
of β.
• ∃xϕ is true in Mβ if and only if ϕ is true in Mβ′ for some x-variant β
′
of β.
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By this recursive definition, we can determine the truth in the Tarskian model
for any sentence of this first-order language. We consider the Tarskian model
to be a case in GTT, such that it can be specified as follows:
(GTTTM): An argument is valid if and only if, in every model in which
the premises are true, so is the conclusion.
GTTTM and GTTPW are two accounts of truth-preservation in classical
logic. The Tarski-model approach in the study of logical consequence. It
states that the validity of an argument is determined by its logical form,
i.e., validity is a matter of form. The argument in Example 32 could be
formalized as RX ⊢ CX in first-order language where RX represents ‘X is
red’, and CX represents ‘X is colored’. It is easy to find a counterexample to
make the premise true and the conclusion untrue in the form of this argument,
i.e., it is an invalid argument. Hence, it does not follow GTT. However,
Tarski’s model-theoretic approach is an alternative for the necessary truth-
preservation criterion.
4.2.2 The Relevant Case and GTT
The relevant case is a restriction of approach (a). In approach (a), GTT
generates logical consequence in the classical sense, i.e., GTTPW refers to
classical logical consequence when cases are referred to as possible worlds. In
this way, “cases (possible worlds) are complete and consistent with respect
to negation”. ([10], p. 49) For English users, there is another strong sense of
“follow from”; here, “ ‘from’ is taken seriously.” (Ibid.) Further, two examples
of arguments are always discussed. It is not valid that for any sentence ψ
follows from any contradiction ϕ∧¬ϕ; it is also not valid that any tautology
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ follows from any sentence ψ. This inevitably leads to a revision of
classical logical, resulting in the birth of relevant logic. Beall and Restall
propose this account of cases for logical consequence in the sense of relevance
to claim that the premises have to be “relevant” to the conclusions. This
means that some valid classical logical consequence relations become invalid.
The situation approach is claimed to flesh out GTT for relevant logic in
BRLP.
(c) The situation approachmeans: (i) to take cases of GTT as situations ;
(ii) to state what account of a given claim is to be true in situations.
In approach (c), conjunction and disjunction behave in exactly the same
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manner as they do in classical logic approach (a). Thus, let us first consider
the truth-conditions of these two propositional connectives as follows:
• ϕ ∧ ψ is true in s if and only if ϕ is true in s and ψ is true in s.
• ϕ ∨ ψ is true in s if and only if ϕ is true in s or ψ is true in s.
With regard to situation approach (c), the main challenge to classical logic is
the classical account of the behavior of negation. This challenge will change
the truth-condition of the propositional connectives.
The idea of this approach is that “situations may be incomplete”. A
situation may make some statements true and others false. However, by
virtue of being restricted to parts of the world, a situation may fail to make
a claim true or make it false ([10], p. 50). Hence, some statements are
undetermined.
According to BRLP, the possible worlds are taken as “special situations”
that are complete and consistent. Given the “undetermined” statements,
we can assume that relevant negation is different from classical negation.
Classical negation is “over complete and consistent values of casex.” ([10], p.
51) It is “complete and consistent with respect to negation.” (Ibid, p. 49)
However, situations are not always complete and consistent. For example,
in fiction, inconsistent situations do occur.2 Hence, in this way, incomplete
or inconsistent worlds can be considered. In approach (c), the cases refer
to “situations” instead of “worlds.” Given that possible worlds are consid-
ered as special situations, i.e., complete and consistent situations, the truth-
condition of classical negation cannot fully capture the behavior of negation
once we begin to consider negation with respect to situations. In other words,
those ignored “situations” have to be reconsidered here. Hence, if a sentence
ϕ is not true, the negation of ϕ does not have to be true; moreover, if the
“true contradiction”, ϕ∧¬ϕ holds, ψ does not have to follow from it, for any
ψ.
For classical negation, the truth-condition is as follows: ¬ϕ is true in a casex
if and only if ϕ is not true in casex. In BRLP, it is suggested that relation
of compatibility is used to analyze the semantics of negation.3
2As Beall and Restall suggest, an inconsistent but perfectly intelligible story has been
provided by Graham Priest in [180]. As Priest stated in the abstract of this article: “The
existence of such a story is used to establish various views about truth in fiction and
impossible worlds.”
3The analysis of the semantic of negation was proposed by Michael Dunn in 1994 and
1996. It is not the only approach of the semantic of negation, but it is preferable in Beall
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• ¬ϕ is true in s if and only if for any s′, s′ is compatible with s, ϕ is not
true in s′.
Further, we formulate the truth-conditions of quantifiers by using the
same consideration of compatibility:
• ∀xϕ is true in s if and only if for any s
′, s′ is compatible with s, ϕ is
true in s′.
• ∃xϕ is true in s if and only if there is some s
′, s′ is compatible with s,
ϕ is true in s′.
The notion of specifying “cases” in GTT to “situations” in BRLP is in a way
attempting to follow both approaches (a) and (b), fleshing out GTT, but,
moreover, going beyond truth-preservation in “possible worlds.” Thus, what
is required here is to go beyond “the constraints” of the worlds, and to obtain
some kind of “truth-preservation,” i.e., “truth-preservation over situations.”
Recalling the two examples of invalid arguments in classical logic, we can
state that the “behavior of negation” constrains possible worlds from be-
ing complete and consistent. This means that classical logical consequence,
restricted to referring cases in GTT to be possible worlds (approach (a)),
makes (constrained) possible worlds complete and consistent with respect to
negation. According to BRLP, specifying cases as “situations” enables one
to specify “relevant logical consequences,” under the condition that “possible
worlds” in approach (a) are considered as special “situations.” By removing
completeness and consistency in GTTPW , we can state that relevant logical
consequence is an incomplete and inconsistent case of GTT. Hence, the va-
lidity of an argument can be expressed as follows:
(GTTRE): An argument is valid if and only if in every situation in which
the premises are true, so is the conclusion.
Based on the situation semantics ,4 “possible worlds” in approach (a) can
be extended to situations. Any statement that is true in the possible worlds in
and Restall’s theory (See, [10], p. 52).
4As an alternative to the possible world semantics, this work can be traced back to
([16], Barwise, 1989) and ([17], Barwise and Perry, 1983) in the eighties. As we show
here, situations, unlike worlds, are not complete in the sense that every proposition or
its negation holds in a world. Further, meaning is related to the relationship between
discourse situations.
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GTTPW has been considered in situations. GTTRE is a more general version
of GTTPW since possible worlds can be seen as special situations: complete
and consistent situations. Generally speaking, this approach suggests a wider
view to describe the behavior of negation in classical logic.
4.2.3 The Constructive case and GTT
The constructive approach stems from the birth of intuitionistic logic (con-
structive logic), which is a variant (deviant) of classical logic. In BRLP, it is
used to instantiate GTT into constructive GTTIN . It is similar to the sys-
tem of possible worlds applied in approach (a) for classical logic and those
of situations applied in approach (c) for relevant logic.
(d) The constructive approachmeans: (i) to take cases of GTT as stages ;
(ii) to state what account of a given claim is to be true in stages.
In BRLP, there are three crucial features of the stages. (In [10], p. 62)
• Stages are incomplete since it “might neither verify a claim nor its
negation; we need not posses total information at each step of our
enquiry.”
• Stages are extensible since a stage, s, “might be followed by (extended
by) another stages s′ : s ⊆ s′.”
• Stages are partially ordered by this relation since the inclusion rela-
tion ⊆ is reflexive, transitive, anti-symmetric on the set of stages, ⊆ is
a partially ordered relation.
In sum, stages are incomplete, extensible and partially ordered by the
relation of inclusion ⊆. Similar to the above three mentioned approaches, we
discuss the truth in a case for the constructive approach and the instantiate
GTT, GTTIN . Before proceeding to check the conditions of the propositional
connectives, we first draw attention to another property: cumulative. This
property represents the relationship between “the truth of propositions ϕ
according to a stage” and “the inclusion relation ⊆”. Further, this property
demonstrates that the information that is provided in stage s is also inherited
to stage s′.
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Given any stage s and formula ϕ, ψ, if s ⊆ s′ and ϕ is true in s,
then ϕ is also true in s′.5 (Property of Cumulative)
Next, we check the truth-conditions of propositional connectives ∨, ∧ as
follows:
• ϕ ∧ ψ is true in s if and only if ϕ is true in s and ψ is true in s.
• ϕ ∨ ψ is true in s if and only if ϕ is true in s or ψ is true in s.
The truth-conditions w.r.t. “case” in approaches (a), (b), and (c) are as
follows: ¬ϕ is true in “case” if and only if ϕ is not true in “case”. This
truth-condition assumes “case” is complete with respect to negation. How-
ever, since “case” might be incomplete with respect to negation in intuition-
istic logic, it is too strong to assert a similar truth-condition of negation.
According to Beall and Restall: “it is too much to say that ¬ϕ is true in
s if and only if ϕ is not true in s′.” ([10], p. 63) Hence, the truth-condition
of negation in stages (in intuitionistic logic), which might be “incomplete,”
should be expressed as:
• ¬ϕ is true in s if and only if for any s ⊆ s′, ϕ is not true in s.
However, “consistency” is required in intuitionistic logic. If ¬ϕ is true in s,
then ϕ is not true in s, moreover, if s′ is the succeeding stage of s, by the
cumulative property, ϕ is not true in s′.
For implication →, in classical logic, ϕ → ψ is equivalent to ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, so
it is sufficient to let ϕ entail ψ in classical logic. However, this equivalence
is too strong to hold in intuitionistic logic. First of all, for the weakest form
of entailment, ϕ → ϕ, there is no further information required to infer ϕ
besides ϕ itself. ϕ → ϕ is the weakest one in all propositions to let ϕ be
sufficient to entail ϕ. We also know that ϕ → ϕ is equivalent to ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ
classically, so ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ could also be sufficient to let ϕ entail ϕ, or ¬ϕ entail
¬ϕ. However, ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ is not true in all stages; but it is true in those stages
where ϕ was decided (constructed) in a certain way. ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ could not be a
5According to BRLP, we can consider this property in the following two ways: (a)
This property provides that if any simple proposition is evaluated, then its evaluated
value (truth) at any stage also holds in complex ones by an induction process. (b) This
property can be regarded as a global condition which governs all propositions, and we can
further check if any truth-conditions and definitions of complex propositions are consistent
with the property.
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form of entailment. Hence, the truth-condition of implication here is similar
to those of cases in approaches (a), (b), (c): ϕ→ ψ is true in s, if and only
if, “ϕ is true in s implies ψ is true in s”. With the help of taking cases as
stages, ϕ→ ψ is true in s and s ⊆ s′, everything true at s is also true in s′,
we get the truth-condition of implication in approach (d) as follows:
• ϕ → ψ is true in s if and only if for any s ⊆ s′, if ϕ is true in s′, then
ψ is true in s′.
When discussing quantifiers, we need to know when an object is available.
One needs to check if “an object is available for evaluation at a stage.” This
condition emphasizes the sequential constructivity of stages in GTTIN . Due
to this property, the range of a quantifier cannot be affirmatively ensured at
stages, since stages are neither “omniscient with respect to the information
they warrant” nor “omniscient with respect to the objects they know about.”
(Ibid, p. 63) For quantifiers ∃, we should note that the stages might be
incomplete in this approach. This means an object might be “unavailable”
to instantiate an existential quantifier. The form ∃xϕ(x) needs an available
witness w such that ϕ(w) is true in s.
• ∃xϕ(x) is true in s if and on if ϕ(w) is true in s, for some w which is
available in s.
An important constraint is that objects available at a stage are also available
at all later stages: If s ⊆ s′ and an object a is available at s, it is available at
s′. For quantifiers ∀, it is not enough to say for all available witnesses w in
s such that the ϕ(w) is true in s. Stages are sequential. When we consider
the truth-condition of ∀, it is possible that counterexamples, which do not
occur in the predecessor stages, occur in a later stage. Hence, a constraint is
placed on the later stages so as to ensure that the truth-condition is suitable.
• ∀xϕ(x) is true in s if and only if for each s ⊆ s
′ and for each w available
at s′, ϕ(w) is true in s′.
In light of the above concepts regarding propositional connectives and
quantifiers, the validity of an argument can be expressed as follows: ([10] p.
64)
(GTTIN): (i) Given a system of stages, an argument is valid (with respect
to the given system of stages) if and only if, in every stage in which the
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premises are true, so is the conclusion; (ii) an argument is constructively
valid or intuitionistically valid if and only if it is valid in all systems of
stages.
4.2.4 A Unified Model of Negation
BRLP proposes a model to unify the three various logical consequences.
This idea originates from the fact that many aspects of a thing could be
equally correct. First of all, we see a metaphor: Hilary claims that “Barack
Obama is an African American” and John claims that “Barack Obama is
a lawyer.” Both of them have described one aspect of Barack Obama, and
both claims can be correct at the same time. The same idea is represented in
the statements of negation made by BRLP. Classical logic involves providing
a description of when negation is true in possible worlds or Tarski models;
relevant logic provides a description of when negation is true in situations,
and constructive logic provides a description of when negation is true in
stages. Each of these refers to one aspect of negation; thus, each addresses
incomplete accounts of the same thing.
The same idea can be seen in the statements of negation in BRLP. Clas-
sical logic gives a description of when negation is true in possible worlds or
Tarski models, relevant logic gives a description of when negation is true
in situations, and constructive logic gives a description of when negation is
true in stages. Each of these displays one feature of negation; each obtains
incomplete accounts of the same thing. BRLP provides “a model” to serve
as a candidate for unifying these aspects of negation. This model deals with
the relations between worlds, constructions, and situations, and is divided
into the following three routes:
(a) worlds with constructions,
(b) worlds with situations,
(c) constructions with situations.
(a) worlds with constructions.
Worlds are regarded as a kind of construction since there is no problem in
determining true or false (and not both) for any given proposition in worlds.
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In this way, worlds finalize the constructions, i.e., worlds will not be ex-
tended by any further construction as they are in the final stage. Hence, the
model consists of “constructions,” some of which are also “worlds.” The par-
tially ordered (extension) relation of constructions, ⊆ is also in this model.
Worlds w play the end point of ordering. In other words, there is no stage
w ⊆ w′, w != w′. Two points need to be explained here. First, in all con-
structions, worlds behave as we expect of them, and second, in all worlds,
constructions behave as we expect of them. For the former,
• ¬ϕ is true in stage s if and only if for any world, ϕ is not true in stage
s′, where s ⊆ s′;
for the latter,
• ¬ϕ is true in world w if and only if for any construction s, w ⊆ s, ϕ is
not true in s.
Hence, ϕ is not true in w since w itself is the only one extended construction
of w.
(b) worlds with situations.
As shown previously, “possible worlds” are seen as consistent and complete
“situations.” It is easy to see how this model can make the possible worlds
behave as we expect of them in situations, under the relation of compatibility.
• ¬ϕ is true in situation s if and only if ϕ is not true in s′, where s′ is
any compatible situation with s.
(c) constructions with situations.
The discussion of (c) finishes this model. According to (a) and (b), worlds
are constructions and worlds are situations, respectively. If worlds are both
constructions and situations, then some constructions are situations. How
can we correlate or connect “constructions” and “situations,” and still keep
them distinct from one another? This was proposed by Beall and Restall as
follows (in [14], p. 10):
1. Take all constructions to be situations.
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2. If a construction is compatible with itself, then we have a situation
which is compatible with a situation itself.
3. If a construction is compatible with some situations, then these
situations are consistent.
4. “Constructions may well be seriously incomplete, but they still carry
the information that the situation/world (or possible worlds) is not
inconsistent.” (Ibid.)
These four items provide us with the means to consider constructions with
situations so as to make the model coherent. We verify the truth-condition
of constructive negation as well as the truth-condition of relevant negation
in the following steps.
5. Given any two consistent and compatible situations s and t, if s, t
are both compatible with themselves and compatible with each other,
there is some world w such that s, t ⊑ w.6
6. If s and t are consistent and compatible, then ¬ϕ is true in s if and only
if ϕ is not true in s; ¬ϕ is true in t if and only if ϕ is not true in t. So, by
plenitude of worlds assumption, s, t are part of some world w, in which
the behavior of negation will also be classical. The truth-condition is:
¬ϕ is true in w if and only if ϕ is not true in w.
Item 5 is seen as passing the consideration of situations to that of worlds.
Further, based on item 6, we elucidate how the behavior of relevant negation
can be realized as classical negation.
For any formula ϕ, construction c, situation s, we moreover have the
following four propositions, each of which builds naturally on the previous
ones:
7. If ϕ fails in any situation s, which is compatible with construction
c, then ϕ fails in any extending construction of c, denoted as c′,
since any such construction is compatible with itself, and hence, is
compatible with c.
6This is a plausible assumption made by Beall and Restall, termed the plenitude of
worlds assumption.
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8. If ϕ fails in c′, c′ is compatible with c, which is compatible with s, then
ϕ fails in s.
9. If ϕ fails in c′, then if s is a situation compatible with ϕ, it follows that
s is consistent, since constructions are compatible with consistent
situations only.
Since c, s are compatible with each other and c, s are both consistent, by
the plenitude of worlds assumption, there is some world w extending both.
But worlds are constructions, and we know that ϕ fails in that world. So
ϕ must fail in s too. So if ϕ fails in every extending construction of c, it
must fail in every situation compatible with c too. Moreover, items 7 and 8
demonstrate the relation between situations with extended construction
c
′ Following item 8, item 9 provides the “consistency” of situations.7
4.3 BRLP-Plurality
The discussion so far offers four cases for three logics that were taken in
BRLP. However, there is a more fundamental concern for BRLP, namely
the plurality of these cases of logical consequence (BRLP-plurality) that
strongly depends on different arrays of application in different perspectives
in which the philosophical motivations are deployed. Thus far, we have dis-
cussed the four cases as “possible worlds,” “Tarskian-models,” “situations,”
and “stages”. We understand that there are three instantiated logical con-
sequences endorsed by BRLP. Similar to Carnap’s principle of tolerance,
BRLP-plurality will gain justification by considering a similar criterion. In
other words, as a theory about pluralism, BRLP needs to further justify the
plurality that is mainly about the concept of logical consequence.
4.3.1 Plurality
When acknowledging that there are four cases of GTT at various concerns,
formulated in varying logics, it is obvious that there is a key requirement
for BRLP to be considered a type of pluralism. Indeed, according to BRLP,
there are four cases where three logical consequences are exemplified. But
7These nine items were rephrased from the statements made in [14], pp. 10–11 so as to
finalize this model.
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for plurality, the equally-good criterion has also been specified by BRLP in
[14]:
“We are pluralists about logical consequence. We hold that
there is more than one sense in which arguments may be de-
ductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally
deserving of the name deductive validity.”
Another criterion: equally-legitimate has been proposed by Graham Priest
in [10], p. 97:
“[Beall and Restall argue that] we can give the truth condi-
tions for the connectives in different ways. Thus, we may give
either intuitionist truth conditions or classical truth conditions.
If we do the former, the result is a notion of validity that is con-
structive, that is, tighter than classical validity, but which it is
perfectly legitimate to use for certain ends... We can indeed give
different truth conditions. But the results are not equally legiti-
mate. The two give us, in effect, different theories of vernacular
connectives: they cannot both be right.”
In this regard, there appears to be a different between “equally good”
logics and “equally legitimate” (equally right). As we have seen, there are
four different theories of negation, classicalPW , classicalTM , relevant, and
constructive. Priest challenged that all these cannot be right; at the most,
only one of them can be right to account for the behavior of negation. Thus,
there should be only one true logic. Following this, BRLP primarily needs
to defend that the endorsed logics are equally legitimate in order to justify
plurality.
The third criterion: irreducibly plural has been proposed in relation to
BRLP in [193], p. 426:
“With J. C. Beall, I have argued for and defended a pluralism
about logical consequence. We take it that the notion of logical
consequence is irreducibly plural in its application. That is, we
take it that there are at least two distinct relations of logical
consequence.”
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Although BRLP is being discussed, it is restricted to three logics: classical
logic, relevant logic, and intuitionistic logic and thus does not include all
logic in the modern logical discipline where there are new, typically inter-
disciplinary application areas for logics. Undoubtedly, this unified model of
negation might be taken to respond to Priest’s challenge that these logics
are “equally legitimate (right)” by expressing different aspects of the same
thing. However, it is not as suitable when adopting an equally good criterion
to justify plurality.
4.3.2 From a Strong Sense of Plurality to Constructing
BRLP
The second focus of this chapter is on the justification of weak plurality in
BRLP and the related problems and criticisms raised in the literature. Beall
and Restall were aware that BRLP is not what is commonly understood as
pluralism. It is no wonder that Beall and Restall affirmatively clarify their
stance by the question-answer as follows: ([10], p. 25)
Q : What kind of claim is logical pluralism?
A : Logical pluralism is a pluralism about logical consequence.
The meaning presented by BRLP is quite different from the common sense
of pluralism in other disciplines. First, BRLP suggests a pluralism of logical
consequence rather than that of logic. (In [10], p. 88)
“We granted the point that we have defended pluralism about
logical consequence, but not pluralism about ‘logic’ understood
as the study of consequence relation.”
The proposed model in BRLP states that these different negations are
different aspects of the behavior of negation. Therefore, they are differ-
ent aspects of logical consequence which has reflected different specifications
of the pre-theoretic (intuitive) notion of logical consequence.These different
specifications are not in competition and not rivals.
Second, as we have borrowed the sense of stronger-weaker pluralism adopted
in moral pluralism and political pluralism, BRLP states different logical con-
sequences are equally good or equally right, however, it is debatable whether
BRLP can be regarded as pluralism in this stronger sense without adopting
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the principle of tolerance. Like moral pluralism, if “there are many different
logical consequences” which is enough to be considered as a reason to claim
a sort of pluralism, then it is no problem for BRLP to be concerned a type of
a pluralism in this same way. Thus, BRLP is obviously a type of pluralism
to propose that there are many different logical consequences. However, it
is hard to capture and justify any plurality. Third, there is no competitor
(rival) between the different negations that have characterized the different
logical consequences. Beall and Restall refuted the requirement of rivals for
pluralism. (Ibid, p. 89)
“...electron pluralism is the claim that there is a plurality of
different electrons – an uncontroversial physical claim. To require
rivalry in a pluralism is to mischaracterise it.”
BRLP, as a strong logical pluralism, states that any two logics (logical
consequences) are equally good by the unified model of negation. The man-
ner in which BRLP justifies plurality is to characterize each logic in logical
pluralism as each individual logical consequence, and to characterize each
logical consequence by a negation. It is not sufficient that the unified model
has justified that classical, relevant, and constructive negations are equally
good, moreover, classical, relevant, and constructive logical consequences are
also equally good; therefore, classical, relevant, and constructive logics are
equally good. This justification is not so much as to provide a reason to
justify that these four logics are equally good, but to show that there are
three different stories for a pre-theoretic notion of logical consequence.
We believe that a lot can be learned in this respect about the justifica-
tion of plurality discussed here, and the reliable account of plurality where
irreducibly plural as the criterion can be found in BRLP. In doing so, BRLP
will not be an analogy to be realized as those kinds of pluralisms that we
have mentioned above, particularly when they have also claimed that their
pluralism should not be required to have rivals and not endorse the tolerance
principle.
The gist that BRLP proposes to the above issues about logical conse-
quence relies strongly on the concept of plurality : facing the fact that several
logics and formalisms are used for various purposes and applications, we
suggest not to take the“equally-good” criterion but instead the criterion of
“irreducible plurality”, to structure the basic attitude and the translation of
logics in various but always formally and well-founded logics. An idea: one-
many statement, then, in BRLP, perfectly articulated the basic framework
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for this cutting-edge research in logic According to this statement, BRLP ac-
knowledges and approves that its pluralism will require a different treatment
than the ordinary pluralism, while the one-many statement maintains that
there is precisely one core notion of logical consequence, and there are many
true instances of this one core notion.
“Graham Priest poses the question: ‘Logic: One or Many?’
Our answer is ‘both’. One: There is precisely one core notion
of logical consequence, and that notion is captured in schema
(V). Many: There are many true instances of (V), each of which
specifies a different consequence relation governing our language.
This one-many answer is what we call ‘pluralism’.” ([14], p. 17)8
This position takes one-many statement and thus pluralizes the one pre-
cise and abstract notion of logical consequence to various concrete instanti-
ated logical consequences. In Beall and Restall’s words, these instantiated
logical consequences should not be rivals. Again, BRLP is not traditional
pluralism. Beall and Restall’s answer to the question definitely suggests that
their theory is not at all a pluralism in the ordinary sense.
4.4 The Scope of Monism in BRLP
Thus far, we have obtained a clear understanding of BRLP. BRLP has the
following three characteristics:
1. BRLP assumes an pre-theoretic notion of logical consequence formu-
lated as GTT;
2. GTT can be instantiated as three “irreducibly plural logical conse-
quences”, classical, relevant, intuitionistic logical consequences;
3. these individual logical consequences do not rival each other but are
different aspects of the intuitive logical consequences.
In BRLP, logic is a matter of truth-preservation in all “cases.” To specify
a logic is to give an account about “cases in GTT”. BRLP has provided a
model to make classical, intuitionistic, and relevant logic compatible. BRLP,
8(V) appears in this citation refers to GTT.
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thus, sets up a standard for logical pluralists that when people endorse some
logics, they should propose these logics which are compatible with each other,
like a pluralist under BRLP. In other words, if one deviant-BRLP holds only
the spirit of BRLP without endorsing the three are logics that BRLP is
considering, he will also have to provide a model for the logics that they are
considering, similar to the model in BRLP.
So far, we have discussed a logical pluralism: BRLP. However, there is no
opposite statement of pluralism, called “monism in logic” clarified by BRLP
explicitly. Thus, in the next section, we discuss what statements should be
given for monism in the context of BRLP to explore the scopes of monism
and pluralism in logic investigations.
4.4.1 From BRLP to Monism in Logic
In the previous sections, we have analyzed in detail a specific example of
logical pluralism from the literature. We have shown that BRLP has been
taken as the landmark of pluralism in logic and influenced research in other
realms. For example, various applications in computer science strongly in-
volve reviewing various logics, using various logics, and developing various
logics for the various purposes. Certainly, this position can also be found
in the studies of logic translation and the new field of the Universal Logic
project (see [72], [137], [150], [151], [152]).
Nevertheless, we will not become involved in these one by one, since these
also involve completely different application domains and are not necessarily
connected with foundational discussions. What we are concerned about is
how a monist asserts his position properly. As we have compared the Car-
nap’s logical pluralism with BRLP (and the deviant-BRLP), the plurality
of different logics, shown in Carnap’s logical pluralism, is due to different
languages. Moreover, this kind of plurality has been justified by Carnap’s
principle of tolerance. If what we consider here is in the Carnap sense, there
seems to be no real disagreement between these logics since differences are
simply due to different languages.
4.4.2 A Discussion of Priest’s BRLP-Challenge
“Monisms contrast with pluralisms and nihilisms. Where the
monist for target t counted by unit u holds that t counted by u
is one, her pluralistic counterpart holds that t counted by u is
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many, and her nihilistic counterpart holds that t counted by u is
none.” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy– Monism ([195]))
Based on this citation, the meaning of monism is the opposite to that of
pluralism. However, this is not always so obvious in monism and pluralism
in logic. Let us first address the following question:
Q: Is it possible, for a logician proposing X-logic, not to assert
X-logic as the logic?
If the answer is “Yes,” then this X-logician might be able to hold some
pluralism like Beall and Restall; if the answer is “No,” then the X-logician is
a monist.
In the following discussion, we deal with the role for the aforementioned
question.
“Take some inference α ⊢ β that is valid in K1, but not in K2,
and suppose that we know (or assume) α; are we, or are we not
entitled to accept β?” ([10], p. 93)
Stephen Read’s opinion on this question is also worth considering again. He
considers the two specifications of logic K1, K2 as classical logic and relevant
logic, respectively ([189], p. 194). This statement can thus be expressed as
follows:
“For the inference α ⊢ β which is classical valid but not rele-
vant valid, and α is told true, does it tell us β is true?”
With regard to this statement, Beall and Restall reply:“ We are classically
entitled to this inference, and we are not relevantly entitled to this inference.
Hence, telling α is true provides β is true, since classical logic is entitled in
this case, so it is valid in the classical sense instead of the relevant sense.”
Following Beall and Restall, Read stated that what is actually expressed
here is not only that the information “β does not follow relevantly from α”
but also “we are not entitled to this inference.” Read, nevertheless, does not
consider this description and realization of Beall and Restall as encompassing
the crucial point of what relevant logic expresses. He states: “Relevant logic
was not put forward as a mere alternative to classical logic..., So too for
intuitionistic reasoning...” ([190], p. 196). Read believes that relevant logic
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and intuitionistic logic are based on monism.9 They were both created as
a replacement for classical logic, and thus, they are not just “alternatives.”
Hence, for Read, the question proposed above has a clear response: it is not
possible for a X-logician not to assert X is the logic in cases of relevant logic
and intuitionistic logic.
4.4.3 The Complement of Plurality
BRLP challenges monism in logic by recognizing the plurality of logical con-
sequences studied in logic. People as pluralists will address the pluralism
in logic that they are endorsing. In the first place, the pre-theoretic notion
of logical consequence helps us become clear that some of the deepest ideas
are independent of notational systems and grammars. Moreover, some of
them believe that one is likely to have a variety of non-rival and compatible
analysis for the pre-theoretic notion, and most especially, a variety of pre-
theoretic notions of one and the same “logical consequence”. BRLP proposes
such a theory. Second, Carnap’s principle of tolerance, as a quite different
logic pluralism, summarizes an approach to endorse this pluralism in logic,
especially to hold a quite pragmatical attitude to study a new relative area.
The position that takes this pluralism and relates this to ontological de-
signs that require different logical languages has been called onto-logical
pluralism (compare e.g. [136], [137], [138], [150]).
It is easily observed that in the latter case, plurality can be justified for
many pragmatic reasons, especially when it is adopted in practical areas.
However, as a theoretical, fundamental, and philosophical debate, Beall and
Restall affirmatively defends what they would like to propose for the BRLP.
In this regard, while various challenges, either from those whom have claimed
that they are monists (e.g. Stephen Read) or those who have ever objected
to BRLP (see [10], Chapter 8 and Chapter 9), the position of monism also
9Readers can learn that BRLP hold a pluralism for constructive logic, which is taken
as the underlying logic of constructive mathematics.
“The fact that there is a classical proof of an important theorem but
no constructive proof does not mean that we should attempt to add new
axioms to the constructive theory so that it will be provable (though this
might be an interesting endeavour in its own right). We could, as pluralists,
just acknowledge that this is one place where constructive mathematics is
properly weaker than classical mathematics.”
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needs to be articulated clearly. For example, Stephen Read stated:
“There is one true logic, the correct logic of truth-preservation.
It is given by a correct analysis of the connectives ‘→’ and ‘o’,
one which does not conflate them with material implication and
extensional conjunction, respectively. This analysis reveals the
true meaning, and extension, of the familiar phrase “impossible
for the premises to be true and conclusion false” ([191])
Furthermore, Ota´vio Bueno and Scott Shalkowsk stated:
“According to logical pluralism, there is more than one gen-
uine deductive consequence relation, even within a given lan-
guage. The position is opposed to the more common view, logical
monism, which privileges a single deductive consequence rela-
tion.” ([57], p. 1)
Obviously, the proponents of BRLP have proposed an opposing theory with
monism, where “pluralism” and “monism” are opposing theories in the com-
mon usage in general. In light of the plurality which has been justified by
BRLP, classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and relevant logic represent three
aspects of the common notion of logical consequence, whereby these aspects
are “equally good”. Hence, following this justified plurality, we will discuss
three possible opposite-BRLP version of monism.
4.4.4 The Opposite-BRLP Version of Monism (i)
First of all, monism needs to be addressed in the same line as BRLP, i.e., there
is an opposite-BRLP version of monism. Theoretically speaking, proponents
of BRLP should provide information about what is logical monism, since
Beall and Restall have proposed what they termed “logical pluralism.” How-
ever, this is not stated clearly in their writings. Thus, we cannot state that
BRLP can successfully be an alternative to logical monism, unless we clarify
the statements about logical monism as well. Beall and Restall includes some
information about logical monism in their writings: One common viewpoint
of the relation between logical monism and BRPL may be as follows: ([206],
§ I, footnote 2.)
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“Firstly, the contemporary debates between logical monists
and logical pluralists are recent phenomena. The rigorous de-
bates between them started with an explicit formulation of log-
ical pluralism and rejection of logical monism by the Australian
logicians Beall and Restall (2000).”
Hence, the idea of BRLP is seen as a “rejection” of logical monism. Under the
formulation: “GTT+Casex”, what does logical monism truly state? Does it
claim that “there is only one true logic” or does it state that “there should
be only one true logic?” Here is one such voice ([12], p. 488)
“Our pluralism holds that some formal logics can fruitfully be
seen as different elucidations of (V), the pre-theoretic notion of
logical consequence, and that (V) does not determine one logic,
but rather, a number of them.”
“To be a pluralist about logical consequence, you need only
hold that there is more than ‘one true logic’..., ..., (2) A logic is
given by a specification of the cases appear in GTT.” (Ibid, pp.
476–477)
Indeed, based on these two citations, we can formulate a possible statement
about the opposite-BRLP version of monism:
[Logical Monism (LM) I]
A pre-theoretic notion of consequence is given in GTT . It determines only
one logic.
Hence, there is only one case that is spelled out using GTT. This kind of
monism in fact, is only based on the statement made in BRLP. To reiterate,
the conception of logic in BRLP is as follows: (1) logic is a matter of pre-
serving truth in all cases; and (2) a logic is constructed by using GTT and
spelling out cases. This conception is firmly accepted by Beall and Restall
in the three tenets ([12], pp. 476–477) or five tenets ([10], p. 35) to propose
their logical pluralism. Hence, anyone who proposes logical monism under
this conception of logic claims that there is only one case that is10 spelled
10We do not use “should” or “could” to replace “is.” If we do, then this kind of a logical
monist will have to further state which case “should be” or “could be” the case clearly.
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out. LM I, is derived from the conception of logic in BRLP. If Beall and
Restall made any statements about “objecting” to some version of monism
in their writings, it is the aforementioned version.
In BRLP, statements related to logical monism are not sufficiently clear.
Moreover, BRLP does not state clearly how to object to logical monism At
the most, we observe a statement in the abstract of [12], Logical Pluralism:
version of March 28, 2000 ([13]). It states the following:
“A widespread assumption in contemporary philosophy of logic
is that there is one true logic, that there is one and only one cor-
rect answer as to whether a given argument is deductively valid.”
The citation above not only reflects the traditional idea of the development
in logic, in which monism in logic holds, but also shows that traditional
logicians were monists since they claimed their logic to be the only right
one. However, this widespread assumption is different from the monism
derived from BRLP, i.e., LM I. Thus, BRLP is attempting to reject this
widespread assumption regarding monism. Beall and Restall “intend to”
deny this traditional conception of logic.
Thus far, we are clear about the monism that BRLP proposes; however, it
is still insufficient to understand what a monist logician should claim. “There
is only one correct answer for a given argument being deductively valid” is
different from “there is only one correct case to spell out using GTT.” There
is still a difference between the monism derived from BRLP and the above
citation. Let us consider the following question:
Q: In the citation, is the meaning of what is underlined the same
as the meaning of the “clause” that follows?
The answer to the question is “Yes”; however, Beall and Restall’s theory
cannot address this stance. In other words, LM I can only address whether
“there is one logic from GTT” so as to answer whether a given argument
is deductively valid. It fails to address whether there is one true logic. We
broaden the scope of this discussion regarding the aforementioned citation
based on the following two cases:
Case 1. Given an argument, there is one and only one underlying criterion to
judge its validity. We do not know whether this argument is valid or
invalid until we judge it through this one criterion.
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Case 2. Given a valid argument with its unique underlying criterion of judging
validity, we do not know whether this argument is valid or invalid until
we find a criterion to explain it.
With respect to these two cases, first, BRLP will not admit that there is one
and only one underlying criterion. Thus, for case 1, Beall and Restall will
judge the validity of an argument by using classical logic, relevant logic, or
intuitionistic logic, respectively. Further, for case 2, Beall and Restall will
judge whether this validity can also be explained by the other two kinds of
validity. This depends on the arguments themselves. For example, if an
argument was checked as “classically valid,” they will check whether it can
also be relevantly valid and intuitionistically valid.
This broadened discussion is necessary because there are no explicit state-
ments regarding logical monism in the official publications of BRLP. We
could, at the most, find some implicit thoughts about logical monism from
different sources of literature and fragments of writings. Thus far, we have
understood that the meaning of the underlined portion in the citation is
equal to the clause that follows it. However, based on the logical monism
that we derived from GTT+Casex, i.e., LM I, we can see that LM I cannot
be applied to the logical monism expressed in the citation.
Under the assumption of the conception of logic in BRLP, LM I suggests
that there is only one spelled out case. As mentioned earlier, a logical monist,
e.g., John, is responsible for stating and justifying the logic that he endorses
(the only one admissible case here). He is able to finish this task immediately,
having no difficulty in claiming “the validity of any given argument” or “any
given valid argument,” i.e., LM I is consistent with the widespread logical
monism, as stated in the underlined portion of the aforementioned citation.
However, there is no reason to presume “the conception of logic in BRLP”
when determining the position of monism in logic. Thus, there is a difference
between this position of monism and LM I.
4.4.5 The Opposite-BRLP Version of Monism (ii)
In the previous section, we formulate LM I for BRLP, based on the GTT+Casex.
We now made another statement about BRLP that implicitly echoes our
opinions in the previous subsection. The citation is as follows:
“[I]n particular, a pluralist response to these issues goes as
follows: Many appeals to ‘Real Validity’ appeals to real validity;
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they are not, however, appeals to the only real validity.
Real validity comes from a specification of cases which appear in
(V).” ([12], p. 481)
Based on this citation, we can clearly observe that Beall and Restall, as plu-
ralists, believe that “real validity” comes from spelling out GTT. They claim
that the so-called “Real validity” is appealing to “real validity.” Further, as
pluralists, they do not appeal to the only “real validity.” In other words,
the position of monism that pluralists would like to replace, based on this
citation, is the only real validity, and they would like to add the following
condition to complete their theory about pluralism:
(RV): Spelling out GTT obtains different kinds of real validity.
Thus, LM I, which is a position derived from BRLP, does not encompass
the idea of logical monism that appears in the above citation. LM I suggests
that “there is only specification of GTT”; however, the latter suggests that
there is only one real validity. There is also a difference between this position
of monism, as shown in the citation, and LM I. Beall and Restall were unable
to clarify the position that they wanted to replace.
Thus far, we have observed how two differences appear between “LM I”
and the “ideas of monism,” as discussed based on the aforementioned two
citations related to BRPL. The opposite-BRLP version of monism was unable
to entirely encompass the logical monism that people follow in the traditional
development of logic.
4.4.6 The Opposite-BRLP Version of Monism (iii)
Two contemporary notions of logical monism as a target of logical pluralism,
grew out of BRLP which lies at the GTT. In this chapter, one of the main
goals is to find the monism that BRLP should replace. In this regard, there is
also another similar investigation regarding the meaning of “logical monism
shown in BRLP” given by G. C. Goddu. ([108], section III.) In the first place,
Goddu clearly states that there are four possible articulations for logical
monism as follows:
• [LM II] There is one and only one true logic.
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• [LM III] There is one and only one correct answer of whether a given
argument is deductively valid.
• [LM IV] There is one and only one sense in which a given argument
is deductively valid.
• [LM I] There is one and only one specification of cases appropriate for
spelling out (GTT).
Second, Goddu not only supports LM III but also, in the same paper, ex-
plicitly proposes that LM III is the core stance of logical monism.
LM II is the primary articulation, following the original question. LM III
has been discussed in BRLP, and the relationship between BRLP and LM I
has been addressed in section 4.4.4. Interestingly, it appears that LM IV is
not controversial since LM I, LM II, and LM III can be interpreted as “the
sense” in LM IV. However, if we really interpreted each of these three as “a
sense,” things would no longer remain interesting.11
There are two questions in particular we would like to discuss which are
directly related to Goddu’s statements:
Assume that an argument may be not deductively valid according to
two-valued sentential logic (hereafter SL), but deductively valid according to
first-order predicate logic (hereafter PL). If there is only one correct answer
to this argument w.r.t. BRLP,
(1) can there be any explanation that fits all these kinds of situations?
(2) irrespective of whether or not BRLP is reasonable, is it not an example
to fail LM III?
Intuitively speaking, it is reasonable to say that any one argument is not
valid w.r.t. SL but valid w.r.t. PL. In addition, we will not regard SL or
PL as not being logics. As Goddu stated, SL-validity captures only some
aspect of deductive validity, i.e., truth-functional validity. It definitely does
not capture deductive validity in its entirety. PL provides more informa-
tion about all the aspects of deductive validity. Moreover, it captures more
11There is a sense (“one,” “true,” and “logic”) in which a given argument is deductively
valid (to interpret LM II). Similarly, there is “one and only one” “correct answer”; thus, a
given argument is also deductively valid (to interpret LM III). There is also “one and only
one” “specification of cases” to spell out (GTT), and thus, a given argument is deductively
valid (to interpret LM II).
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parts pertaining to the structure of natural language than what PL encom-
passes. In this way, Goddu proposes the notion of partial logic. Partial logic
states that SL allows us to understand part of the story of deductive validity.
It enables us to add more to the story, thereby making the logic richer and
bringing us closer to representing the structure of natural language. Goddu’s
notion of partial logic can be summarized as the following principle:
(Principle of refining partial logic): To capture more truly valid ar-
guments is to keep refining partial logics in virtue of adding more structure
in it.
Goddu’s investigation, based on his aforementioned concept, may temporar-
ily bring an end to the exploration of the content of logical monism. He
formulated a plausible principle to explain that we can capture a more truly
valid argument by refining “the partial logic.” Moreover, he explicitly stated
that the stance of monism in logic can be represented by LM III. (Ibid, p. 223)
In his opinion, monism or pluralism in logic cannot be determined only by
the words presented in BRLP.12 With his concept of partial logic, Goddu, at
the most, presented some “by-product” statement of the pluralism/monism
that Beall and Restall’s considered. This means that although Goddu pro-
posed a sort of monism (LM III) by studying BRLP, he was unable to answer
the question about the content of monism that BRLP would like to replace.
4.4.7 From BRLP to Relativism in Logic?
Adopting a position of logical pluralism either with or without notational tol-
erance will result in several general debates and objections (see [10], Chapter
8) and several specific ones (see [10], Chapter 9; compare e.g. [57], [81], [194],
[226]). Obviously, the idea of BRLP can be debated within the philosophy of
logic. In this section, however, we specifically discuss on logical relativity and
relativism to which pluralism in logic could be easily attributed. Relativism
was usually taken by various applications in ontology language enterprises
before the proposal of the onto-logical translation graph (See [150]), as
stated in the following:
“[...]This corresponds to a relativisation of the physical symbol
12“...Without answers to these questions we cannot yet determine whether Beall and
Restall have successfully provided an alternative to logical orthodoxy.” (Ibid, p. 218)
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system hypothesis, resulting in a more pragmatic use of ontolo-
gies in focused application domains and contexts, and a grounding
of ontological concepts (e.g. using sensor data), thus better cap-
turing the situated, embodied and embedded nature of human
concepts[...]” ([137], p. 260)
Relativism might have a pragmatic motivation for applications in computer
science, however, the discussion so far offers some non-pragmatic motivation
for pluralism in the philosophy of logic. Thus, we will give BRLP-answers to
enquiries about being relativism.
In relation to BRLP, Achille Varzi ([216]) made a statement that the
three specifications of GTT are “in a relativistic position.” In other words,
in Varzi’s stance, when we inquire whether or not an argument is valid,
there will be no unique answer. “There is more than one sense in which an
argument can be valid” (Ibid., p. 1). Thus, it has to depend on “what the
cases are,” i.e., the validity of an argument is “relativistic” with respect to
cases.
Proponents of BRLP would not like anybody to claim that BRLP is a
sort of relativism;
“[...] Recall that we are not relativists about logical conse-
quence, or about logic as such. We do not take logical conse-
quence to be relative to languages, communities of inquiry, con-
texts, or anything else. We do not take logic to be relative in this
way [...] This is a pluralism, not a relativism.” ([10], p. 88)
However, based on Varzi’s observation, it makes sense to consider relativism
as a further development of pluralism in logic. According to Varzi, BRLP
states that there are different equally good and nonequivalent ways of “read-
ing” GTT. This means that there are different but equally good “senses” of
models (cases), possible worlds, Tarskian models, situations, or stages. How-
ever, BRLP does not consider the internal disagreements between the
different instantiated logics. Varzi, in this manner, proposes that his logical
relativism is a stronger version of specifying GTT, which also leaves room
for internal disagreements. ([216], p. 2)
“They leave room for disagreement because they are com-
patible with different ways of characterizing that portion of the
language that is responsible for the required nexus between the
4.4. THE SCOPE OF MONISM IN BRLP 99
premises and the conclusion of a valid argument– –different ways
of characterizing the ‘logical vocabulary’.”
Note that, in BRLP, the core conception of logic stems from applying GTT,
wherein each logic should be specified by “casex”. Thus, different logics are
instantiated by applying different cases of GTT. Hence, for any “logicalx
consequence relation” with respect to “casex”, a “logicalx truth” is either
true in all different cases or there are logicalx consequence relations with a
zero premise.13 In this way, a logical truth pluralism should hold. Indeed
BRLP will accept being“pluralist” about logical truth ([10], p. 100), however
it is debatable to accept further a logical truth relativism. (See [10], p 94)
De facto logical relativism fits well with pluralism with Carnap’s tolerance
principle, which depends on notational systems and grammars. Moreover, its
wide acceptance in various areas of ontology designs is clearly a fact we must
acknowledge, as expressed in the statements expressed by Kutz et al. as
follows [137]:
“[...] we believe that from a methodological viewpoint, and
especially from its sheer practical usefulness, the advantages of
adopting a position of logical pluralism in ontology engineering
can hardly be seriously challenged, [...]”
Note that logical pluralism in this citation has adopted Carnap’s tolerance
principle. Another relative debate, which has been attributed to Priest’s
challenge, must be discussed here.
“Take some inference α ⊢ β that is valid in K1, but not in K2,
and suppose that we know (or assume) α; are we, or are we not
entitled to accept β?”
Beall and Restall respond to this question by claiming that BRLP is not
about the plurality of what is true in a case. It is about the plurality of
the “logical consequence relation.” This means that they would prefer not to
take into consideration: “β is true” with respect to K1; “it is not true” with
respect to K2. This is because if they did, as mentioned previously, they
would be accused of adopting relativism with respect to truth.
13In the latter case, “logical truth” is naturally seen as a “degenerate” of logical conse-
quence. (For details, see [192], p. 39)
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This famous debate has been discussed widely (compare e.g. [10], [12],
[173], [178], [189], [190]). Stephen Read’s review ([189]) is particularly worth
noting: If the inference: α ⊢ β is valid in K1, but not valid in K2 should we
conclude that β is true, given “α is true”? Since Beall and Restall deny that
they are relativists with respect to truth, the question, “is β true?” would
then have a determined response. With regard to this inference, Read argued
as follows:
1. it is apparently expressing the “information”: β is true in K1;
2. it fails to express any “information”: β is true in K2;
3. it does not, moreover, express any “information”: β is false in K2.
The information carried by K2 is insufficient to determine the truth of β in
K2; on the contrary, the information carried by K1 definitely tells us about
the truth of β, i.e., β is true in K1. Hence, by BRLP, if K1 and K2 are both
good on the account of validity, only K1 can enable us to understand what
we want to know about “β is true”. Read refers to this as “K1 trumps K2”.
In this manner, he further concludes that K1 and K2 are not “equally good”
“in a very real sense” since K1 answers the question of whether β is true,
but K2 does not. ([190], p. 195)
However, we believe that Read’s argument is not correct to a great extent.
This is because although the information carried by K2 fails to express the
truth of whether β is true, it succeeds in expressing that “it is not the case
that β is true” There is no reason to support that the information carried
by K1 is not “as equal as” K2, if we consider “good” in a more general
sense. Further, K2 carries even more information than K1 with respect to
quantity. The meaning of the usage of “equally good” here is completely
different to that of BRLP. In BRLP, the usage of “equally good” focuses
on the “equality” of the different features of the same thing. Each of these
features, in the sense that they describe the same thing, is equal to the other.
This means that in BRLP, there is no dominant feature regarding negation,
no dominant logical consequence, and no dominant logic.
Remark 33. Indeed Beall and Restall are aware that such different logics
are based on different philosophical analyses:
“Rival logical theories, such as intuitionistic logic, paraconsis-
tent logics, relevant logics, connexive logics, and so on, are based
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on different philosophical analyses of this basic notion.” ([12], p.
488, [192], p. 36)
However, they still regard the three logics as equally good (irreducible).
Moreover, as we have discussed in this chapter, given two specifications of
logic, classical logic and relevant logic, for the inference α ⊢ β, which is
classically valid but not relevantly valid, when α is told true, does it tell us
β is true? BRLP includes the statement: we are classically entitled to this
inference, and we are not relevantly entitled to this inference. Hence, for
telling α is true provides β is true, it is because classical logic is entitled in
this case, so it is classically valid instead of relevantly valid.
Taking these positions to deal with various non-classical logics which con-
cern the replacement of classical logic is the speciality of BRLP. Some logical
monists, like Stephen Read, think that what relevant logic actually expresses
is not only to obtain information, such as “β does not follow relevantly from
α”, but also “we are not entitled to this inference”. Read does not think
Beall and Restall’s description and realization correctly catches the crucial
point that the proponent of relevant logic intends to express in the Priest’s
challenge, he said: “Relevant logic was not put forward as a mere alternative
to classical logic.”([189], p. 196) It is apparent that relevant logic is based on
monism. It is to replace classical logic instead of just being an alternative.
4.5 Conclusion
In the introduction, we formulated two questions to address the foundational
discussions of logic translation. We moreover sketched the landmark ideas
of pluralism in logic that were raised by Beall and Restall to answer these
two questions. The core of this chapter examined BRLP which is widely
discussed by the logic society and formulated the corresponding position of
monism with respect to BRLP. BRLP as a pluralism encompasses some logics
that are presumed to rival each other.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we would like to shed new light on the pluralism in logic,
particularly in relation to Universal Logic project and logic translation stud-
ies. Before continuing we should consider one different academic research in
which the same term “universal logic” appears at first glance to satisfy the
aims of classicalism AI – the good old-fashioned AI (GOFAI) ([121],
[122]).
Compared with the Universal Logic project that was connected with the
spirit of Universal Algebra, a universal logic system C-UniLogic (see Ap-
pendix) which was realized as a “universal” logical system was proposed by
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Asian.1 The development of universal logic systems by some Asian is to
pursue the trend of the GOFAI. They propose to build a smart, open, self-
adaptive framework to describe the fascinating parts of the human brain with
properties that are integrated, flexible, dialectic, and evolutionary. Classi-
calism AI is seen as an opposite theory connectionism AI. It asserts that the
core task in human intelligence investigation is to symbolize and formalize
“thoughts” so that they can be understood by computers. In the sense we
have considered so far, the development of such a universal logic system is an
obvious case with different interests and purposes from the Universal Logic
project.
As shown in the previous chapters, logical pluralism has already been
described in some application-oriented research in the literature, where it
is believed that there is no one true logic, nor is there no one true model
theory. In this way, discussion of psychologism, and so of the term new logic
in relation to cognitive science and computation, in Dov Gabbay’s words
(1990, 2001), will be carried out in the domains of interdisciplinary and
cross-cultural studies.2 This could shed new light on the development of
modern cognitive science and artificial intelligence, in particular, to introduce
paraconsistent logics with dialetheism and dialectical logic within these areas.
Moreover, it provides us a coherence notion about non-western logic allowing
for inconsistency and characterizing the cognitive processing in the Asian
to our cross-cultural studies. Yet it presents a universal logic system with
dialecticism (C-UniLog) that was raised in the nineties, almost at the same
time as Jean-Yves Be´ziau’s formulation of the term Universal Logic.
In this regard, the universality of the modes of cognitive processes will be
challenged in this chapter. The argument connects the factors of Cultural–
psychobiological and developmental psychological biases with the related fac-
tors that we have found in the Universal Logic project. Finally, if logical plu-
ralism may be revised, it is clearly possible for the combination of the three
factors, psychologism, cognitive modification, and the tolerance principle to
formulate a new meaning of pluralism in logic, namely cognitive processes
1The first, the second, and the third editions of the World Congress and School on
Universal Logic were held in 2005 (Switzerland), 2007 (China), and 2010 (Portugal), re-
spectively. The fourth edition will be held in 2013 (Brazil). Readers should consult the
official website of Unilog: http://www.uni-log.org/ for further details.
2The only major critique of psychologism in the development of logic, with the partial
meaning of applying psychological techniques to logic, was given by Gottlob Frege and
Edmund Husserl.
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modification pluralism.
5.2 The Modes of Cognitive Processing
Recall the underlying motivation of the Universal Logic project. There is
a substantial point of agreement with Be´ziau’s treatment of this proposal:
it is a general theory of logics. A proper definition of logical structure and
semantics will ensure that this idea does not depart from the Tarskian logic
tradition too much. In the theme of the journal Logica Universalis, Special
Issue “Is logic universal?”, the Universal Logic project has caused linguistics,
logicians and philosophers to raise this question again (see [26]). The core
of this chapter develops a new direction for the Universal Logic project that
shows the appearance of cultural differences that were discovered in logical
studies.
Briefly, by employing two cultural streams: the Aristotelian stream and
the Confucianism-Taoism-Buddhism stream, there are two ideas of universal
logic: the Universal Logic project which follows the Aristotelian stream and a
universal logic system (Confucianism-Taoism-Buddhism stream). In the last
chapter, we addressed the question: Is there a universality of the modes of
cognitive processes? This question requires some empirical study in cultural
psychology as presented in this chapter. We can now pinpoint the question.
Here we offer a result for comparing the modes of cognitive processes
in different cultures, based on an implementation for cultural psychological
studies, which is further applied to the principle of tolerance that will for-
mulate a new sense of pluralism in logic studies. According to the cultural
psychology investigations, it will sometimes be more difficult for the West-
erner to accept eastern schools of thought, such as Taoism or the concepts of
yin and yang due to the fundamental differences in their cognitive processes.
There are at least two systems of thoughts that exist in different cultures, one
is the holistic system and the other is the analytic system. They also reflect
the two entirely different cognitive processes of the Asian and the Westerner,
respectively (see [156], [158], [198]).
Several relative contributions in cultural psychology describe how systems
of thoughts contribute to the formation of theories in different cultures. The
Asian adopts a holistic attitude toward the relationship between a part and
the whole; they seldom use the framework of formal logic but instead they
use dialectical reasoning. On the contrary, the Westerner adopts an analytic
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attitude toward an object and the categories to which it belongs. They use
rules to realize the behaviors of an object, e.g., the formal logic (compare
e.g. [158], [161]).
Moreover, there is a significant extent to which the Westerner is interested
in categorization, which provides rules in addressing various issues during
the course of education. Formal logic indeed plays an important role in this
process of education and problem solving. On the contrary, the Asian is
concerned with the contexts within which an object exists; the world is more
complicated for them than for the Westerner. When they face an event,
they feel the need to consider many factors and the relationships among
these factors. They definitely do not try to understand events through a
deterministic framework. For them, formal logic does not play a key role in
solving problems. In other words, the fundamental beliefs about the nature
of the world that are held by people from different cultures differ (compare
e.g. [156], [158], [198]).
5.3 Cognitive Instrumentalism in Logic
We have here two very different conceptions of universal logic, and the situ-
ation is considerably more perplexing with cultures. Here no single selection
of fixed habits, terms, and ordinary usage of languages, etc. produces a
uniformly plausible pattern of cognition modes. With different cultures, the
only way to have a reasonable communication and develop understanding is
by using cross-cultural comparison. It is clear that with the relatively conser-
vative statement of the general theory of logics compared to the statement of
proposing a universal logic system, the definitions produce some intuitively
reliable results applied to various areas (e.g. [19], [60], [217]). However, we
have no assurance that this is a cross-cultural method to produce the right
assessment for every results expressible in different cultures.
5.3.1 The Cognitive Toolkit
In [156], there is a discussion that beliefs about the nature of the social
and physical world will affect beliefs about how to obtain new knowledge
and the cognitive processes (pp. 35–37). Two cognitive processing modes are
observed in cultural psychology: the dialectic logical mode and formal logical
mode (see [156], [157], [159], [158], [161]), where the conception that logic
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as cognitive process is a common assumption. Thus, adopting the position
of taking logic as the cognitive process through which basic beliefs about
the nature of the world are formed, there is such an analogy in the Claude
Le´vi-Strauss’s classical The Savage Mind (La Pense´e sauvage): when people
endeavor to solve the problems of daily life, it is likened to craftsmen with
a cognitive toolkit which provides them with tools to create their piece of
art; different cultures reflect different preferences regarding their choice of
tools and their mastery in making such a choice, as well as the skills and
the appropriateness of the timing associated with their choices. Similarly, in
Nisbett and Norenzayan’s words:
“[...] actual possession of particular cognitive processes may
differ across cultures in that different cultures may invent com-
posite cognitive structures out of universal primitive ones, thus
performing feats of cognitive engineering, as suggested by Den-
nett’s (1995) characterization of culture as a ‘crane-making crane’
[...] As the mutual interdependence of culture and cognition be-
comes better understood, “crane-made cranes” such as these will
tell us much about the cultural foundations of the cognitive tools
of everyday life [...]” ([157]).
Hence, according to [156], [157], [158], there are two representative world-
views or reality-views: the holistic world-view and analytic world-view. On
one hand, if the world (reality) is largely determined by the relationships be-
tween objects and events, then the ability to observe all important elements
in the surroundings, the relationships between these elements, and the rela-
tionship of the part with the whole is important. For the time being, the
development of the process of attention, perception, and reasoning focuses on
identifying important events and distinguishing the complicated relationship
between events. On the other hand, if outcomes are significantly determined
by objects’ behaviors which are, in turn, significantly determined by rules and
categories, then the ability to identify objects by distinguishing them from
their surroundings and their contexts as well as their abilities to infer the
rules and categories to which they belong assumes importance. Depending
on how to consider the world (reality) functions, the processes of cognition
would then involve the development of the corresponding abilities.
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5.3.2 The Dialectical logic mode and ‘Principles’?
By the analogy that logic is seen as a cognitive tool, then dialectics (dialectic
logic mode, thereafter) is a key tool in the toolbox for the Asian. Before
we can address the issue of the role of dialectics in various empirical sci-
ences, such as cultural psychology, it is important to discuss the attitude of
the Asian to contradiction. With no preference for using formal logic (for-
mal logical mode, thereafter), the Asian does not look for ways to “resolve”
contradiction but rather “facilitates the transcending” (or synthesizing) of
all contradictory situations. Further, they may accept some opinions that
are not consistent or harmonious, but facilitate “edification” and “enlight-
enment.” Another challenge posed in [156], [158] pertains to the Asian’s
infrequent reliance on formal logic and a greater reliance on experiences in
the process of reasoning as compared to that by the Westerner. Moreover,
other studies reveal that the Asian has maintained such tendencies nowadays
(see e.g. [156], [159]).
The origins of what we consider as the dialectic logic mode in Asian can be
traced back to ancient China. Following up the aforementioned statements
about cognitive processing, a further investigation was made that Asian are
more likely to prefer proverbs that explicitly contain contradictory meanings
within them (see [156]). For example, “too humble is half-proud”. On the
contrary, the Westerner is more likely to prefer proverbs that are free of con-
tradictions. For example, “one against all is certain to fall.” Emphasizing
these transcending and synthesizing contradictions opens up a promising av-
enue for assessing these contradictions. We can now consider the abstraction
of various principles that govern dialectics, even at the risk of violating its
very spirit that no “explicit rules” should be associated with dialectics. Three
principles of dialectical reasoning have been formulated. Clearly, there are
at least three principles concerning dialectics that we can endorse without
hesitation. First is the simple principle of the nature of reality, the principle
of change: ([156], [158])
a. The Principle of Change (1) The nature of reality is that of con-
stant change, that is, reality is a dynamic and changeable process; (2)
a thing will not resemble itself over time because of the fluid nature of
reality.
Second is a principle, so to speak, about logic
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b. The Principle of ContradictionOppositions, paradoxes, and anoma-
lies are continuously being created. Thus, the old and new, the good
and bad, the strong and weak coexist and are dependent on each an-
other for their existence.
This second principle follows from the fact that reality is not precise or
cut-and-dried but is full of contradiction ([161], p. 743). The third is a
principle follows from the second principle.
c. The Principle of Relationship Nothing either in human life or na-
ture is isolated or independent; instead, everything is connected.
Principle (a) puts forth the Asian worldview, principle (b) expresses the
consequence of the constantly changing nature of the world, and principle (c)
explains that due to the nature of reality, which is characterized by change
and opposition, in order to meaningfully consider a part, it is essential to con-
sider its relationship with other parts and with the whole as well. Clearly,
if these three principles could accurately characterize dialectics or dialectic
logic mode, then it would also be easy to understand the deep-seated rea-
sons for and the effect of culture on the preference of attempting to build a
universal logic system to unify various logics that have been described (see
Appendix).
Finally, experience is the dimension that the Asian culture stresses should
not be ignored. We will not call this the principle of experience. Of course,
the accounts above take some formalization to be relativized to a sort of
cognitive mode, of “logical mode”, and so the underlying principles will be
a somewhat formulation of the observations in the Asian cultures, histories,
and societies. There is a single way these principles might go, and we will
consider it in due course. In relation to experience, it is important to see
that the Asian bases their accounts on this rather unlikely principle, in some
form or other.
Indeed, the substantial technical and mathematical attraction of the mod-
ern account of various logic applications, e.g. many-valued logic, paraconsis-
tent logic, fuzzy logic that are widespread in the Asian is mainly derived
directly from principles (a) and (b). Assuming the above-mentioned ob-
servations are right, it is experience that allows the direct application of
well-known ideas for defining “truth” to the task of defining logical truth in
the various widespread logical systems mentioned here.
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This is an important selling point for the account of dialectics. Our or-
dinary concept of truth, even logical truth involves various notions that are
notoriously difficult to pin down, notions such as necessary, possible, and so
forth. But if the modern philosophical logic (non-classical logic) account is
correct, what it achieves is a truly remarkable description of obscure notions
to mathematically tractable ones. If this is right, the development of philo-
sophical logic shows that we can in fact sidestep all of these difficult concepts,
and that we can given a mathematically precise definition for them if we can
define the notion of truth, even logical truth for the formal languages – or
what comes to the same thing, if we can figure out these relative notions to
some reliable explanations.
This is a tremendous advantage, one we should not undervalue. Further-
more, it is an advantage not well-shared by Westerners. As Nisbett states:
“It is precisely because the Chinese mind is so rational that
it refuses to become rationalistic and... to separate form from
content.” ([140] and [156], p. 165)
If experiences should not be ignored, then such kinds of thoughts should be
considered seriously. The Chinese do not encourage people to think about
things and events that are too abstract; rather, they encourage people to be
more practical. In accordance with principle (a), the fact that everything
changes is core to their vision of the world and is especially influenced by
three traditional philosophies – Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism ([156],
[157], [158]). Due to “changes”, in the context of the knowledge system in the
Asian, people could believe that a proposition and its negative proposition
could to be at the same time. Consistency is not a necessary condition in
this kind of belief system, even when it is claimed that the existence of a
proposition implies the existence of its negative proposition, or it is claimed
that the negation of proposition appears soon after the proposition.
These notions are unacceptable in the traditional Western system of
thought. When the Asian engages in daily reasoning, they appeal to di-
alectical notions from the very outset ([158], [161]), specifically, in assessing
the counterfactual statements or engaging in the counterfactual reasoning
that plays a key role in Western society, they appeal to the non-Westerner
pattern. Ben Goertzel makes a similar statement as follows:
“[...] After all, every Chinese mathematician uses reductio ad
absurdum, a theorem-proving strategy which is explicitly coun-
terfactual in nature. Obviously Chinese mathematicians develop
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a mental ‘schema’ for applying counterfactual reasoning to math-
ematical statements. [...] My informal survey indicated that Chi-
nese people, even those who speak reasonable English, are simply
not comfortable thinking counterfactually about commonplace
situations. Counterfactual reasoning in mathematical proofs would
seem to be, psychologically, a different “routine” from counter-
factual reasoning regarding politics and everyday life. This is an
intriguing example of mental ‘modularization’. Just as a person
who reasons logically about chess need not reason logically about
her boyfriend’s activities, a person who reasons counterfactually
in mathematics need not reason counterfactually about common-
place real-world events.” ([110], pp. 92–93)
Interestingly, the birth of paraconsistent logic in modern formal logic dis-
plays similar ideas found in the thoughts of Asian ([172], [173], [174], [175],
[176], [183]). Further, the path taken by paraconsistent logic is similar to
that taken by dialectics, namely, both attempt to overcome or transcend two
contradictions in a situation instead of attempting to resolve them.3 Hence,
within the cultural-anthropological context, while logic is treated as a cog-
nitive process, the details of the story of logic are completely different from
what we learn in our courses on logic.
In contrast, the development of formal logic tries to capture the ordinary
truth of statements and intuitive validity of arguments by means of treating
logical forms suitably. A philosophical criticism about Tarski’s model theory
which plays an important role in modern formal logic has been presented
by John Etchemendy, namely that Tarski’s model-theoretic definition with
representational semantics which equates the logical truth of a sentence with
the ordinary truth of another sentence is misleading (compare [77], [78],
[79]). The problem with such a reflection is that the mere truth expressed
in such (Western) development of logical studies can, in general, guarantee
nothing more than the truth of its logical forms. It cannot guarantee that the
arguments have any intuitive validity and ordinary truth of statements. In
particular, it cannot guarantee that their formal logical distinctive features,
whether proof-theoretic or model-theoretic, which usually were thought to
set logical truth, capture the common, daily, run-of-the-mill truths.
3According to Nisbett’s observation, the Chinese cultivated a different dialecticism
from Hegelian, which claims that the “thesis is followed by antithesis, and resolved by
synthesis.” ([156], p. 27)
112 CHAPTER 5. THE GEOGRAPHY OF COGNITIVE MODES
The non-Western pattern of thought simply shows that the truth of the
ordinary statements did not completely depend on the specific meanings of
the selections of formal methods. People do not always think of truth in the
formal logical way, and the ordinary concept, as relativized to a completely
formal methodological selection cannot be fully captured only in this way.
5.4 From Cross-Cultural and Interdisciplinary
Notions of Logic to a New Sense of Plu-
ralism
According to the considerations that we have put forth, as pointed out by
Nisbett, because of differences in cognitive processes, we believe that we
cannot arbitrarily comment on people with cultures that differ from ours.
We are not concerned here with the merits or demerits of the Western pat-
tern of thought, and in particular we will also not spend time discussing
those non-Western pattern of thought. On a daily basis, logicians, as human
beings, face problems on daily reasoning and thinking. Although logicians
know much about and have worked extensively with inferences and logic,
some daily issues are inevitably encountered in the daily course of life. The
cross-cultural logics investigation also gains importance when considering
the problem of cognitive processing in the empirical studies mentioned in
this chapter. Moreover, our discussion so far will offer not only a pragmatic
motivation but also empirical evidence to support our formulation of a new
sense of logical pluralism.
To relate the issues between the Universal Logic project and the idea
of a universal logic system to the cross-cultural aspect that is the focus of
this chapter, it is apparent that this issue has gone beyond the confines
of logic that goes back to the Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl’s anti-
psychologism4(compare e.g. [100], [130], [135]). The contemporary notions of
‘Logic’ were claimed by Dov Gabbay to be a result of the interaction with
4A more general usage of the term ‘psychologism’, is given in [135]: “many authors
use the term ‘psychologism’ for what they perceive as the mistake of identifying non-
psychological with psychological entities.” To relate to the issue raised in philosophy of
logic,[...] ‘Psychologism’ then refers (approvingly) to positions that apply psychological
techniques to traditional philosophical problems.” Briefly, in logic, people who think that
logical laws are not identical to psychological laws or do not apply psychological techniques
to logic, would be viewed as adopting anti-psychologism.
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computing ([103]), a decade later, the term new logic was specified as being
related to cognitive science clearly defending a psychologism position ([100],
p. 170).
“Still, it is fair to ask us to say with clarity where we see the
difference, such as may be, between logic and psychology. Where,
in particular, is the divide between the new logic and theoretical
cognitive psychology? Our answer to this is that much of what the
new logic comprehends is theoretical cognitive science, including
relevant parts of computer science and any other discipline that
bears in a principled way on how cognitive processes operate.”
The general idea of logic which emerged from the tradition within math-
ematics in the first decades of the 20th century, with the birth of relative
interactions between algebra and logic in mathematical logic (see chapter 1;
compare e.g. [45], [50], [51], [55], [54]), could have a whole different look. It
has been suggested that Universal Logic as a mathematical theory, which is
connected the Universal Algebra, be developed by employing psychological
techniques to logic, especially since the idea of a universal logic system has
taken the same term “universal logic” but with an opposite meaning. This
suggestion moreover has directly led to the following “general and ambigu-
ous questions”: “Is logic universal?” Five questions in particular are raised
in the Special Issue of Logica Universalis concerning aspects of universality
in human reasoning: ([27], p. 161–162)
1. Do all human beings have the same capacity of reasoning? Do men,
women, children, Papuans, yuppies, reason in the same way?
2. Does reasoning evolve? Did human beings reason in the same way
two centuries ago? In the future, will human beings reason in the same
way? Are computers changing our way of reasoning? Is a mathematical
proof independent of time and culture?
3. Do we reason in different ways depending on the situation? Do we use
the same logic for everyday life, in physics, and in questions to do with
the economy?
4. Do the different systems of logic reflect the diversity of reasoning?
5. Is there any absolute true way of reasoning?
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The two ideas of “universal logic”: the Universal Logic project and a
universal logic system are born from entirely different academic research and
can be distinguished from each other. Nevertheless, the succession of the
Universal Logic project that expresses a general theory of logics comes from
a series of studies on paraconsistent logics ([39]) in which the underlying
thought is to reject the principle of explosion, also known as ex falso quodli-
bet or ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet meaning “from a contradiction,
anything follows” which is the opposite to the Western tradition.5 While the
Westerner attempts to emphasize formal reasoning in critical thinking, argu-
mentation, and debate in their “system of education,” Asians try not to treat
every proposition as “bivalent”, namely, either true or false. The difference
in the behaviors and thoughts of the Asian and the Westerner has been re-
flected in many aspects of daily life. This can be explained by the distinction
between holistic and analytic attitudes ([156], [157], [158]). The role of Chi-
nese dialecticism in the modern world should be taken seriously. Moreover,
various positions with a not so confined notion of ‘logic’ should be adopted,
while interdisciplinary studies have become widespread in academia.
5.4.1 Revision of Pluralism in Logic
While interdisciplinary information science is predominant, there are many
technologies in use, with different cultural-related considerations, user com-
munities, and tool support (e.g. [47], [58], [115], [144], [146], [201], [215],
[228]). As stated by Kutz et al.,
“Logical pluralism de facto permeates almost all areas of knowl-
edge engineering; its wide acceptance is clearly a fact we have
to acknowledge. Indeed, we believe that from a methodological
viewpoint, and especially from its sheer practical usefulness, the
advantages of adopting a position of logical pluralism in ontology
engineering can hardly be seriously challenged [...]” ([137], p. 262)
5The principle of explosion: Call |= is explosive if it validates {ϕ,¬ϕ} |= ψ for every
ϕ and ψ. Paraconsistent logics can be defined in the most general sense as any logic with
a non-explosive consequence relation. A branch of paraconsistent logic called dialethesim
argued that it is the view that some contradiction are true, i,e, there are sentences, state-
ments, propositions, or anyone taking to be truth-bearers ϕ, such that both ϕ and ¬ϕ are
true.
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In this manner, the mutual exclusivity of the distinction between logic and
psychology, especially to logic and psychology about cognition, including rel-
evant parts of computer science and any other discipline will be eliminated.
The trend of scientific and technological developments in the modern era
acknowledges that there was no good reason to encumber the very ideas of
widespread logical languages “in applications” and various interdisciplinary
studies about various logic. Hence, the relationship between logic and psy-
chology can be considered seriously, the stance of relating non-psychological
with psychological entities was not a mistake in everyday practice. For exam-
ple, the notion of reflective equilibrium might have been taken as a challenge
to anti-psychologism. The notion of reflective equilibrium proposed by Nel-
son Goodman in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1955) is a method to justify
rules of inductive logic. The conception of reflective equilibrium can be seen
as a mechanism which puts the rules of inference (inductive or deductive)
and those inferences that we have judged to be acceptable in a broad range
of particular cases, in the same basket, named reflective equilibrium, while
we justify these rules. It emphasizes (a) no inference rule is acceptable as
a logical principle unless it is compatible with those instances of inference
reasoning which we admit to be acceptable, or we will abandon this infer-
ence rule; (b) at the same time, if we find these individual inferences are
incompatible with inference rules that we generally accept and unwillingly
abandon, then we have to revise our views about those individual inferences
we might have taken as acceptable initially.6
Note that the value of mentioning reflective equilibrium not only lies in
being a practical example of endorsing psychologism but also in the cultural
differences discussed in this chapter, and moreover supports our formulation
of the pluralism in logic. Stephen Stich in the Fragmentation of Reason
(1990) observed that the cultural difference will shatter reflective equilibrium
(see [202]; compare e.g. [156], [158]). In this way, if we cannot agree with the
principles (inference rules in reflective equilibrium) that are used to judge
the correctness of an individual inference, then we cannot help but wonder
whether such a disagreement is merely due to personal preferences regarding
the underlying principles.
6See also, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – “Reflective Equilibrium”. ([70])
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5.4.2 Some Cultural–psychobiological Perspectives on
Modification of Cognition
So far, our proposal that logical studies involve the cognitive processing di-
mension and cross-cultural empirical evidence would not seem odd. For ex-
ample, Graham Priest stated: ([173], p. 150)
“I believe that the development of modern formal paraconsis-
tent logics is one of the most significant intellectual developments
of the twentieth century. In challenging entrenched Western at-
titudes to inconsistency that are over 2,000 years old, it has the
potential to ricochet through all of our intellectual life – and
empirical science wears no bullet-proof vest. As we have seen,
empirical scientists have always tolerated, and operated within,
inconsistency in certain way.”
Three ideas, then, in the combination, summarize our formulation of plural-
ism in logic: psychologism,modification of cognition, and the principle
of tolerance. First, with regard to the BRLP, it involves the identification
of consequence relations, i.e., to identify them with the concept of logical
consequence. In other words, it appears that the proposal of logical plural-
ism could also be seen as one possible method for dealing with the problem
pertaining to the identification of the contemporary notions of ‘Logic’.
Second, by adopting the position of psychologism, we further make an
assumption that logic is a cognitive process in the cultural psychological per-
spective ([156], [157], [158]). There are at least two underlying modes of
cognitive processes in cultural psychological perspective. Third, with the
new trend and investigation of logic translation applications, e.g., ontology
design and onto-logical translation graph ([137], [150]), we suggest to address
the study on the translation between the two underlying modes of cognitive
processes by referring to the cultural psychology research in a broader sense
of applications, that is, to formulate the translation between a formal logical
mode and dialectical logical mode. Another suggestion, the descent-with-
modification7 of cognitive modules from a psychobiological viewpoint, can
7The phrase descent-with-modification comes from the Charles Darwin’s classic On the
Origin of Species (1859) where Darwin developed two main ideas, one being descent with
modification and the other natural selection. The former explains life’s unity and diversity
, the latter is the explanation for adaptive evolution.
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be found in [147]. In accordance with the descent-with-modification mod-
ularity, current cognitive modules are understood to be shaped by evolu-
tionary changes from ancestral cognitive modules. It moreover argues that
descent-with-modification modularity is compatible with a range of data in
neuroimaging studies, and this conception of modularity may have important
implications for the practice and conception of cognitive scientific fields such
as linguistics and psychological (developmental) disorders. The main notions
expressed in the descent-with-modification modularity approach to cognitive
architecture and processing may be summarized as follows:
• Evolution has, through descent-with-modification, created the entire
array of living organisms on the planet earth, including human be-
ings; descent-with-modification has not constrained biology to any sin-
gle narrow niche.
• Descent-with-modification provides the constraint, it does not strictly
limit the results, but limits the process: the question is always where
one could go from here (or get here in the first place), not about where
one could get by starting from scratch. As such, the more we know
about ancestral systems, the more we are able to put the notion of
descent-with-modification to use.
• The adult cognitive (and neural) structure should still be presumed
to be a reflection of both experience and genetic factors– the position
that cognitive modules are understood to be shaped by evolutionary
changes from ancestral cognitive modules does not in any way lessen
the role of experience but instead to suggest a different way of thinking
about the nature of the genetic contribution.
• Descent-with-modification made us stand a better chance of under-
standing cognitive and neural function if we studied particular cogni-
tive domains not as entities unto themselves, but through a comparison
with other current systems that might plausibly have descended with
modification from common ancestral systems.
“In the On the Origin of Species, Darwin (1859) argued that ‘existing
forms of life are the descendants by true generation of pre-existing forms’:
evolution never starts from scratch, but instead by modifying the structures
of organisms already in place.” ([147], pp. 446–447)
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In an interdisciplinary manner, we have intersected the realms of cul-
ture psychology, with the realm of cognitive science, and an investigation
have been addressed whether the cognitive differences will disappear in the
emerging world of ethnic differences ([156], Epilogue). Formulating a logic
translation between the formal logical mode and dialectical logical mode will
shed new light on the meaning of the principle of tolerance that is used to
characterize pluralism in logic. We believe that the institution theory which
provides the idea for logic translations between different logics in use with
a certain sense of logical pluralism8 will also serve as a framework for the
translation between the two modes mentioned here by translating the syntax
and semantics of different formalism. This formulation of pluralism in logic
brings the term closer to the stronger meaning of pluralism. The cultural
psychological assumption that logic is taken as the cognitive process enlarged
our perspectives of pluralism in logic. It is similar to take “logic as algebra”
in algebraic logic pertaining to mathematical enterprises, and “logic as struc-
ture” in the structuralism pertaining to philosophical enterprises, “logic as
cognitive process” that should be pertain to cognitive scientific or psycho-
logical enterprises will also enlarge the perspectives in the Universal Logic
project.
In regard to logical pluralism, we have addressed some relatively basic
problems in former chapter as follows:
1. Is it correct to claim the singularity of logic?
2. What is the debate between monism and pluralism in logic?
3. Is there a universality in the mode of cognitive processes?
The third question will be discussed. To adopt the aforementioned cul-
tural psychological viewpoint, that is “logic as cognitive process”, our answer
should clearly be“no”. Nonetheless, this answer does not in any way reject
8Goguen and Ros¸u stated:
“Mathematicians, and even logicians, have not shown much interest in
the theory of institutions, perhaps because their tendency toward Platonism
inclines them to believe that there is just one true logic and model theory [...]
On the other hand, computer scientists, having been forcibly impressed with
the need to work with a number of different logics, often for very practical
reasons [...]” ([111], p. 294)
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universality in the other sense, where universality pertains to various objec-
tive and systematic scientific findings for common features for the cognition
of Homo sapiens . However, it does not presuppose that there is a unique
way of reasoning or one mode of cognitive processes.
Let us now return to the principle of tolerance which will subsequently
formulate a different version of pluralism in logic. The tolerance princi-
ple we consider must still be within the framework of regarding logic as a
cognitive process. In relation to Carnapian principle of tolerance, it stated
that people should not be forbidden to choose a logic for themselves, al-
beit people should provide sound reasons for supporting their choice and the
consequences of their choice. “The liberty to choose” characterizes the core
essence of the principle of tolerance. Similarly, in BRLP, with the other
plurality (irreducibly plural) the common concept of logical consequence has
been articulated to claim that classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and rele-
vant logic exemplify the notion of logical consequence equally. As mentioned
in this chapter, in cultural psychological and psychobiological perspectives,
the modification of cognition for different typical and representative cog-
nitive processes has been discussed: firstly, cognitive processing had being
changed due to the change in the reality of societies; secondly, descent-with-
modification of cognitive structures with genetic factors which states cogni-
tive modules are shaped by evolutionary changes from the ancestral cognitive
modules. To mark the principle of tolerance as encompassing these variants,
including cultural differences, it is possible to structure a logical pluralism
as the cognitive processes modification pluralism in a broader sense.
5.5 A Universal Logic System with Dialecti-
cism
This formulation of pluralism in logic may be carried out by reviewing the
differences between a large extent of the Universal Logic project and a uni-
versal logic system. The notion of a universal logic system with dialecticism
was introduced by Hucan He et al. in the 1990s. As mentioned in the begin-
ning of this chapter, apart from supporting the classicalism of AI, He et al.
aimed to develop a “continuous” and “controllable” logical system such that
it is possible for it to be developed as a logic for dealing with different possi-
ble cases. We called such a universal logic as the C-UniLog (see Appendix).
120 CHAPTER 5. THE GEOGRAPHY OF COGNITIVE MODES
First of all, it will be helpful to discuss the concept of logic they hold:
• Logic is a sort of criterion or device that can be applied for judging and
regulating doctrines and theories. Logic can be found in all doctrines
and theories by abstracting and extracting judgments and deductive
rules. It cannot stand alone outside the development of doctrines and
theories ([125], p. 1).
• Theories should conform to the logics that they own.
• An existing logic needs to be refined or expanded; otherwise, it must
be able to explain new scientific theories and discoveries.
In the literature, the development of C-UniLog is still at a nascent stage
([125], p. iv, pp. 21–22). Based on two main characteristics: the continuity
of the domain and controllable propositional connectives operations, attempts
to develop a logic to deal with all circumstances. C-UniLog is with mathe-
matical formal logic (rigid logic) as the kernel, whereby various flexible logics
can be changed arbitrarily according to the application requirements.9 Sup-
posedly, He et al. attempted to deal with and to limit themselves to a rarer
pragmatic situation by applying their conception of logic.
What role does, or should, the C-UniLog play in the concept of Universal
Logic? This is the question that is to be addressed in this section. The
question is hardly a new one, but the development of the Universal Logic
project makes a profound statement on the subject as follows:
“Let us immediately reject some misunderstanding; universal
logic, as I understand it, is not one universal logic. In fact, from
the viewpoint of universal logic the existence of one universal logic
is not even possible, and this is a result that can easily be shown.
One might thus say somehow ironically the following: according
to universal logic there is no universal logic.” ([32])
9He et al. clearly refer the rigid logics based on the modern mathematical formal
logic that can only be used in a close, hologram and binary world such as the world
of mathematics. It is not necessary in the contrary sense that flexible logics refer to
the logics that are capable of handling contradictions and uncertainties (compare e.g.
[123], [125]). A similar usage of these terms can be found in [218], p. 39 where rigidness
means “justifiability” in inference steps and flexibility means “context-dependency” of the
inference processes for the activities of a reasoning system.
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Proponents of C-UniLog realize that their subject has important implications
for empirical sciences, but discussions on applications of C-UniLog have fo-
cused largely on non-Western society. It therefore seems inappropriate to
address the question directly.
I will first address the issue of the speciality of C-UniLog: dialecticism.
Next, we will look at the role that dialecticism has played in modern science,
and the relation of this to C-UniLog. This will raise the question of how
the theoretical status of C-UniLog ought to be treated in science and if such
acceptance should be more than provisional? These topics will be addressed
in this section. An outcome of this discussion will be that, in the light of
developments in Universal Logic and logical pluralism, we may well have to
change our attitude to variants of certain kinds in logic; such a change would
open new possibilities in science itself.
5.5.1 From Fuzzy Logic to a Universal Logic System
To understand C-UniLog, we need to distinguish clearly between it and the
Universal Logic project. To do this, we need a clear idea of what the former
approach is all about. A good place to begin is with the basic understanding
of fuzzy logics begun in the 1965 proposal of fuzzy set theory by Lotfi Zadeh.
In this well-known article: Fuzzy sets , Zadeh defends his own approach to
the calculus of logic, drawing on an idea to use a membership function with
a range covering the interval [0, 1] operating on the domain of all possible
values that characterize or define reasoning that is approximate rather than
fixed and exact (see [119], [227]).
I am not concerned here with the merits and history of probability theory
and fuzzy logics, and in particular I will not spend time considering any
formal system of fuzzy logic in mathematical logic and other applications.
But it is worthwhile taking seriously the limitations of fuzzy logics that have
been discussed by He et al. as follows:
• Probability theory is a logical system with a continuous truth value,
which introduces the continuous changeability of variables, AND-operation
and OR-operation. It successfully demonstrates the changeability of
these two operations in three special situations, principles of minimal
correlated, maximal correlated, and independent correlated, with whose
behaviors of operation-models.10
10This paragraph is taken from the words and ideas expressed in [126], pp. 76–77.
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• As probability theory fails to be a universal logic system, it fails to
develop the changeability of the OR-operation, and the AND-operation
in a general case, hence probability theory, at present, is just a special
instance of C-UniLog. (For related studies, see [219].)
• Although fuzzy logic develops the continuous changeability of the OR-
operation and the AND-operation, unfortunately, fuzzy logic only em-
ploys the principle of maximal correlation in its early development,
thereby missing the opportunity to be developed as a universal logic.
In addition, it claims that fuzzy logic is only a special instance of uni-
versal logic in the case of h = 1. (See Appendix.)
• Triangular norm (T-norm) theory studies the changeability of the OR-
operation and the AND-operation, and determines the different opera-
tion models of the OR-operation and the AND-operation based on the
three correlation principles. He et al. claimed that nobody has ever
connected these with a controllable continuous logical system; hence
missing the opportunity to be developed as a possible universal logic.
C-UniLog can be viewed as a theory of generalizing “fuzzy logic in the
broad sense (older, better known, heavily applied but not asking deep logical
questions) serving mainly as apparatus for fuzzy control, analysis of vague-
ness in natural language and several other application domains” ([119]) with
a pragmatic ability to be applied to many fields, including control theory and
artificial intelligence. 11
5.5.2 C-UniLog as a Meta-theory
C-UniLog, of course, is particularly concerned with studying the so-call gen-
eral principles of logic, but the following point might be made about the
status of the methodology. To be a theory of analysis over the logic struc-
ture, the domain, the connectives, the quantifiers, and the value, a universal
logic structure and a universal logic generator are formulated, and C-UniLog
should be considered as a meta-theory that closely related to the family of
fuzzy logic. By giving the specific parameters of the structure, the related
11He et al. claimed that C-UniLog pertains to the stream of second revolution of logic,
which tried to break through three laws and one character (TLOC) (see Appendix
and [123], pp. 86–88).
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various logics can be reasonably produced (see [125], chapter 12). In this re-
gard, similar to the Universal Logic project, C-UniLog can become another
general theory of logics.
For C-UniLog, there is many much work in introducing quantifiers, which
is completely different from the materials in our first course of logic (see Def-
inition 38 in Appendix). They not only introduce new quantifiers to describe
every possible circumstance but also attempt to reduce the old, previously
acknowledged “quantifiers” and “logical terms,” ∀, ∃, , and ♦, to a different
theoretical level. In this sense, C-UniLog can naturally be understood as a
meta-theory, especially to the family of fuzzy logics. Purely from the meta-
logical point of view, the position of C-UniLog is similar to what people have
taken as mathematical logic, i.e., to analogize as mathematical theories of
studying the mathematics of logics. If we consider this viewpoint, C-UniLog
can be a semi-mathematical theory of logics, which may be regarded as an
artificial-intelligential theory of logic.12
5.5.3 Dialecticism
A number of modern logicians and philosophers, in the past few decades, have
attempted to provide mathematical foundations for dialectical logic (e.g. [23],
[187], [188]). Dialecticism (Dialectics) in a general sense is the study of those
propositions that have intrinsic contradictions and extrinsic uncertainties,
and to look for the formal relationship among them. Dialetheism which is
the view that some propositions of the form ϕ and ¬ϕ are both true, where
¬ is realized as the negation, should be treated as a sub-filed of dialecticism
([183]). It is usually considered a branch of paraconsistent logics. Many logics
with dialecticism have appeared in special areas of artificial intelligence and
law such as building theories of defeasible reasoning (compare e.g. [98], [132],
[166], [167], [168]).
Though the construction of inconsistent mathematical theories or formal
paraconsistent logics is relatively newer than dialecticism, there are already
inconsistent arithmetic ([179], [181]) and inconsistent mathematics ([149]).
In C-UniLog, an appropriate mathematical theory is found and should per-
tain to the family of fuzzy logics. Hence, a likely way for dialecticism to
12It cannot be regarded as a mathematical theory of logic since mathematics does not
allow for the concept of contradiction. C-UniLog aims to introduce the dialecticism mech-
anism of flexibilization to include inconsistency. Unless we revise the content of mathe-
matics, we cannot possibly claim that this type of theory is a mathematical theory.
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be introduced into mathematical logic is via what is called as the process
of flexibilization. He et al. believe that the development of mathematical
dialectic logic is possible in a step-by-step manner. They also believe that it
is different from mathematical formal logic that has only an equivalent form,
as the transforming laws of mathematical dialectic logic are infinite and are
changing. He et al. state:
“[...] It is impossible to find the general law in limited time as
it has infinite inequivalent forms. However, relatively speaking, it
is possible to implement the idea of universal logics according to
the research compendium of universal logics: gradually advancing
from the bottom level, finding the general laws of universal logics
in some levels and sides, including these laws with the flexibilized
method [...]” ([125], p. viii)
The question of how to introduce dialectics to mathematical logic is techni-
cally sophisticated (see Appendix). We do not intend to provide a detailed
answer to this question by using their approach, which is to establish flexible
logics in which there are various new principles that dialectic logic could have
discovered. The main steps of this approach may be summarized as follows:
• First, abstract the truth value range for flexible logics, operation model
clusters of flexible propositional connectives and flexible quantifiers
from the real world.
• Second, prove the logical properties with respect to these operation
model clusters to build the flexible propositional (quantifier) logics .
• Third, abstract the mathematical theories pertaining to these flexible
logics.
Note that mathematical logic is treated as a sort of rigid logic. Mathematical
logic consists of four core fields: set theory, model theory, recursion theory,
and proof theory, which was termed the Four Theories by He et al. In-
troducing the mechanism of dialectics to re-formulate every rigid logic will
generate individual flexible logic. Thus, there is a conjecture that it is neces-
sary to adjust the Four Theories to obtain the new Four Theories (compare
[123], p. 96 and [125], chapter 1).
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5.6 Conclusion
C-UniLog and the Universal Logic project are developing similar but differ-
ent revision methods for the same thing, namely, modern logic to put forward
their ideas of universal logic. In this regard, we have discussed related works
by considering some empirical studies in cultural psychology pertaining to
cognitive processing, logic, and reasoning. Based on the spirit of C-UniLog,
the dialectical mechanism to be introduced into mathematical logic flexibi-
lizes mathematical logic, i.e. to mathematicalize dialectical logic.
A general challenge that has particularly been addressed is the coming of
the second revolution of mathematical logic ([123]). As He et al. observed,
the limitation of logic is similar to other disciplines and theories as follows:
“Any theory will experience a process from simple to complex.
In the beginning, because of the lack of theoretical foundation and
research experiences, simplification is necessary for establishing
the corresponding elementary theory” (Ibid, p. 89).
In this regard, the “neglect of complexity” was taken as a limitation or even
a defect in the development of theories. However, as we have discussed in
this chapter, this is common in western culture or in the cognitive mode
of the Westerner. Richard Nisbett in [156] used a metaphor to describe
this. If we consider the hypothesis that “the universe is pretzel-shaped,”
then it is better that the universe is “pretzel-shaped,” else there would be no
opportunity for us to discover the shape of the universe. Further, by holding
the “pretzel-shaped” hypothesis: “we’re better off starting with a straight
line and modifying it as it becomes clear that the linear hypothesis is too
simple” (Ibid, p. 209).
This description is a typical example. The Asian is more inclined to
believe that the world is “complicated”, which of course it is. Hence, the
same notion can be found in their theories. Westerners, on the other hand,
prefer to begin with a simple hypothesis to view the world. However, this is
definitely not a defect, rather it is merely a “limitation” Of course, this word
should not be understood in a negative sense.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Further Research
Contents
6.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.2 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.1 Summary
With the various logics which have been proposed in the development of
modern logic, Universal Logic could be further seen as a theory of trying to
make an “identification” to different logics in order to answer a basic question:
“what is logic?” This process of identification identifies the commonality and
differences between various logics, moreover it could check the connections
and relationships between different logics. In the past, different logics were
generated by different considerations, some of these were raised to challenge
the appropriateness of classical logic, e.g., intuitionistic logic.
After conducting a comprehensive investigation on the development of
Universal Logic project which aims to identify abstract logical consequence,
we found BRLP which is seen as a landmark in the modern pluralism in logic
is qualified as an identification of abstract logical consequence. The abstract
logical consequence relation was developed not only for the aforementioned
practical reasons, but also for the theoretical and philosophical considera-
tions. Moreover, various related interdisciplinary investigations pertaining
either to the Universal Logic project or BRLP can be found in various areas.
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We would like to emphasize that the study of logic translation plays a
key role in the Universal Logic project. The notions of translation in par-
ticular have been employed by many applications of academic research. We
incorporate our distinction between deviant logic translation and extended
logic translation with Haack’s distinction between deviant logics to support
discussions in the philosophy of logic. As mentioned, according the Univer-
sal Logic project, the study of deviant logic lacks a foundation of systematic
and serious theories. We admit that this criticism is also applicable to our
distinction of logic translation. However, it is true that with respect to clas-
sical logic, modal logic is not considered to be similar to intuitionistic logic;
further, it is true that the translation from IPL to modal system G is not
considered similar to that from CPL to IPL. Thus, we have to admit that
there should be some distinction for the concept of logic translation.
Readers may be aware of the insufficiency of the connection between the
work on logic translation and the Universal Logic project. As discussed in
previous chapters, one of the main goals of the Universal Logic project is to
identify the “trivial” parts, which should be common to various systems of
logic. This will allow us not only to ascertain the common aspects of logic
but also determine their differences. One way to do this is to compare them;
the work on logic translation provides the possible methods for such com-
parison. For example, Wo´jcicki has shown the reconstructability of classical
propositional calculi in intuitionistic logic (([224]), [225]). As described in the
contest at the 2nd World Congress and School on Universal Logic,
“However Wo´jcicki has shown that classical logic cannot be
reconstructed within intuitionistic logic - his concept of recon-
structibilty being a stronger concept of translation. Go¨del’s trans-
lation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic shows that intu-
itionism is not in a sense safer than classical logic, but maybe this
has to be relativised due to Wo´jcicki’s result.” ([30], p. 56)
In addition to clarifying the meaning of translation, the main objective of
the citation is to express that differences between logics can be indicated
through translation. Moreover, some related issues in philosophy of logic can
be reexamined by providing a systematic methodology. For example, the
translation paradox discussed in this dissertation was solved by Mossakowski
et al. in the paper “What is a logic translation?” ([151]) by introducing the
institution theory to study logic translations from an abstract perspective.
Also, it was claimed in the paper “13 Questions about Universal Logics”
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([32]) that the widely accepted notion about deviant logics in philosophy of
logic should be treated in a more systematic way.
To study the foundational issues of logic translation, logical pluralism is
naturally considered. As we have shown, BRLP represents a style of logical
pluralism in the philosophy of logic. In order to justify plurality, there is
a model which allows a systematic analysis of the three endorsed logics in
BRLP.
Essentially, when we are out of the philosophical domain but with a in-
tegrative viewpoint, we believe that all logics used in the logic society today,
e.g. paraconsistent logic, many-valued logic, quantum logic, and free logic,
etc. might be able to study some deviant-BRLP models in the same way.
Furthermore, this approach allows in particular a classification for different
families of logics in an abstract way. The conclusion of logician Stephen
Read’s book review of Logical Pluralism ([189]) states the following:
“Logical Pluralism presents a challenge to the proponents of
alternative logic, and even to classical logicians who find alterna-
tive logics interestingly mistaken. In a short book, the authors not
only raise deep issues, they also provide neat thumbnail sketches
of a range of logics. It is clear from my response that I think their
position is mistaken, but theirs is a challenge that must be met,
and meeting it adequately is not easy. Every logician should read
this book.”
Yet, as we have discussed, BRLP has not comprehensively explained the
exact stances that it will replace. The modern logical society should reflect
on the validity of any given argument, to study the essence of validity, the
concept of logical consequence, and further, to realize the applications of all
these concepts.
Logical monists set up a unique criterion to claim the validity of an ar-
gument; logical pluralists set up more than one criterion. It is difficult for
logicians to merely look at and not address the various logics that are widely
discussed and developed in various scientific domains. BRLP excites not only
those working in philosophical studies but also those working in various sci-
entific domains related to logic. It reminds people to reflect on foundational
positions when conducting work on “reality” and “applications”.
The pluralistic or even the relativistic approach will not only serve as the
foundational complement of the earlier chapters about the Universal Logic
approach, where logic translation plays a key role, but also serves as the
130 CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH
foundation, we believe, to some areas of computer science, e.g. ontology
design and some other interdisciplinary areas.
Theoretical computer scientists, mathematical logicians, and even math-
ematicians, have shown much interest in and shared the spirit of the Uni-
versal Logic project, perhaps because their tendency toward pragmatism
inclines them to believe that there is not just one true logic. We have al-
ready mentioned some of the model-theoretic studies for Universal Logic that
were explored, for example, the categorical abstract model theory based on
Goguen and Burstall’s notion of institution ([111], [112], [113]), institution-
independent model theory ([72]), the axiomatization of the abstract model
theory ([18]), and an abstract model theory framework for Universal Logic
([104]).
In the literature, an abstract framework for the study of sub-logic that
we have introduced allows a systematic analysis of conceptual and technical
problems, both of which are from the Abstract Model Theory viewpoint
(compare e.g. [104], [151] [154]). Moreover, the abstract model theory point
of view has been suggested as an appropriate direction for the Universal Logic
project.
“Although abstract logic and abstract model theory are ex-
pressions which look similar, they refer to two different traditions,
..., The combination of abstract model theory with abstract logic
is surely an important step towards the development of Universal
Logic.” ([33], viii,)
Pluralism or relativism which was born for many application-oriented
reasons has been widely accepted in various logic studies. In the early part
of the 20th century, it was not common for logicians and computer scientists to
conflate the general theory of logics with the term Universal Logic. According
to Be´ziau’s view, a general theory of logics and its notion of arbitrary logical
structures was essentially dependent on Tarskian logic and Birkhoff’s notion
of Universal Algebra by taking the conceptual approach. Moreover, one of the
main results of the Universal Logic project is to combine general bivaluation
semantics with Gentzen’s sequent calculus in order to promote the idea of
abstract logic which plays an important role in the development of modern
logic to an even more general level.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the main work of the Universal
Logic project is to identify universal and common parts of various logics,
such that people can moreover apply them more or less directly to specific
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logics, depending on certain situations of certain problems. It is worth men-
tioning again, that as a result of Universal Logic, the property of maximal
consistency, which is traditionally considered to depend on specific features,
when we prove the completeness of a given logic, should be attributed to
the universal parts of a logic instead of taking it as specific parts of various
specific logics.
We wish to emphasize certain points in our work which, though not en-
tirely new, have not been comprehensively discussed in the literature about
the Universal Logic project:
1. The notion of arbitrary logical structure accompanied with bivaluation
for the Universal Logic project was already noted in the early papers on
Universal Logic ([38], [46]), and it is further emphasized here through
the discussion of the translation paradox. This fact makes it possible to
claim logical structures are on a par with other mathematical mother
structures in traditional mathematical structuralism, Bourbakism, and
the relationship between logic and algebra are clarified, of which [35]
and [45] are worth mentioning. This can be regarded as the primary
aspect in the Universal Logic Project, leading to the so-called Neo-
Bourbakism, which identifies the status of a logical structure as being
at the same level as the other three mother structures in the Bourbakian
sense.
2. There have been various logics in the development of the modern logic
society. A conception of an arbitrary logical structure has been studied
in the Universal Logic project. Universal Logic, which has claimed to
be a general theory of logics, has to face the explosion of various logic
systems generated by different considerations and applications in order
to answer a basic question: “what is logic?” Logic translation inves-
tigations could serve the purpose of identifying the commonality and
differences between various logics, as well as presenting the relation-
ships between different logics, e.g. the onto-logical translation graph
([150]).
3. In many cases, various logics were generated by different considera-
tions, some of which were raised to challenge the appropriateness of
classical logic. The development of intuitionistic logic is the succinct
of classical logic without the law of excluded middle. Thus, it was tra-
ditionally seen as a sublogic of classical logic. In every single example
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we have discussed, the logic translation studies have a notion of inclu-
sion between classical logic and intuitionistic logic. However, in the
progress of logic translation between KGGG-EW and BBS-BEW,
the translation paradox shows that it is not clear enough to indicate
the meaning of sublogic, which one is stronger or weaker, which one
should be seen as an extension of the other (Chapter 2). As a result of
the Universal Logic project, there will be systematic and fruitful stud-
ies on logic translation (compare e.g. [137], [150], [151], [152], [154]).
Logical pluralism serves as the primary fundamental investigation for
foundation studies on logic translation.
4. Clearly, the understanding of fundamental studies on logic translation
has changed considerably over the decades. This is not to say that
such techniques have been, or ever should be, abandoned, rather we
now see them as serving a different purpose, especially in computer
science. Two fundamental questions have been addressed: (1) Which
translation is the best to show that a logic is a sublogic of another? (2)
In which sense can a logic be said to be weaker, stronger or safer than
another, through a translation? The institution theory, which is a
kind of abstract model theory, was used to answer these questions,
with the following three outcomes in [151]:
First, it generated some results about the interaction of different types
of translations with different kinds of logical connectives and quanti-
fiers. Second, it showed that some well-known translations between
(variants of) classical and intuitionistic logic can be turned into se-
mantic translations. Third, it provided a simpler and more conceptual
explanation of the faithfulness of logic translation. In the mathemat-
ical regard, the institution theory definitely shed new light on logic
translation investigations in general logic. Moreover, in practice, the
faithfulness of translations between logics could be a good base in an
interdisciplinary manner for applications. From the proof-theoretic per-
spective, Go¨del et al. in the KGGG-EW presented double-negation
translation (or negative translation) between classical first-order logic
and intuitionistic first-order logic. It gains importance, e.g., within the
philosophy of mathematics.
The last part of our work has been concerned with the nature of logic in an
interdisciplinary manner, its status as a corrigible theory with a certain sub-
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ject matter, and its claims to uniqueness. For example, “logic as algebra” in
algebraic logic pertaining to the mathematical enterprise, and “logic as struc-
ture” in structuralism pertaining to the philosophical enterprise. With this,
we revised the nature of several anthropological and psychological notions–
especially the introduction of “logic as cognitive process” on the differences
between different cultures.
Traditionally, translation in a pragmatic sense encounters linguistic and
cultural problems. From this perspective, the outcome of the investigation is
an interdisciplinary and interesting one. Consistency and non-contradiction
have often been taken to be so central to the notions in question that it
has been felt that Westerner traditions could not operate without them.
As we have seen, they can. But perhaps more importantly, the discussions
show that these core notions are not as crucial for those of non-western cul-
tures. Many of the traditional theories of truth in western culture may be
allowed to be neglected by non-western cultures, negation is not a standard
contradictory-forming function, and the view of rationality is not similar
to contemporary western analytical philosophy, e.g. epistemology and phi-
losophy of science, and the nature of logic has collapsed into some faddish
pluralism or relativism in philosophical logics. Perhaps the most surprising
thing, then, is how easily considerations of inconsistency and tolerance to
contradiction can be found in various applications areas, e.g. Paraconsistent
Artificial Neural Networks ([1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [145], [199]). This
might make the traditional view of the centrality of consistency and that of
non-contradiction to the Westerner even more surprising. These two turn
out to be views that can not be sustained.
A formal logical mode for the westerner and a dialectic logic mode for
the Asian have subsequently formulated a different pluralism in logic in the
following three ways: the first is the consideration of logic translation studies
in a broader sense; the second is the combination of cross-cultural empirical
results from the Cultural–psychobiological viewpoint on the modification of
cognition; and the third is a new consideration of the principle of tolerance
from the cultural psychological perspective. We reconsider the “principle
of tolerance” within the framework of regarding logic as a cognitive pro-
cess. Two typical and representative cognitive processes have changed and
been modified due to changes in the reality of societies in cultural-psychology
form, and moreover some descend-with-modification of cognitive cultures can
support these changes and modifications from some psycho-biological view-
points. To mark the principle of tolerance as encompassing these variants
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means the cognitive processes do not fall in either the formal logical mode
or dialectical logical mode. Thus, a kind of cognitive processes modifi-
cation pluralism in a broader sense of logic has been presented.
In the end, we doubt that for the comparison of the relationship between
C-UniLog and the Universal Logic project connected with the spirit of Uni-
versal Algebra is a serious issue. We revisited the general and ambiguous
question: “Is logic universal?” and the five specific questions that were ad-
dressed in the Special Issue of the journal, Logical Universalis. We framed
our discussions of these questions in an interdisciplinary manner under the
assumption of logic as cognitive process. Core to this dissertation is the de-
velopment of an interdisciplinary formulation of logical pluralism based on
the combination of psychologism, a modification of cognition, and the toler-
ance principle discusses these questions. Briefly, we reorganize and answer
some of these questions which can be summarized as follows:
Do all human beings have the same capacity of reasoning? Do men,
women, children reason in the same way?
No. There is no one common reasoning capacity that will fit all human beings.
Particularly, when ‘reasoning capacity’ or ‘thinking’ (in general) is examined
in relation to children, it was found that children’s thinking does not develop
in the same way as adults. This has been taken to mean that before a certain
age children are not capable of understanding things in certain ways and this
is not a reflection on their intelligence. This shows the difference of capacity
of reasoning between adults and children (compare, e.g. [15], [73], [162], [165],
[160], [197], [200]).
Does reasoning evolve? Did human beings reason in the same way
two centuries ago? In the future, will human beings reason in
the same way? Do we reason in different ways depending on the
situation?
Our answer is “Yes” for all four questions. From a psychobiological per-
spective, cognitive modules is descent-with-modification, that is to say cur-
rent cognitive structures are shaped by evolutionary changes from ancestral
cognitive structures. Moreover, from the cultural-psychological perspective,
people perceive and think, with the change of social practices and tempo-
rary states of social orientation, In this two perspective, reasoning today has
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evolved two centuries ago and will continue to evolve in the future. Moreover,
Nisbett states that some hints or clues of a specific situation are sufficient
to switch to another totally different inference strategy. ([155], p. xi)
Do the different systems of logic reflect the diversity of reasoning?
Is there any absolute true way of reasoning?
For the first question, the answer is “yes”. While ‘different systems’ attempt
to refer to the various specific reasoning cases between the spectrum where
the dialectical mode is on one side and the formal logical mode is on the other,
it is not difficult to see the diversity between these two representations. The
answer is still “yes”, even when we do not clarify logic in this bi-polarized way
but to focus on logic application studies, the need for diversity of reasoning
has been acknowledged in various application areas nowadays. For the second
question, the answer is “no”. There is no absolute true way of reasoning by
following the answers to these questions here. Reflective equilibrium might
have been seen as a common and reasonable thinking method for various
situations, especially to achieve a state of balance among a set of beliefs by
mutually adjusting the general principles and particular judgments in daily
life. However, cultural diversity shatters the reliability of this method, where
cultural differences make people generate different preference to achieve such
a state of balance. Taking these general answers to these fundamental ques-
tions concerning the universality to the modes of cognitive processes is our
starting point. We have presented a formulation of logical pluralism for the
Universal Logic project that rests mainly on two assumptions, namely an
endorsement of the modification of cognition with the tolerance principle
and an adoption of a certain psychologism. The combination of these ideas
led to the introduction and study of cognitive processes modification
pluralism.
This abstract dogma for the study of the Universal Logic project that we
introduced as a general theory of logic and the C-UniLog that we introduced
as a flexible logic derived from dialecticalizing the mathematical logic (rigid
logic) allows a systematic analysis of conceptual and application problems in
logical engineering that has been considered both by these two ideas of
Universal Logic. In the first place, Be´ziau observed that the trend of universal
logic gained prominence in the 1980s, when practical questions in the new
development of different fields, such as AI, linguistics, and computer science,
were raised. Further, he stated that issues about mathematical foundations
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had already been eclipsed in logic at the time, and hence, many revised
versions of logic were proposed ([32], p. 140). In addition, Be´ziau stated
the following: “universal logic plays a crucial role with respect to AI, expert
systems and automated reasoning, since it helps to develop systems adapted
to the most various data: that is called ‘logical engineering’.” ([32], p. 147).
There should be no specific logic that can be adapted to every situation and
every problem; in other words, “there is no miraculous universal logic” (ibid,
p. 147).
Essentially, the logics used in logical engineering today are in the spirit
of Universal Logic, such as the proposal about the onto-logical engineer-
ing that applies structuring and modularity principles based on institution
theory thus leading to the theory of hyperontologies ([137]). It allows
ontology designers to build their ontologies. This is considerably similar to
the opinions about C-UniLog with respect to the development of AI that
aims to use flexible and changeable logics by including mathematical logic
as the kernel (the rigid aspect) to solve all uncertain and contradictory situ-
ations. In other words, they hope to construct a family of flexible logics for
each different situation. Indeed, logical engineering developments support
the view that Universal Logic allows various approaches that have been used
in the logical society. This relativistic attitude to logical studies and inter-
disciplinary studies suggests a methodology that will be useful for various
application areas.
6.2 Future Research
This dissertation dealt with Universal Logic, logic translation, logical plu-
ralism and logic across cultures. The notion of logic translation is at the
heart of the Universal Logic movement; the SFB/TR 8 Spatial Cognition
and the DFKI Bremen are deeply involved in this movement. While continu-
ing to remain aware of the importance of the central issues of logic, we hope
that psycho-social factors and cultures are also given serious consideration,
particularly with the rise of new disciplines. Universal Logic provides a gen-
eral theory of logic to study the most general and abstract properties of the
various possible logics. Following this work, we have tried to bring some ad-
ditional perspectives to the logical menagerie, starting with but not limited
to the logic translation between intuitionistic logic and classical logic, and
moreover suggested some potential studies in an interdisciplinary manner. It
6.2. FUTURE RESEARCH 137
seems that our work has raised some more questions, as is often the case,
than it has answered. We summarize the future directions and extensions as
follows:
Logical Pluralism and Logical Dynamics
A general challenge that will need to be addressed in the future is the inte-
gration of various interesting logical pluralism proposals (e.g. [8], [21], [57],
[81], [170], [196]). A sense of logical pluralism which proposed the increasing
plurality of logical systems was earlier presented by Johan van Benthem in
[22], p. 373), in this sense, such plurality is much closer to the case of modal
logics.
“[...] This pluralist view is much closer to what has always
been standard practice in modal logic, where no single system
has ever commanded general allegiance. It is also closer to the
spirit of the earlier-mentioned linguistic applications. Linguistic
competence is usually measured through a variety of grammatical
mechanisms, which may be different for different syntactic tasks.
And the same might be the appropriate view in logic, viewed as
a description of human cognitive competence.”
Johan van Benthem further stated:
“[...] There seem to be two broad answers in circulation to-
day. One is logical pluralism, locating the new scope of logic in
charting a wide variety of reasoning styles, often marked by non-
classical structural rules of inference. This is the new program
that I subscribed to in my work on sub-structural logics around
1990, and it is a powerful movement today.” ([21], p. 182.)
With regard to the work above, the meaning of plurality in logic relies on
sub-structural logics and various modal logical systems that are generated
by choosing modal terms as logical constants. Here plurality exactly coin-
cides with Carnap’s principle of tolerance. However, it is different from the
pluralism that we have elucidated in BRLP.1
1As Priest said: “What Johan calls logical pluralism is rather different from what many
self-ascribed logical pluralists call by that name. For him, logical pluralism is the study
of sub-structural logics–logics obtained, generally speaking, by taking a sequent calculus
for classical logic, and then modifying or eliminating some of its structural rules, such as
Weakening and Contraction.”
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For the logical dynamics program, it is observed that the main issue for
logic has become the study of “the variety of informational tasks performed
by intelligent interacting agents, of which inference is only one among many,
involving observation, memory, questions and answers, dialogue, or general
communication” which replaces a study of the variety of reasoning styles and
notions of consequence. Investigations of logical systems “should deal with a
wide variety of these, making information-carrying events first-class citizens
in their set-up.” Related discussions took place at various logical conferences
on pluralism2, and subsequent discussions made by Johan van Benthem ([21])
and Graham Priest ([170]) appeared in The Australasian Journal of Logic,
which primarily discusses logical pluralism and logical dynamics.
The General Theory of Structures and Cognitive Struc-
tures
Concrete future work concerns interfaces to cognitive science. We propose
a study of the cognitive structures in an interdisciplinary way such that
the Universal Logic project will also benefit. The primary objective is to
study the possible opportunities for developing communication between logic
(information), psychology (rationality), and argumentation theory. Thus, we
plan to conduct a study to consider the cognitive structures of humans.
From a cross-cultural perspective, with the assumption of logic as cogni-
tive process, we propose to study the formal logical mode for westerners and
the dialectic logical mode for the Asian as the first work. For the formal logi-
cal mode, there seems to be some candidates to serve this purpose, including
classical logic, intuitionistic logic, relevant logic, and linear logic and so on.3
For the dialectic logic mode, prescribing a clear idea of dialectical logic is the
primary goal.
2(1) Logical Pluralism Conference, Tartu, Estonia, 27-31 Aug 2008; (2) The first Arche´
Conference on Foundations of Logical Consequence, 11-15 June 2010; (3)The Arche´ ‘Logic
or Logics?’ Mini-Course, St Andrews, 27-29 September 2010 (4)The Second Arche´ Con-
ference on the Foundations of Logical Consequence, St Andrews, 8-10 June 2012
3“Some people regard the wider landscape of deduction as it is unfolding right now
as one more step in ‘foundational’ research, looking for ‘the correct base logic’ governing
human reasoning. Thus, people might convert from being a classical logician to a disciple
of intuitionism, and then as the century comes to a close, to being a believer in linear
logic. ...In many contexts, what they are doing is still much more adequately described by
classical or intuitionistic systems, But, for other purposes, linear logics or relevance logics
may be much closer to the mark.” ([22], pp. 373–374)
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Ideally, we hope the study of cognitive structures fits the spirit of Uni-
versal Logic because the Universal Logic project is attempting to contribute
to the development of a general theory of structure.4 With regard to the
Universal Logic project, in developing “a general theory of structures”, it
has already focused on several realms of mathematics, e.g., abstract algebra.
Apart from this, we can consider specifying the targeted structures that we
are going to study instead of only discussing “structure” in a vague sense.
For example, the revision of mathematical logic attempts to characterize the
cognitive structures of children ([15], [73], [162], [165], [160], [197], [200]) and
study the general psychological problems of logical-mathematical thought,
introduced by psychologist Jean Piaget and logician E.W. Beth ([25]).
Finally, to consider separate structures suggests that we are not directly
addressing the general theory of structures. The development of Category
Theory is worth mentioning. Category Theory deals with mathematical
structures in an abstract manner and investigates the relationships between
structures with many more mature results than the Universal Logic project.
The study of the structures of human cognitive processes will be carried out
in an interdisciplinary manner. It should be not only contribute to the fields
of mathematics and logics but also to psychology and cognitive science.
4“Universal Logic can contribute itself to the development of a general theory of struc-
tures in stating and solving such crucial issues as for example identity between logical
structures. When and how two mathematical structures are identical is a problem of
crucial import in the theory of structures.”([32], p. 139.)
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This appendix briefly addresses the methodology in C-UniLog, which
mainly relates to the flexiblization of mathematical formal logic. We present
the corresponding methodology, following [123] and chapter 11 in [125]. Es-
sentially, C-UniLog can be taken as a generalization of the family of fuzzy
logics, aimed at substantiating positive answers to various problems for un-
certain situations in reality. To support the answers in a principled way, an
idea of dialectical mathematical logic by the endorsement of cross-cultural
logic investigations is presented. Moreover, if the motivations for the C-
UniLog proposal are reasonable, then its development is expected to lead
to the new Four Theories: model theory, proof theory, set theory, and
recursion theory becomes necessary as He et al. have suggested.
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A.1 Methodology
He et al. stated that three laws and one character (TLOC) have restricted
the scope of applying mathematical logic to a “close hologram two-valued
reasoning process in a determined world.” ([123], p. 85)
• The law of bivalence: given a proposition p, p is either true or false.
• The law of contradiction: given a proposition p, p and its negation ¬p
cannot both be true.
• The law of excluded middle: given a proposition p, either p is true or
its negation ¬p is required to be true.
• The character of closeness evidences (CE): all evidence requires in rea-
soning is known and static.
Further, they considered whether classical mathematical logic itself or the
three laws and CE are a kind of “approximate description” of the real world.
Thus, they termed all logics following these three laws and CE, or any logic
following classical mathematical logic as rigid logics. On the contrary, they
claimed that there should be some specific logics (rules) for capturing un-
certain or contradictory situations. We are living in an intellectualized in-
formation era. They, thus stated that logic should consider many pragmatic
problems. Consequently, they proposed the flexibilization of mathematical
formal logic by flexibilizing the basic elements, which refer to the Four The-
ories in mathematical logic.
A.2 Flexible Truth Value
The truth value of a flexible proposition in flexible logic ranges as a contin-
uous value in [0, 1].
Definition 34. A general form of flexible truth value is an arbitrary multiple
dimensional ultra ordered space, denoted as follows:
W = {⊥} ∪ [0, 1]n〈α〉, n > 0
* [0, 1] is the base space of the domain of W , it could be degenerated to
any discrete valued space even if to be {0, 1}.
A.3. FLEXIBLE PROPOSITION CONNECTIVES OPERATION 169
* n is the space dimension of W where n = 1, 2, 3, ... generally but does
not exclude n > 0.
* ⊥ denotes “something has no definition” or “something is beyond the
scope of discussion”.
* α is finite symbol string which might be an empty string ε. It denotes
the additional characteristics of proposition or predicate.
A.3 Flexible Proposition Connectives Oper-
ation
Flexible proposition connectives include (universal) conjunction, disjunction,
negation, implication, equivalence, which are also found in classical proposi-
tional logic. Further, flexible proposition connectives include universal aver-
age and universal combination, which are used to describe the uncertainties
of the relation between flexible propositions by introducing the notions of
generalized correlativity, measure error, and favoritism.
Flexible proposition connectives include (universal) conjunction, disjunc-
tion, negation, implication, equivalence. In addition, it also includes universal
average and universal combination, which are used to describe the uncertain-
ties of the relation between flexible propositions with the help of introducing
the notions of generalized correlativity, measure error and favoritism.
(a) Generalized Correlative Coefficient, denoted as h, h ∈ [0, 1] rep-
resents generalized correlativity between two propositions. When
h = 1, it represents that two propositions are attracted ; when h = 0.75,
it represents that two propositions are independently relative; when
h = 0.5, it represents that two propositions are repulsive; when h = 0,
it represents that two propositions are antagonistic.
(b) Error Coefficient, denoted as k, k ∈ [0, 1] representsmeasure error
of the truth value of a proposition. When k = 1, it represents that there
is a maximal positive error ; when k = 0.5, it represents that there is
no error ; when k = 0, it represents that there is a maximal negative
error.
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(c) Favoritism Efficient (Property of Inequality), denoted as p, p ∈ [0, 1]
represents favoritism. When p = 1, it represents that there is the
maximal left favoritism; when p = 0.5, it represents that there is no
favoritism; when p = 0, it represents there is the maximal right fa-
voritism.
C-UniLog requires the existence of a “logic creator” to create concrete logics
to satisfy concrete requirements. First, it constructs standard propositional
universal logical systems to achieve this. In this system, there are four
generation mechanisms for generating universal propositional connectives :
(1) Generation Bases, (2) Generators, (3) Extended-Ordered, and
(4) Batse Space Transformation.
In (1), each propositional universal connective has a generation base, i.e.,
the operation model of each propositional connective. It means there is no
error on the truth value of propositions and whose generalized correlativity
between propositions is the maximal repulsive. The components of (1) are as
follows: (i) seven generation base models for propositional universal connec-
tives, (universal)-NEGATION, CONJUNCTION, DISJUNCTION, IMPLI-
CATION, EQUIVALENCE, AVERAGE, COMBINATION; (ii) of the many
different expressions with the same model, there are two commonly used
ones, NOT-AND expression of base models and NOT-OR expression of base
models (See, [125], pp. 257–258).
In (2), it defines the different levels of notions on the generator integrity
clusters that are used to deal with the practical problems in the real world,
i.e., the world wherein error is never equal to 0 and generalized correlativity
is equal to non-neutral. (See [125], pp. 259–260.)
The third generation mechanism, (3), requires that propositional connec-
tives operation models be studied based on a standard base space [0, 1]. This
is done so as to prescribe how to construct these propositional universal con-
nectives operation models on partially-ordered space [0, 1]n, n = 2, 3, ... and
hyper-ordered space {⊥} ∪ [0, 1]n < α >, n = 1, 2, 3... (See, [125], pp. 260–
261).
In (4), He discusses the transformation methods for various propositional
connectives operation models. The purpose is to pursue a practical appli-
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cation form, derived from the base space, which is from the standard base
space [0, 1] to the optional base space [a, b], a ≤ b, a, b ∈ R (See, [125], pp.
260–261).
Definition 35. The behavior of propositional universal connectives binary
operation models U¬, U∧, U∨, U→, U, U c© are as follow:
1
(U¬) U¬(x, k) = N(x, k) = (1 − x
n)1/n
(U∧) U∧(x, y, h, k) = T (x, y, h, k) = Γ
1[(xnm + ynm − 1)1/nm]
(U∨) U∨(x, y, h, k) = S(x, y, h, k) = (1−Γ
1[((1−xn)m+(1−yn)m−1)1/m)1/n]
(U→) U→ = I(x, y, h, k) = ite{1| x ≤ y; 0| m ≤ 0 and y = 0 and x %= 0;
Γ1[(1 − xnm + ynm)1/nm]}
(U⇔) U⇔ = Q(x, y, h, k) = (1± | x
nm − ynm |), where if h  0.75, then +;
else −.
(U) U = M(x, y, h, k) = (1 − (((1 − x
n)m + (1 − yn)m)/2)1/m)1/n
(U c©) U c© = C
e(x, y, h, k) = ite{Γe[xnm + ynm − enm]} | x + y ≤ 2e; (1 −
(Γe
′
[((1−xn)m + (1− yn)m)− (1− en)m])1/m)1/n | x + y > 2e; e}, where
e′ = N(e, k).
Definition 36. The behavior of propositional universal connectives multi-
variate operation models U∧, U∨, U are as follows:
(U∧) U∧(x, y, h, k) = T (x1, x2, . . . , xl, h, k) = Γ
1[(xnm
1
+ xnm
2
+ · · · + xnml −
(l − 1))1/nm)]
(U∨) U∨(x, y, h, k) = S(x1, x2, . . . , xl, h, k) = (1−Γ
1[((1−xn
1
)m+(1−xn
2
)m+
· · · + (1 − xnl )
m − (l − 1))1/m])n)1/n
(U) U = M(x1, x2, . . . , xl, h, k) = (1 − (((1 − x
n
1
)m + (1 − xn
2
)m + (1 −
xnl )
m)/l)1/m)1/n
1where S = ite{β| α; γ} is a conditional expression which represents “if α is the case,
then S = β; if α is not the case, then S = γ”. Γ1[x] represents the restriction of x to [0, 1],
i.e., Γ1[x] = ite{1| x > 1; 0| x ≤ 0 or x is a imaginary number; x}.
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Note. We should note that only three connectives, U∧, U∨, U, have multi-
variate models. This is still an incomplete definition for the system of propo-
sitional universal connectives.
Note. For the expression of value of each k, n,m in Definitions 35 and 36,
refer to [125], §.11.3.
Remark 37. Definitions 35 and 36 involve considerable mathematical no-
tions, particularly the triangular norm, used in fuzzy logic. Thus, it can
be stated that people who wish to understand C-UniLog in detail need to
have an advanced understanding of fuzzy logic. Readers without the related
background can consult Chapters 2 to 4 in [125], [214] and [120]. Appar-
ently, the context of thinking in C-UniLg originates from a similar context
in fuzzy logic. The presentation of Definitions 34, 35, and 36 is to provide an
approximate idea of the basic concept and its design in C-UniLog. Further
details have not been provided here.
According to C-UniLog, Definitions 34, 35, and 36 will form a proposi-
tional universal logic system which is an exchangeable flexible propositional
logic under the base of h and k. Moreover, an exchangeable flexible propo-
sitional logic becomes an unexchangeable one after favoritism efficient p is
introduced to it. “Exchangeable flexible propositional logic is the corner-
stone of flexible logic as a whole.” ([65], p. 93) This is because the idea
of “propositional (sentential) logic” forms the basis of any given traditional
logic. Moreover, as we can observe, the two basic elements of traditional
logic, truth value and propositional connectives, can be flexibilized, as repre-
sented by these two definitions, in order to include correlated contradiction
and uncertainty in flexible logic. So, in such a condition, it will further have
a propositional universal logic.
A.4 Flexible Quantifiers
The third step in achieving C-UniLog is to establish flexible quantifiers, which
is to describe the uncertainties of the restriction degree. In addition to ∀, ∃ C-
UniLog introduces four new quantifiers, ↑k◦, $
k,
∮
α
, ◦k† ,
∫
α
, which are defined
in the W .
Definition 38. The flexible quantifiers in C-UniLog are defined.
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a. ↑k◦ (Threshold Meta Quantifier):
It is a flexible quantifier, where k ∈ [0, 1] is a threshold of propositional
truth value. ↑k◦ ϕ denotes the truth value of proposition ϕ which has
an error with level k. 2
b. $k (Hypothesis Quantifier):
This quantifier represents the hypothesis propositions. This denotes
that the judgment that “happened later” resulted from the hypoth-
esis propositions, where k ∈ [0, 1] represents the trust degree of the
hypothesis.
c.
∮
x: c
(Scope Quantifier): This quantifier represents the restriction of the
scope of individual variables. This denotes restricting individual vari-
ables of the later predicate to a definite scope. c ∈ [0, 1]∪{+, !} means
the scope of the quantifier can range over some part of the domain,
e.g., c ≥ 0.5 means that it ranges over a major part of the domain, and
c < 0.5 suggests that it ranges over a minor part of the domain, (even
if it could range over the entire domain (when c = 1)). When c > 0,
it denotes existence in the domain, symbolized as
∮
x:+
This can be
understood as the existential quantifier of classical propositional logic.
Similarly, when c = 1, it corresponds to the universal quantifier ∀x;
when c ≥ 0.5 , it corresponds to the certainty quantifier x, and when
c < 0.5, it corresponds to the possibility quantifier ♦x.
d. ◦x∗d† (Position Quantifier): This quantifier represents the relative po-
sition of the individual variables and special points. The quantifier
divides the domains into three segments, according to a specified point
d ∈ D as x < d, x = d, x > d, where ∗ ∈ {<,=, >}.
e.
∫
x: c
(Transition Quantifier): This quantifier represents the change in
the transition characters for the truth-value distribution of predicates.
This means changing the distribution transition characters on the x-
axis for the following truth-value of the predicates, where c ∈ R+.
When c > 1, the edge of the fuzzy set is actued ; when c < 1, the edge
2This is the only quantifier concerned with the standard propositional calculus of uni-
versal logic. ([125], p. 133) This concept is quite different from all the known traditional
logics. Logics with any quantifier will not belong to the propositional level (0-level) but
will belong to the predicate level, which is used to range over the domain discussed.
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of the fuzzy set is passivated ; and when c = 1, the edge of fuzzy set is
invariable.
A.5 The Flexible Reasoning Models Estab-
lishment and the Generation of Logics
The next stage of C-UniLog focuses on the establishment of flexible reasoning
models, which are used for the descriptions of the uncertainties in the pro-
cesses of reasoning There is a need to develop this next stage for the following
reasons: ([123], p. 95)
1. reasoning models in classical mathematical logic are deductive and
monotonic.
2. there are deductive reasoning models for the three elements, flexible
truth value, flexible propositional connectives, and flexible quantifiers.
3. there are various reasoning models, including inductive reasoning, ana-
logical reasoning, hypothesis reasoning, discovery reasoning, evolution-
ary reasoning, etc., defined on the basis of the above three elements in
flexible logic.
As a result, these reasoning models are not absolutely separated but trans-
formed into each other under some conditions. This model flexibility will
play a key role in describing uncertainty and contradiction. The final stage of
g of universal logic is through coordination transformation to generate logics
in other truth value ranges. (Ibid, § 5.5.)
